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Summary 
 
The Companies Act 71 of 2008 introduces a completely new system for the regulation of 
distributions by a company to its shareholders. The preferred method for protecting the 
interests of creditors in distributions is now based on a solvency and liquidity test. 
Regrettably, the provisions setting out the requirements for distributions on the one hand and 
the solvency and liquidity test on the other have been poorly drafted. This thesis first explains 
and then applies an innovative interpretation theory to these provisions with a view to piecing 
together coherent content. The thesis finds that creative interpretations will not suffice in 
various places, meaning that substantive revision is required. The thesis concludes with brief 
amendment proposals and accompanying commentary. 
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Opsomming 
 
Die Maatskappywet 71 van 2008 bied ‘n radikaal nuwe sisteem vir die regulering van 
uitkerings van 'n maatskappy aan sy aandeelhouers. Die voorkeur metode om die belange van 
skuldeisers in uitkerings te beskerm, is nou op ‘n solvensie- en likwiditeittoets gebaseer. 
Ongelukkig is die wetlike bepalings wat die vereistes vir uitkerings aan die een kant uiteensit, 
en die solvensie en likwiditeit toets aan die ander kant, swak opgestel. Hierdie tesis 
verduidelik eerstens die bepalings, en pas dan 'n innoverende interpretasie teorie op hierdie 
bepalings toe, met die doel om 'n samehangende inhoud daar te stel. Die tesis bevind dat 
kreatiewe interpretasies  op verskeie plekke nie voldoende sal wees nie. Dit beteken dat 
substantiewe hersiening noodsaaklik is. Ten slotte bied die tesis kortliks wysigings-voorstelle 
met meegaande kommentaar. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Introductory: Aim and Outline 
 
This thesis considers the regulation of distributions to shareholders, particularly from the 
perspective of creditor protection. An undisputed premise – the main reason behind the 
genesis of the thesis – is that many of the distribution provisions (not to mention, very much 
of the rest) of the recently adopted Companies Act 71 of 2008 (‘the 2008 Act’) are 
conceptually anomalous and occasionally even incoherent.
1
 Besides substandard drafting, it is 
also clear that the 2008 Act strikingly lacks a systematic and clear conceptual structure, as 
well as a unified and coherent policy perspective. Not only is a focused philosophical vision 
not readily discernible upon a reading of the Act, but further, “…neither the policy document 
nor the explanatory memorandum articulate in any detail the considerations that informed the 
proposals regarding…distributions”.2 This makes for a highly undesirable state of affairs: on 
the one hand foggy provisions abound, on the other interpretative guidance is missing.  
 
The task of the scholar evidently increases in importance: legal uncertainty looms large, and 
those who are forced to apply these provisions will desperately require assistance. It is 
essential to attempt to piece together the muddled or incongruent provisions in a workable 
form. But the larger, more fundamental object is to begin to discern a deeper foundational 
logic; I aim to sketch the outlines of a practicable and efficient analytic framework or 
conceptual structure, in the sphere of distributions to shareholders (but also more broadly in 
corporate regulation, especially as it informs distributions). 
 
                                                 
1
 In my view, in the literature in general this point has not been adequately stressed. A recent article by PJ 
Sutherland proves a noteworthy exception, see “The state of company law in South Africa” 2012 Stell Law 
Review 157. Many of the ideas put forth in this work were prompted by the critical spirit of the author’s 
arguments. Nevertheless, most prominent corporate law scholars in the country do point out weaknesses and 
suggest improvements See, for instance, Jooste “The maintenance of capital and the Companies Bill 2007” 
(2007) 124 SALJ 715; Jooste “Issues relating to the regulation of ‘distributions’ by the 2008 Companies Act” 
(2009) 126 SALJ 627; Van der Linde “The regulation of distributions to shareholders in the Companies Act 
2008” (2009) 3 TSAR 484; Van der Linde “The solvency and liquidity approach in the Companies Act 2008” 
(2009) 2 TSAR 224; Van der Linde “The regulation of share capital and shareholder contributions in the 
Companies Bill 2008” (2009) 1 TSAR 39. Furthermore, regarding case law, for instance, in DH Brothers 
Industries (Pty) Ltd v Gribnitz NO and Others (3878/2013) [2013] ZAKZPHC 56; 2014 (1) SA 103 (KZP); 
[2014] 1 All SA 173 (KZP) paragraph 18 the court registers a conceptual anomaly concerning the business 
rescue provisions. 
2
 Van der Linde “Distributions to shareholders” (2009) TSAR 492. 
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The above mentioned problem necessitates two further explorations. A philosophical and 
legal investigation into the very nature of interpretation is required. Interpreting (applying) 
the (distribution) provisions of the 2008 Act as is – descriptively, factually – will often be 
inefficient or illogical (at best) and completely unworkable or unfair (at worst).
3
 Naturally, 
normative interpretative inventiveness or creativity seems necessary: but what legal 
(authoritative) bases exist by virtue of which such liberties may be taken? I intend to utilise 
normative interpretation with a view both to making the law cohere as well as to streamlining 
it. Without question, I will have to justify this approach.
4
 The other consequence is that (not 
only a critical but also) a comparative perspective is required. Not only is it invariably 
instructive to glance at the manner in which other systems deal with similar problems (the 
agency problems and efficiency considerations at play do not differ much across different 
jurisdictions)
5
 but more urgently: it is also often the case that South African law has 
borrowed from another system in the first place, in which case the suitability, efficiency and 
overall coherence (also within the larger scheme of corporate regulation) of the borrowed 
provision(s) requires investigation or justification.  
 
The thesis has two broad aims, one being interpretative, the other regulative (legislative). 
First, I hope to elucidate a coherent, efficient and practicable interpretation of the current 
(often lacklustre) distribution provisions. Second, where the latter will prove inadequate, 
substantive regulative proposals for reform will be suggested.
6
 
 
It will be necessary to gauge exactly what the legislature actually enacted and to juxtapose 
this with its purported objects. The results can in turn be measured against a broad analytical 
framework representing modern trends and economically realistic perspectives in corporate 
law. In this way an efficient and logical conceptual foundation emerges on the basis of which 
deficient or lacklustre provisions can be reformed or streamlined. 
 
The research aim will thus broadly be to consider the distribution provisions of the 2008 Act 
against the background of both the legislature’s own perceived policy objectives and a sound 
                                                 
3
 Such instances will emerge below in an analysis of the relevant provisions. 
4
 A separate chapter is thus devoted to a jurisprudential analysis of interpretation (see chapter 2). In order to 
place my proposed analytical framework (and subsequent analysis of relevant provisions) on a firm logical 
basis, this chapter is entirely indispensable.  
5
 H Hansmannn & R Kraakman “What is corporate law?” in R Kraakman, P Davies, H Hasmann, G Hertig, K 
Hopt, H Kanda & E Rock The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A comparative and functional approach (2004) 1 1. 
6
 See chapter 6 below. 
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conceptual structure for distributions. The outlines of the latter can also be discerned from a 
comparative analysis. Moreover, I will need (briefly) to consider the aims of corporate 
regulation and the theoretical nature of the company, since my concern is chiefly with 
conceptual structure or philosophical justification and, ultimately, utilising that structure to 
advance useful reform proposals. 
A pervasive and fundamental inquiry concerns that of creditor protection: whether or not it is 
desirable/necessary and if so, which legal mechanisms are to be employed to this end? 
Accordingly, the solvency and liquidity requirement – the major requirement for a lawful 
distribution under the 2008 Act, aiming to safeguard the interests of creditors – is carefully 
analyzed; untangling the concept of solvency and liquidity perhaps comprises the pervasive 
pulse of the thesis. A short survey of the precursor to the solvency and liquidity approach, 
namely the capital maintenance doctrine is first apposite. This will form part of some 
necessary background remarks. 
 
1.2 Background 
 
1.2.1 The Capital Maintenance Doctrine 
 
It is trite that the affording of limited liability to companies poses unique risks for corporate 
creditors. Consequently, corporate regulation virtually everywhere, inter alia, endeavours to 
shield creditors against the risk of shareholder opportunism, that is, the risk that shareholders 
will simply withdraw company funds to the detriment of corporate creditors.
7
 The traditional 
principle seeing to this is the capital maintenance rule.
8
  
In short, the doctrine entails that the issued share capital of a company must be maintained – 
cannot be returned to shareholders – so as to serve as a guarantee or trust fund acting as 
security for corporate creditors.
9
 Most pertinently, as a result, dividends may not be paid out 
                                                 
7
 The normative question whether creditors should be protected by corporate regulation and (if they should) the 
degree of protection is a matter of scholarly debate; I tersely tackle the matter in the next section. 
8
 It is not within the scope of this thesis to expound this principle in any great detail. On the development of the 
principle, see Brincker Geldelike Bystand 29 – 44. 
9
 Cassim “The reform of company law and the capital maintenance concept” (2005) 122 SALJ 285. 
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of share capital.
10
 Hence, the reward to a shareholder for his investment in the company 
(dividends) could only be paid out of profits.
11
 A company was traditionally, moreover, 
legally unable to repurchase its own shares – consisting, of course, in a return of share 
capital.
12
 Having initially been adopted in South Africa via the common law, these principles 
were later statutorily qualified. Packaged as a financial limitation on distributions, the capital 
maintenance rule outlaws distributions to shareholders save “…out of an excess of the 
company’s assets over the sum of its liabilities plus share capital”.13 
The theoretical justifications for the doctrine are various; they do not seem to have developed 
particularly sequentially or logically. The following have been advanced: the doctrine’s 
imposition is tantamount to the price shareholders are obliged to pay in exchange for the 
benefit of limited liability; that it gives effect to an implied contract between the company 
and the creditors; and that the share capital constitutes a guarantee or trust fund safeguarding 
the interests of creditors.
14
 By reference to McGee,
15
 Van der Linde summarises “a set of 
rational objectives” discernible in the doctrine:16 
 Protecting existing shareholders from the forced depletion of their interest in the company and by 
dilution of that interest by its devaluation 
 Protecting the company as entity from being looted by unscrupulous shareholders or promoters 
 Protecting creditors from unjustified dilution of the value of the company. 
Be that is it may, the principal concern remains that of protecting creditors. And the need for 
this protection springs from affording shareholders limited liability. 
In Europe and in America, the term ‘legal capital’ is frequently used, and its relation to the 
concept ‘capital maintenance’ is not always clear. Van der Linde notes that ‘legal capital’ is 
“potentially wider…because it also encompasses the specific share capital structure on which 
                                                 
10
 This principle, amongst others, was evinced in England by the judiciary near the end of the nineteenth 
century; see Guinness v Land Corporation of Ireland (1883) 22 ChD 349 CA (356); Re Exchange Banking Co, 
Flitcroft’s Case (1882) 21 ChD 591. It was inferred from legislation in force at the time (The Companies Act of 
1862 (25 & 26 Vict c 89)), as well as the ultra vires rule. 
11
 Really, the common-law rule stating that dividends cannot be paid out of share capital was supplemented by a 
rule stipulating dividends may be paid only out of profits. See Gower and Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 275. 
12
 The question of share repurchases or ‘buy-backs’ cannot be dealt with in great detail. Additionally, I will not 
discuss the vexed question of par value shares – shares traditionally could not be issued at a discount below their 
par value – and the issue is no longer especially important with the elimination of the possibility of authorising 
new par value shares. 
13
 Van der Linde Aspects of the regulation of share capital and distributions to shareholders LLD dissertation 
UNISA (2008) 21. 
14
 20 – 21. See also Manning Legal Capital  50 – 53.  
15
 McGee Share Capital 139. 
16
 Van der Linde Aspects 21. 
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a particular contribution and distribution regime is based”.17 That is, the concept ordinarily 
refers to that body of rules regulating shareholder pay-in obligations and distributions (pay-
out obligations), as well as share capital structure.
18
  
The capital maintenance doctrine has fallen out of favour in the last quarter of the twentieth 
century and was abolished in numerous countries. Initially the doctrine was recognized as 
South African law and the idea that the paid-up share capital of a company serves as a trust or 
‘guarantee fund’ protecting creditor interests was confirmed by our highest court at the 
time.
19
 In 1999 a sea change was set in motion and South Africa followed the increasingly 
common trend of moving away from capital maintenance. The break was, unfortunately, not 
a clean one. Van der Linde explains that 
the Companies Amendment Act 37 of 1999 introduced amendments which ‘changed dramatically the 
capital maintenance rule and the perceived protection it afforded [creditors]. Although these 
amendments brought about significant changes in the regulation of distributions to shareholders, the 
provisions underpinning the concepts of authorised and issued capital and the capital maintenance 
principle were not amended. This has given rise to certain anomalies and the amendments have been 
described as ‘unsystematic efforts to eliminate the capital maintenance principle’.20 
Therefore a central concern of the company law reform process consisted in modifying share 
capital provisions. The trouble is – as I have noted earlier – neither the policy document 
(South African Company Law for the 21
st
 century – Guidelines for Corporate Reform),21 nor 
the Explanatory Memorandum to the Companies Bill 2008
22
 (‘the explanatory 
memorandum’) properly spells out the factors underpinning the proposals concerning 
distributions and share capital.
23
 
Anomalous and irregular though it may be, South Africa’s shift away from capital 
maintenance and towards a solvency and liquidity approach has picked up momentum since 
1999. So arguably lacklustre has the capital maintenance doctrine ostensibly been that even in 
                                                 
17
 23. 
18
 22. 
19
 252. See Lewis v Oneanate (Pty) Ltd & Another 1992 (4) SA 811 (A) at 818. 
20
 Van der Linde Aspects 252. 
21
 GN 1183 in GG 26493 of 23 June 2004. 
22
 This appeared at the end of the Companies Bill 2008. 
23
 Van der Linde Aspects 252 – 253.  
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Europe – “the current stronghold of capital maintenance”24 – a reassessment is currently 
underway.
25
 
So why is capital maintenance increasingly discarded? There are several reasons. One is that 
the concept ‘capital’ was interpreted restrictively, so that it was permissible to pay dividends 
on profits made in a given year without consideration for losses in previous years.
26
 
Dividends could, furthermore, be paid out of unrealised gains in certain cases;
27
 additionally, 
it was not required that unrealised losses in respect of fixed assets be considered. Another 
reason is that share capital is not immunised against business risks: restricting the return of 
capital to shareholders does not prevent assets representing capital from being exposed to 
business risks and so possible loss. At any rate, there was often little use in even talking of a 
capital ‘guarantee fund’: no minimum capital requirements were prescribed – companies 
were (are) significantly funded rather by loans – and so there is often little capital (and the 
resultant ‘cushioning effect’) to speak of. In short, the doctrine seemingly fails to succeed in 
its primary task: protecting creditors. 
The issue of the size of share capital – it usually being negligible – is sometimes countered by 
the suggestion of prescribing specific ratios of debt to equity.
28
 The problem, though, still 
hinges on the degree to which additional funds can become available for payment to 
creditors; capital is also often tied up in illiquid assets and hence unavailable for payment to 
creditors.
29
 This is because companies are freely able to buy assets that decline in value, 
meaning companies can instantly start incurring losses, so that, practically speaking, their 
paid-in capital is a meaningless amount.
30
 For this reason, it cannot really be said that 
creditors in fact place much reliance on a company’s share capital in deciding whether to 
grant credit to it or not. Credit risk being their real concern, creditors actually take into 
account factors like “balance-sheet gearing, interest cover…[,] minimal tangible net worth”; 
                                                 
24
 24. 
25
 The feasibility study regarding an alternative to capital maintenance commissioned by the EC embodies a 
helpful summary of the various proposals advanced by influential groups (e.g. SLIM Group; Lutter group; 
Rickford group and the like): KPMG Feasibility Study on Capital Maintenance – Main Report (Contract 
ETD/2006/IM/F2/71) 269 – 310. For further references, see Van der Linde Aspects 24 n 140. 
26
 In re National Bank of Wales Ltd (1899) 2 Ch 629. 
27
 Dimbula Valley (Ceylon) Tea Co Ltd v Laurie [1961] Ch 353. 
28
 Van der Linde Aspects 25. 
29
 See Enrique & Macey “Creditors Versus Capital Formation: The Case Against the European Legal Capital 
Rules” (2001) 86 Cornell Law Review 1187. 
30
 1187. 
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they rather give significant weight, moreover, to “contractual restrictions and personal 
guarantees by directors or major shareholders”.31 
A further (very thorny) difficulty concerns the often impenetrable task of discerning and 
managing the extent of the share capital.
32
 Not only has it been cogently argued that 
compliance with capital maintenance rules is difficult and costly, but their overall impact is to 
reduce equity investment.
33
 
In South Africa, the rules regarding capital maintenance derived in part from the common 
law and in part from legislation. The capital maintenance rules were far from clear because of 
this double source; uniformity, consistency and rational development were hardly traceable in 
the case law. 
1.2.2 Agency problems, Creditor Protection and the Objects of Regulation 
 
Transactions that lead to share capital flows out of a company, or transactions giving a return 
on share capital, hold noteworthy potential for conflict between stakeholders. The resultant 
conflicts are various: they exist between shareholders inter se – between majority 
(controlling) and minority shareholders – and between directors (managers) and shareholders; 
the most important conflict of interest – for the purposes of this thesis – is that between 
creditors and shareholders.
34
 The primary risk consists in the power shareholders have to 
manipulate limited liability to the detriment of corporate creditors.  
In the language of economics, these conflicts within the corporation give rise to ‘agency 
problems’. From this perspective – that is, the law and economics point of view – the object 
or function of corporate regulation ought to be both to lower the costs of business contracting, 
(or to create contracting efficiency) and to minimise value-reducing opportunism by 
stakeholders.
35
 Whincop observes
36
 
                                                 
31
 Van der Linde Aspects 26. 
32
 26. 
33
 Enrique & Macey “Creditors Versus Capital Formation” (2001) 1186 – 1191, 1202, 1168. 
34
 Hansmannn & Kraakman “Agency problems and legal strategies” in R Kraakman, P Davies, H Hansmann, G 
Hertig, K Hopt, H Kanda & E Rock The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A comparative and functional approach 
(2004) 22. 
35
 Hansmannn & Kraakman “What is corporate law?” in The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A comparative and 
functional approach 2. 
36
 Whincop An economic and jurisprudential genealogy of corporate law (2001) 172. 
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An appropriate objective for the law is to allocate the costs of fraudulent transactions in a way that 
minimises the contractor’s and the corporation’s (shareholders’) joint costs of unauthorised 
transactions. […] In effect, one would prefer to allocate the risk to the party with the lowest costs of 
avoiding the unauthorised transactions[.]… 
Of course the mentioned agency problems are peculiarly impacted by a given constellation of 
corporate activity. It is essential constantly to be mindful of the idiosyncratic assemblages 
constituting the various corporate law regimes in the world: irreducibly unique political 
dispensations and trends, corporate incentives and structures, social permutations, 
divergences in wealth distribution (and the like) invariably shape (corporate) laws. In this 
regard the concept of path dependence carries some explanatory power.
37
 Path dependence is 
concerned with unearthing the reasons behind divergences in business structures and 
practices which subsist between different countries in the face of otherwise similar corporate 
architectures. Differences in corporate ownership and governance – despite an ostensible 
global convergence in economies and business practices – remain and must be taken 
seriously. The idea of path dependence is just one way of tracing and predicting the shape 
future changes will take. 
More fundamentally, influential corporate law scholars – especially of the law and economics 
breed – think it the purpose of corporate law to advance the aggregate social welfare (this in 
addition to self-evidently defining the various business enterprises and attempting to contain 
the agency problems between its stakeholders). So, by implication, the aggregate welfare of 
both principals and agents should be boosted. Hansmann and Kraakman shrewdly doubt 
whether the maximisation of shareholder value in general succeeds in advancing social 
welfare; fortunately, also, they admit that legal institutions sometimes privilege a particular 
corporate participant or group on the basis of politics or some other contingent consideration 
or trend – that is to say, it is conceded (though in my view understated) that legal regulation 
is not as a matter of course efficiency-oriented or economical.
38
  Like many other advocates 
of a broadly economic flavour, they overestimate the level of rationality most institutions and 
actors approximate to. They assert that creditors – including employees and consumers – will 
only contract with a corporation in the event that they themselves anticipate being better off 
                                                 
37
 Bebchuk and Roe "A theory of path dependence in corporate ownership and governance." Stanford Law 
Review (1999), 127. 
38
 18 – 19. Perhaps the most famous statement on the utility- or necessity of profit maximisation is Milton 
Friedman’s: “There is one and only one responsibility of business – to use its resources and engage in activities 
designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open 
and free competition without deception or fraud.” Milton Friedman, The social responsibility of business is to 
increase its profits, THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, (September 13, 1970). 
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as a result.
39
 Often, however, it will not be reasonably possible to predict this ex ante but, 
moreover, inequality of bargaining power will often rob smaller creditors of assumed 
contractual agency. Merely viewing the law as a mechanism commissioned to reduce overall 
transaction costs, often diverts attention from the formative influence of politics, and the 
inequality inherent in many contractual bargains. 
In America, the point of departure often seems to be: why should the law protect creditors at 
any rate? Why can they not look after themselves?
40
 Corporations are conceptualised as 
privatised, market-like institutions marked by individual autonomy, and free contractual 
regulation; they are anything but hierarchical, self-generating (coercive) power centres 
subject to public governance. To varying degrees, these assumptions can be conceptually 
traced back to a ‘corporation as nexus of contracts’ outlook.  
Interestingly, Hansmann and Kraakman argue that the only essential function of corporate 
law is that it makes possible ‘affirmative asset partitioning’ – that is to say, all other 
fundamental elements of a company can be established and maintained through contractual 
means or private ordering.
41
 Now, simply put, affirmative asset partitioning basically entails 
that the creditors of the shareholders cannot enforce their claims against the company – the 
reverse of limited liability. This is the only basic attribute of a company that, in their words, 
“…could not feasibly be established by contractual means alone”.42  
Essentially, then, all the other characteristic elements of the corporation, on their reasoning, 
can realistically (“feasibly”) be contractually designed. Their contention is unconvincing.  
The core aspects defining corporate structure – perpetual succession, directorial fiduciary 
duties, the separate liability of the company, centralised management, transferable shares, and 
the like – are not trivially or accidentally laid down by statute. Decidedly mandatory and 
involuntary tools are invoked for a reason: shareholders rarely agree individually to corporate 
decisions, and individual contractants can scarcely agree to render a third party liable for their 
actions. Conceptually, therefore, numerous corporate schemes are at odds with foundational 
                                                 
39
 Hansmannn & Kraakman “What is corporate law?” in The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A comparative and 
functional approach 18. 
40
 To be fair, in reality a view (along these lines) espoused by an advocate of this approach will naturally be 
nuanced. It will often be the case that statutory creditor protection will benefit both creditors and shareholders, 
i.e. where the costs of raising debt capital through the corporate structure are diminished. A thoughtful proposal 
will recognise that the aim cannot simply be to do away with opportunism; rather the object must be to attempt 
to actualise a proportionality (of sorts) between the costs of opportunism and the costs of minimising 
opportunism; see Hertig & Kanda “Creditor Protection” in The anatomy of corporate law 71. 
41
 Hansmann  & Kraakman  “The Essential Role of Organizational Law” (2000) Yale Law Journal 110 390. 
42
 393. 
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contractual norms; practically, the contractual administration and enforcement of such 
schemes does not seem feasible. In all likelihood, even on efficiency grounds, a pure nexus of 
contracts (however engineered) – in the stead of the corporate form – is not workable.43  
Perhaps the conceptual basis of a roughly US-style view advocating no or little statutory 
protection to creditors is not tenable. So, not only are weaker or smaller creditors vulnerable 
to exploitation in the contractual process under such a model – in addition to the foregoing 
concerns I have noted – but there is also the problem of involuntary creditors. Such creditors 
cannot conclude contracts with the company to safeguard their interests – e.g. delictual 
creditors; their debts were not voluntarily (contractually) incurred.
44
 The justification of 
corporate regulation – especially aiming to protect creditor interests – arguably follows 
naturally from the very fact that the law created the corporation to begin with. This roughly 
appears to represent the English approach: limited liability is conferred on a company by the 
state; it thus stands to reason that the state should regulate corporate structure and activity in 
the interests of creditors and the investing public. The European Union mirrors this approach. 
The point of departure or initial premise being that creditors (and shareholders) require 
legislative protection as a necessary foundation of any corporate law system.
45
 This profound 
philosophical divergence – between Europe and America – is quite prominent in regard to the 
issue of creditor protection.
46
 
Aside from the aforesaid well-documented divergence, creditor protection across most 
systems largely corresponds. The principal concern of creditors also remains the same in 
every jurisdiction: that their claims are satisfied when they become due. Creditors are usually 
protected particularly when a company nears insolvency: for instance, directorial liability can 
be imposed for insolvent trading, as well as the imposition of fiduciary duties on directors 
relative to creditors. Such matters will not receive direct attention in this thesis. Rather, my 
concern is with creditor protection as regards limitations on the distribution of corporate 
funds. (Although it is important to bear in mind that this part of the law should also be 
construed in view of other rules aiming to safeguard the interests of creditors.) 
                                                 
43
 I am referring to the notion of contract as it is legally understood; particularly nuanced economic notions of 
contract may indeed escape my criticisms. 
44
 Hansmann & Kraakman “Toward unlimited shareholder liability” (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal 1879 on this 
point argue for an exception to limited liability regarding damages to be paid to delictual creditors. For a 
contrary view, see Goddard “Corporate Personality – Limited Recourse and its Limits” in R Grantham & C 
Rickett Corporate Personality in the 20
th
 Century (1998) 11. 
45
 Cassim “The reform of company law” (2005) 122 SALJ 285. 
46
 Enrique & Macey “Creditors Versus Capital Formation” (2001) 1166. 
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Since one of the chief conflicts of interest involves shareholders in relation to creditors, a 
brief remark is now apposite on the nature of their respective rights vis-à-vis the company, as 
well as the legal difference between these two stakeholders. Any corporate law regime has to 
attempt to balance the legitimate interest shareholders have in a return on their investment, 
with the primary interest of corporate creditors: that the board will not drain the company of 
assets through dividends (share repurchases or otherwise) – particularly when the board 
realises the company is in financial trouble – unduly leaving them insufficient assets.47 Now 
the legal difference between creditors and shareholders are well known. Shareholders invest 
in a company by purchasing shares in it. In exchange for contributing to the share capital of 
the company, the shareholder acquires certain rights (constituting the share(s)). It does not 
follow that the shareholder has a legal right to the return of the contributed capital. The 
company – existing independently of its participants in the eyes of the law – owns its assets – 
including the contributed capital – and is itself liable for its debts. Limited liability dictates 
that shareholder assets are shielded against company creditors. Creditors of the company 
have claims which rank higher than the (personal) creditors of the shareholders to the 
company funds. Personal creditors of the shareholders, furthermore, cannot claim the 
shareholder’s interest in the company assets. And (as illustrated earlier) a shareholder cannot 
simply withdraw her stake if she so chooses. 
Van der Linde states that there is a qualitative – not a quantitative – distinction between the 
investments of shareholders and creditors.
48
 She says company law requires a residual 
beneficiary: at least one issued share must have the unlimited potential to receive profits as 
well as assets upon liquidation.
49
 Share capital is often said to be the price for limited 
liability: but, Van der Linde opines, it is also the price for unlimited entitlement.
50
 So the 
potential gains shareholders stand to make – as residual claimants – are not contingent upon 
the size of the share capital ventured but rather on the profitability of the business as a whole, 
and are as such unlimited.
51
 Shareholders “…have an expectation, but not a right, to share in 
                                                 
47
 Hanks “The new legal capital regime in South Africa” (2010) AJ 132. 
48
 Van der Linde Aspects 10. 
49
 10. 
50
 10. 
51
 10. Normatively, this point is perhaps specious; see Greenwood “Dividend Puzzle” (2006-7) 32 Journal of 
Corporation Law 155. 
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the profits of the company during its existence and in any surplus assets upon its 
dissolution”.52 
Furthermore, it is the shareholder who often receives the label of ‘owner’ of the corporation. 
This is because the shareholder has the right to control the company – i.e. participation in 
voting to approve significant transactions and in the election of directors – in addition to the 
right to receive the company’s net earnings or profits.53 Both of these rights, however, are 
normally proportional to the amount of the capital contributions by the shareholders.
54
 
Interestingly, Van der Linde also (perhaps principally) distinguishes creditors and 
shareholders on the basis that the latter has a proprietary right – the shareholder gives 
consideration and gets property in return in the form of shares – whereas the former merely 
has a personal right vis-à-vis the company.
55
 But this is arguably an unfortunate and 
conceptually confusing distinction to draw. The shareholder’s right is only ‘proprietary’ (as 
Van der Linde has it) in a trivial sense: the right consists in the mere ownership of the share. 
But that property relation between shareholder and share – that ownership – is secondary to 
the more pertinent personal relationship: between shareholder and company. That is to say, 
essentially we are not concerned here with a real or property right but rather with the personal 
right of the shareholder against the company. And that right happens to consist in a share (in 
property): but a share is merely a bundle of personal rights. And so never is the supposed 
‘proprietary’ nature of the shareholder’s right of any great import. Both the shareholder and 
the creditor have personal rights against the company – it is just that the precise source for 
each class of claimant will differ.
56
 A personal right – which arises from an obligation – 
asserts a relationship between persons – that is, here, the stakeholder as against the company 
(a juristic person).
57
 A personal right is available, not against persons generally but, against a 
specific person or persons.
58
 Unlike real rights which belong to the law of property, personal 
                                                 
52
 Van der Linde Aspects 9. 
53
 H Hansmannn & R Kraakman “What is corporate law?” in The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A comparative 
and functional approach 13. 
54
 13. 
55
 Van der Linde Aspects 9. 
56
 For instance, share versus credit granting agreement (contract). 
57
 Whereas a real right asserts a relationship between a person and a thing; see Nicholas An introduction to 
Roman law (1962) 100. See also, for example, Flexi Holiday Club v La Lucia Sands Shareblock Ltd 
(2006) 2 All SA 479 (D) paragraph 13 in which the relationship between the shareholder and the company is 
described: “the shareholder enjoys a personal right against the company to share in its profits by receiving 
dividends and perhaps on liquidation to share in its eventual assets if any.” 
58
 Except, of course, in the sense that the shareholder has a trivial property relationship with regard to the 
obligation itself. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
20 
 
rights fall under the law of obligations.
59
 Barry Nicholas’s ingenious statement best captured 
the crucial difference between real and personal rights as “…the difference between owning 
and being owed something”.60 Never, of course, can it be said that either a creditor or a 
shareholder legitimately owns the company assets (on pain of jettisoning the foundational 
principle of separate juristic personality). When the shareholder is branded the ‘owner’ of the 
company, this cannot mean, therefore, that she has a real right to the company: something 
looser in the way of ‘having certain voting rights and being a residual claimant’ is meant. 
This analysis gives credence to the line in general taken by economic theory, in which 
shareholders are treated as a subspecies of creditors – that is, a type of creditor situated in the 
lowest rank in the hierarchy of creditors but who then have a residual interest in its assets. 
Their position as investors is explained with reference to the same considerations that influence the 
conditions upon which credit is extended to the company, namely the duration of the investment, the 
expected return on investment, the risk involved and the degree of control that can be exercised over 
the company.
61
 
In this way, then, it is often useful to conceptualise shareholders as a subspecies of creditors. 
This construction, moreover, prevents a conceptual confusion which views shareholders as 
true owners of the company. The label of creditor – as applied to shareholder – then serves 
the useful purpose of inferring a personal right and makes it clear that a shareholder does not 
have an ownership right. This construction situates the legal relationships of stakeholders (i.e. 
corporate creditors and shareholders) to the company squarely under the law of obligations – 
where, in my view, it belongs. The important caveat, mentioned earlier, must, however, be 
stressed: shareholders “…have an expectation, but not a right, to share in the profits of the 
company during its existence and in any surplus assets upon its dissolution”; shareholders 
occupy the lowest level in the pecking order of creditors.
62
  
 
                                                 
59
 101. 
60
 99. 
61
 Van der Linde Aspects 8. 
62
 This is not to suggest that ordinary creditors are to be equated with shareholders. In the context of decision 
(control) rights, for instance, – concerning the question of the decision-making process in the event that 
unforeseen eventualities come to light – it can be seen that shareholders possess decision rights to the extent that 
the company is solvent, whereas creditors acquire decision rights in default situations (see Hart “Financial 
contracting” (2001) Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business Discussion 
Paper Series. Paper 327, 11. 
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1.2.3. A Short Survey of Distributions
63
 
 
The domain of distributions to shareholders has traditionally been one amenable to corporate 
regulation by statute.
64
 The chief reason for that, as is apparent from the foregoing, resides in 
the need for safeguarding the interests of creditors: public policy requires that an appropriate 
balance be struck between the primary concern of shareholders to receive a return on their 
investment and the principal concern of creditors that company assets not be drained leaving 
insufficient funds for the satisfaction of their claims. Naturally, the legislature has to balance 
the interests of the various stakeholders in the company; over and above the protection of 
creditors, different classes of shareholders amongst themselves also require protection.
65
 A 
distribution – in the sense in which I will use the term – consists in nearly any transaction of a 
company with its own shareholders which has the effect of reducing the shareholders’ equity. 
In the normal case a company makes distributions to shareholders in the form of dividends or 
purchases of its own shares. (My main focus lies with the first form.)  
A ‘distribution’ encompasses returns on share capital and the return of share capital.66 Since 
capital need not any longer be maintained (in the traditional sense), share capital can be 
returned to shareholders, provided the relevant requirements and financial restrictions are 
satisfied. Of course, any anticipated return on the contributed capital is uncertain; even 
preference shareholders may get nothing if a dividend is not declared.
67
 A shareholder only 
has an expectation – not a right – to receive dividends: but – in contrast to her remote 
expectation to share in the surplus assets at liquidation – this expectation is vivid.68 Much has 
already been said – and much more will still be said – about the agency problems manifesting 
between creditors and shareholders. Just a word, then, on the issue of distributions to 
shareholders which frustrate the rights and interests of shareholders. Van der Linde highlights 
                                                 
63
 I only wish here to elucidate the bare bones of the law regarding distributions, i.e. the basic elements, 
structure, and distinctions. The critical analysis of its coherence and efficiency is found in later chapters. 
64
 Eisenberg “The modernization of corporate law: an essay for Bill Cary” (1983) 37 University of Miami Law 
Review 187. 
65
 McGough “Statutory limits on a corporation’s right to make distributions to shareholders: the law of 
distribution in the 1984 Revised Model Business Corporation Act” (1987-1988) 21 Akron L Rev 29. 
66
 Van der Linde Aspects 14. Van der Linde does not explain this statement; but its motivation is obvious 
enough. 
67
 Ferran Company law and Corporate Finance (1999) 53. 
68
 Van der Linde Aspects 14. 
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the most glaring difficulties, noting that such conflicts crop up even in the event that a 
company has only one class of shares where dividends are proportionate:
69
  
Dividends may be withheld to squeeze out minority shareholders or excessive dividends may be paid to 
deprive the company of investment opportunities. Similarly, selective distributions to some 
shareholders of a class are problematic, as they divert corporate assets to controlling shareholders at the 
expense of minority shareholders. They infringe the basic principle that each share in a class represents 
a homogenous claim on the wealth of the company. According to this principle, shareholders in a class 
are entitled to formal as well as substantive equality. 
Perhaps one of the more striking conceptual or structural points regarding the new law on 
distributions is that the 2008 Act does not regulate the various types of distribution 
separately.
70
 That is to say, the law is organised or structured around a solitary concept of 
‘distribution’ – there is a single law of distribution, as it were. So, distributions, in general, 
are regulated under section 46 of the 2008 Act. Hence, the 2008 Act applies the same 
financial limitations to all distributions. It further does not prescribe the effect of distributions 
on the share capital accounts of a company. Basically, section 46 sets out the requirements 
for the making of a distribution. Notably, however, section 48 deals in particular with buy-
backs, or more accurately: a company’s acquiring its own shares, and a subsidiary company 
acquiring shares in its holding company. 
Section 1 of the Act contains a definition of ‘distribution’: this also covers a transfer of the 
consideration for the acquisition by a company of its own shares or shares in any company in 
its ‘group’. Consequently, where a company acquires its own shares or shares in its holding 
company, both sections 46 and 48 must be complied with. The other pertinent section which 
will be scrutinised later is section 77, which deals with directorial liability. 
All distributions governed by the 2008 Act are encompassed in the definition of ‘distribution’ 
enshrined in section 1. A distribution divides into three possible sub-types: 
                                                 
69
 15. Where more than one class of shareholder exists, the creation of preference shares throws up unique 
challenges. The issue of share repurchases looms large here: selective distributions to shareholders of a certain 
class normally take the form of a so-called ‘buy-back’. Share repurchases are not considered at length.  
70
 The position under the Companies Act 61 of 1973 (‘the 1973 Act’) was dealt with under section 90, which 
tackled the issue by reference to a confusing expression ‘payments’. This concept included the distribution of 
profits and capital funds made without a reduction of share capital – hence the use of this term (as opposed to 
‘distribution’); see Blackman, Jooste, Everingham, Larkin, Rademeyer & Yeats Commentary of the Companies 
Act (2003) 5 – 135. The 1973 Act did not prescribe an inclusive definition of ‘distribution’. Further, because 
there was later a superimposition of a solvency and liquidity outlook on a legislative scheme designed along the 
line of a capital maintenance outlook, the regulation of distributions under the 1973 Act was intricately 
confusing and fragmentary (see Van der Linde “The regulation of distributions” (2009) TSAR 484). The 2008 
Act drastically transforms the law on distributions and I will not have occasion to dwell on the approach of the 
1973 Act.  
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 A transfer of money or other property71 
 The incurrence of an obligation72  
 The forgiveness or waiver of an obligation.73 
Each of these constitutes a distribution irrespective of whether it is achieved directly or 
indirectly.
74
 It is the last-mentioned one which is perhaps most controversial and novel. 
Liquidation distributions are explicitly excluded
75
 because surplus assets are only distributed 
to shareholders once corporate debts have been settled, meaning creditor protection is not 
necessary.
76
 
The memorandum must spell out the rights and preferences of each class of shares as regards 
distributions generally. That is, it is not exclusively required in regard to dividends.
77
 
Furthermore, all the shares in a class have to be treated equally.
 
 The memorandum can also 
entitle shareholders to ‘distributions’ calculated in specific ways. 78  Naturally, the 
memorandum may further cater for distribution preferences, as well as liquidation rights 
relative to different classes of shares.
79
 
The first type of distribution constitutes a direct or indirect transfer by a company of money 
or other company property (other than its own shares) to or for the benefit of one or more of 
its shareholders or the shareholders of another company within the same group. This can take 
the following forms (constituting an exhaustive list of distributions that can be made by way 
of a transfer of money or property):
80
 
 Dividends 
 Payments in lieu of capitalisation shares 
 Consideration for the acquisition by a company of its own shares 
 Consideration for the acquisition by any company in a group of shares of another 
company in the group 
                                                 
71
 Section 1 under ‘distribution’ paragraph (a). 
72
 Section 1 under ‘distribution’ paragraph (b). 
73
 Section 1 under ‘distribution’ paragraph (c). 
74
 See the introductory words of the definition in section 1. 
75
 See the concluding words of the definition in section 1. 
76
 Van der Linde “The regulation of distributions” (2009) TSAR 486. 
77
 See sections 36(1)(b)(ii), 37(2)(b), and 37(4). 
78
 Section 37(4)(c). 
79
 Section 37(4)(d).  
80
 R Jooste “Corporate Finance” in FHI Cassim, MF Cassim, R Cassim, R Jooste, J Sheve and J Yeats (eds) 
Contemporary Company Law (2011) 243; Van der Linde “The regulation of distributions” (2009) TSAR 486. 
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 Other transfers by a company in respect of any of the shares of that company or of 
another company within the same group. 
There is no definition of ‘dividend’. Traditionally construed, one can attribute the following 
meaning: ‘a proportionate payment to a class of shareholders out of the profits of a 
corporation’. 81  Because of the move away from capital maintenance, the rationale for 
distinguishing dividends and the residual class of other transfers as regards shares from a 
legal perspective is unclear: a definition which enables distinguishing proportionate and non-
proportionate distributions with a concomitant difference in shareholder approval 
requirements would not make sense, since the 2008 Act focuses on approval of directors and 
not shareholders.
82
 In terms of the Act, it is accordingly immaterial whether a distribution 
falls to be classified under one of the particular mentioned instances. 
The inclusion of payments in lieu of capitalisation shares as a distribution is fairly standard 
and uncontroversial. Since shares in the company are not deemed property which it transfers, 
the issue of capitalisation shares cannot be construed a distribution.
83
 
The transfer of money or property in consideration of the acquisition by a company of its own 
shares is the third instance of a distribution in the form of a transfer. A share repurchase 
requires compliance with both sections 46 (because it is a distribution) and 48 (the section 
setting out the requirements for buy-backs). No definition of ‘acquisition’ is supplied in the 
Act. Of course, strictly, a company is not able to acquire (or buy back) its shares since it 
cannot hold rights against itself.
84
 Van der Linde notes that the concept must be taken to 
encompass any instance where a shareholder surrenders rights in respect of a share to the 
company, whether counter-performance is given or not.
85
  
Transfers as consideration for the acquisition by a company in a group of shares of another 
company in the group are very controversial. It is natural to regard a company acquiring 
shares in its holding company as a distribution. However, the idea of regarding as a 
distribution the acquisition of shares in a subsidiary or co-subsidiary is unwarranted. It seems 
                                                 
81
 Van der Linde “The regulation of distributions” (2009) TSAR 487. 
82
 487. 
83
 487. On this sub-type see section 47 of the 2008 Act. 
84
 That is, a share is merely a bundle of (personal) rights and if the company acquires these rights, it stands to 
reason that it cannot sue itself for performance. In other words, the company is itself both the right- and the duty 
holder of a particular obligation.  
85
 488. This is why I said earlier that a distribution encompasses almost any transaction between the company 
and its shareholders in terms of which shareholder equity is reduced. 
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to conflict with the very nature of a distribution as a gratuitous return on- or of invested 
capital.
86
 The other shareholders of the subsidiary – excepting the holding company – have 
not invested capital in the holding company: and in the event that they receive consideration 
for selling their shares to the holding company, the latter evidently receives value in return.
87
 
A transfer otherwise in respect of shares of the company or another company within the 
group constitutes a catch-all of sorts. This provision is nevertheless subject to section 
164(19), which states that a payment in terms of appraisal rights will not constitute a 
distribution. It is not clear why only this provision is so limited. Nevertheless, the said 
exclusion will result, quite controversially, in shareholders who insist on being paid for their 
shares (because of their dissent with a particular corporate action) possibly receiving payment 
in competition with creditors.
88
 Should a shareholder invoke the appraisal remedy, she need 
not even establish prejudice as a result of the intended corporate action.
89
 So the 2008 Act 
gives such a shareholder creditor status, whereas payment due to a shareholder who 
succeeded in terms of the oppression remedy will be deemed a distribution, which is subject 
to the financial limitations, so that creditor status will not follow for the shareholder in such a 
case.
90
 Both of these procedures aim to prevent shareholders from being locked into a 
company and so the disparate regulation is seemingly unwarranted. One would perhaps 
expect the conversion of shares into debt instruments to be expressly regulated, as the 
previous instances – to be a distribution (and so subject to the prescribed financial 
constraints) given that those creditors’ interests might be affected in the case of a 
conversion.
91
 Van der Linde submits that such a conversion falls under this catch-all or 
residual category.
92
 
The second (sub-type) principal way in which a distribution can be effected is by a company 
incurring a debt or obligation for the benefit of its own shareholder or a shareholder of 
another company in the group. Two issues emerge here. One, what is the status of the 
incurrence of a non-monetary obligation: can abstaining from doing something or rendering a 
service be a distribution, and if so, how is it to be quantified?
93
 Secondly, is it required that 
                                                 
86
 491. 
87
 491. 
88
 489. 
89
 489. 
90
 489. See section 163(2)(g) of the 2008 Act. 
91
 489.  
92
 489. Although it is arguably more logical that it falls under paragraph (b) of the definition of “distribution” in 
section 1 of the 2008 Act (and hence not under paragraph (a)). 
93
 490. 
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the obligation be incurred qua shareholder (or by virtue of the shareholding of the 
shareholder)? No limitation to this effect is found in the statute; this wide scope might be 
unrealistic and unduly restrictive for the shareholders in a company. For instance, what is the 
position in case a shareholder becomes the beneficiary of a right against his company qua 
creditor and not in his capacity as shareholder? Surely this cannot be construed a distribution. 
Though this is unlikely to cause too much confusion, the definition could have been clearer. 
The third main method by which to make a distribution – forgiveness or waiver by a 
company of a debt or other obligation owed to the company by a shareholder or a shareholder 
of a company within the group – suffers from the same capacity problem just discussed. Its 
inclusion might be useful in that it covers the waiver of a claim for outstanding performance 
on unpaid or partially unpaid shares.
94
 Surely this provision cannot include waivers in respect 
of liabilities of other companies in the group, as this would be legally impossible.
95
 
Before providing an elaborate outline of my research hypothesis and questions, a last remark 
under this section is apposite. As I have been underscoring, creditor protection is essential 
where corporate distributions are made. It is important to note that the contrasting nature of 
the respective philosophies of the United States and the United Kingdom is most intensely 
felt when it comes to creditor protection. In short, a high premium attaches to statutory 
creditor protection in England (and the EU), whereas creditors are largely left to fend for 
themselves in America. Elements of each approach are discernible in the 2008 Act: this 
means that, because these two outlooks are uneasy bedfellows, corporate regulation is 
presently fragmentary, lacking a unified conceptual structure. The striking point is this: the 
2008 Act on the whole, but specifically regarding distributions, probably due to the marked 
American influence, represents a controversial trend to afford the board of directors of a 
company significantly more power. Specifically relevant for the purposes of this thesis: it is 
now the board which must authorise a distribution.
96
 The liability of directors in regard to 
distributions is addressed in sections 46(6), 77(e)(vi) – (vii), and 77(4) – (10). It is arguable 
that this demonstrable power afforded the board is commensurate with the extensive scope of 
liability assigned to them by these sections. 
 
                                                 
94
 490. 
95
 That is, it must be borne in mind that each company within the group is a separate legal person:  a personal 
obligationary relationship exists solely between the shareholder and the company with whom she has entered 
into a legal relationship. 
96
 Section 46(1)(a)(ii) of the 2008 Act. 
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1.3 Research Hypothesis 
 
The hypothesis of this thesis is that the distribution provisions in the 2008 Act are in 
significant respects conceptually confusing and cannot be said to represent a unified, 
consistent philosophical vision. The resultant legislation – the 2008 Act – enacted by the 
legislature cannot even – linguistically, reasonably – be judged a fair reflection of its own 
perceived policy agenda.
97
 
 
1.4 Research Questions 
 
The research hypothesis throws up numerous critical questions around which this study will 
be organised. 
  
(i) Did the legislature successfully create statutory provisions representing its 
purported aims? How do these laws and aims square with an economically 
realistic and philosophically sophisticated outlook on corporate regulation and 
distributions? What kind of underlying philosophy is discernible in the 2008 Act 
regarding distributions, and is it normatively justified? 
 
(ii) In case a distribution law’s literal application would be impossible, inefficient, or 
otherwise undesirable, a measure of judicial (interpretative) creativity seems 
apposite (even necessary). How is this legally (authoritatively and linguistically) 
justified? And where should the limits to such acts of interpretative invention be? 
 
(iii) The central requirement for a lawful distribution is solvency and liquidity. The 
contours of these concepts are not yet clear, though their importance is 
unquestioned, as they embody the means by which creditors are statutorily 
                                                 
97
 Unearthing the reason(s) for this state of affairs is not easy and cannot really be considered in this thesis. 
Probably, it has a lot to do with the disparate range of influences in the drafting process: especially the tension 
between English- and US-style rules, as well as the concomitant divergence in underlying philosophy.  
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protected as regards corporate distributions (inter alia). Hence, it must be asked: 
what is the meaning of solvency and liquidity in the 2008 Act, and how should it 
be applied? I will address related questions such as: is this the best or most 
efficient way of protecting creditors? How does it relate to the capital maintenance 
principle? Is there a need both for a solvency and a liquidity element or will one 
suffice? 
 
(iv) In the light of the answers put forward to these questions – and having advanced a 
modest analytical framework for corporate regulation – I inquire into the 
coherence and efficiency of connected provisions. Are the provisions covering the 
authorisation of distributions, and the acknowledgment of solvency and liquidity 
coherent and efficient? To what extent is interpretative diagnosis sufficient to 
render coherent or streamline the confused parts and to what extent is substantive 
legislative reform required? 
 
(v) On the basis of the foregoing conclusions, as well as intermittent comparative 
analysis: what would conceptually coherent, economically refined, and 
philosophically sound distribution provisions look like? (That is to say: what form 
should an appropriate reform proposal take?) 
 
1.5 Methodology and Overview 
 
This study adopts a functional approach: an innovative interpretation theory is introduced and 
explained in order to provide a coherent reading of the law on distributions under the 2008 
Act. I am always looking to make sense of the provisions of the 2008 Act as they stand 
through the lens of the interpretation theory I espouse in Chapter 2. I have not deemed it 
appropriate to undertake lengthy expositions of comparative law: no jurisdictions receive 
detailed and separate treatment, therefore. Piecemeal comparative analyses are only included 
insofar as they contribute to the exegesis of the law on distributions under the 2008 Act. The 
Model Act is probably referred to most, as it was itself an influence of the 2008 Act and it 
represents a good example of an efficient, self-contained system of (corporate) law. But on 
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the whole my functional approach requires a narrowing of the compass, focusing on the Act 
itself and interpreting it through the lens of my interpretation theory.  
 
In chapter 2, I explicate my approach to legal interpretation. I provide numerous conceptual 
tools and distinctions and provide examples of how legal interpretation should be understood 
(and how it should not be understood). This chapter sets up the framework for the 
interpretative and legislative suggestions that follow throughout the rest of the thesis. It is 
found that pragmatic tools to aid interpretation are difficult to come by. It is suggested that 
ambitious interpretative proposals must proceed along principled criteria and cannot remain 
unsubstantiated. It is concluded that interpretative moves that do not follow self-evidently 
from legal content have to be justified. 
 
Chapter 3 is devoted to an analysis of the solvency and liquidity requirement, which forms 
the foundational or base requirement of the law on distributions under the new company law 
system. The chapter shows that the solvency and liquidity test constitutes an appropriate 
limitation on distributions to shareholders. The more specific mechanics of its operation, as 
prescribed by the 2008 Act, however, are found to be unsatisfactory. It is concluded that 
substantive revision will be crucial in this area. I conclude that the purposes of section 7 do 
not play a role in the interpretation of solvency and liquidity. I suggest it is more beneficial to 
give content to the distribution provisions with reference to the dynamics of solvency and 
liquidity.  
 
Chapter 4 attempts to untangle and clarify the opaque relationship between the authorisation 
of a distribution and the acknowledgement of solvency and liquidity. It is clear that this 
relationship has not been coherently conceived. I note the interdependence between the 
requirement of solvency and liquidity on the one hand, and the authorisation of the 
distribution and the acknowledgment of solvency and liquidity on the other.  
 
Chapter 5 deals with the question of liability for unlawful distributions. It is concluded that 
the problems elucidated in the previous chapter have a knock-on effect on the question of 
liability for unlawful distributions. The interdependence and interplay between solvency and 
liquidity, the requirements for distributions, and the liability of directors is established. It is 
suggested that efficiency, good sense, and coherence on rare occasions require normative 
improvements to the text of the 2008 Act. 
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Chapter 6 briefly sets out some recommended provisions. This is the prescriptive chapter in 
which proposals for textual improvements to the relevant provisions of the Act are advanced. 
The provisions are meant to serve as a template for future reforms.  
 
I use single quotation marks where I am not quoting the legislation verbatim. Single 
quotation marks are used for my own quotations (where I introduce my own examples, for 
instance), terms of art and the like. For the most part, I use double quotation marks where I 
am quoting actual legislative provisions, cases, journal articles, and so on.  
 
It should be noted that the issue of share repurchases is not covered in this thesis. 
 
Each chapter, barring the current, penultimate and final chapters, open with an introduction 
and end in a conclusion. Thematic conclusions are thus drawn in the designated chapters. 
Chapter 7, the overall concluding chapter, accordingly reverts back to a more philosophical 
viewpoint. The chief conclusions are, nevertheless, concisely summarised in the final chapter, 
as I provide answers, collectively, to the research questions. 
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Chapter 2 
How to interpret the 2008 Act. Philosophical justifications: interpretative conservatism 
or interpretative activism or neither? 
 
2.1 Introductory  
 
“Analytic philosophy at its best uses logical rigour and semantic sophistication to achieve a sharpness 
of philosophical vision unobtainable by other means. To sacrifice those gains would be to choose 
blurred vision. Fortunately, good vision is not restricted to looking at eyes.”98 
 
In the light of the research hypothesis, an account of the philosophical bases of meaning and 
interpretation is necessitated. But – to begin at the beginning and no doubt to tease out the 
obvious – why should legal interpretation be invoked at all in an analysis of corporate law? 
The law makes itself felt, not only in the course of judicial application, but also in its intrinsic 
normative force: actors invariably endeavour to and (mostly) do tailor their conduct in accord 
with legal prescriptions, on pain of an injurious encounter with the public force. The act of 
interpretation is pervasive, and indeed constitutes the very life-blood of the law: besides 
judicial enforcement, regular subjects (citizens) in one way or another have to engage in the 
activity of legal interpretation. It is in our understanding and application of (corporate) law 
where the import of (corporate) regulation manifests, not its mere (abstract) enactment. 
Naturally my focus falls on legal interpretation as the legally authoritative resolution of 
questions concerning what the content of (company) law is in its concrete application to 
specific cases. 
 
At many junctures decisive interpretative decisions have to be made due to the 
terminologically muddied waters of the 2008 Act. Either the interpreter sticks rigorously to 
the letter of the law; or she engages in interpretative gymnastics, taking semantic liberties, in 
order to streamline (or advance some policy goal, i.e. efficiency, fairness, and the like). Legal 
theorists usually frame this interpretative decision as an embodiment of the choice between 
literal application – that is, strictly discerning the grammatical, ordinary or semantic meaning 
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of a provision – and purposive interpretation, which allows for the actualisation of underlying 
goals or values (and occasional departures from the letter of the law).
99
 
 
The former method can be said to be marked by judicial (or interpretative) conservatism: the 
interpreter is merely gauging and implementing the legislature’s legal pronouncements as it 
enacted them. The exercise is usually characterised as descriptive or factual. This theory is 
routinely justified by reference to the rule of law, the separation of powers, judicial 
deference, and so on. This approach is usually criticised as defunct and unrealistic – as 
laudable values and policy objectives are obscured, and the law-maker’s intent is 
occasionally obfuscated – and has fallen out of favour in recent times. The latter method – the 
purposive theory – can be fairly dubbed the prevailing theory in statutory interpretation 
today. This activity is usually thought of as normative or evaluative. It is deemed to have the 
advantage of more realistically effecting relevant policy objects, as well as more accurately 
capturing statutory intent. Its primary drawback is thought to be its vulnerability to 
interpretative (judicial) opportunism.  
 
My submission is that the above picture is confused: it represents profound linguistic 
confusion, and is philosophically specious. Now, my ultimate aim is to justify interpretative 
decisions I (will later) make in respect of the distribution provisions enshrined in the 2008 
Act. But, to this end, I cannot later propose, for example, the literal interpretation of a given 
provision if this very notion (as is the case with purposivism) is part of a misguided picture of 
the interpretative dilemma sketched above. Hence, I first need to frame the debate in a 
conceptually cogent manner. After that I will have to offer philosophical and authoritative 
support for a particular interpretative method or framework. On the strength of that 
interpretative picture, I can justifiably put forward specific ways in which potentially absurd 
or opaque provisions should be interpreted.  
 
This is also to say: far from lurking in the shadows of purposivism (itself a somewhat fuzzy 
notion), judicial opportunism in fact rather lurks precisely where a unified, philosophically 
sophisticated picture of interpretation is absent. In other words, in the absence of such a 
theory, novel or inventive interpretative proposals invariably smack of arbitrariness – which, 
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as any jurist knows, is anathema in the theory and practice of the law. So, why is the dispute 
between literalists and purposivists mistakenly conceived?  
 
2.2 The Conflation of Meaning and Assertion, and other Conceptual Blunders 
 
The reason for the confusion consists chiefly in running together meaning and assertion.
100
 
Before I flesh this out, it has to be noted that legal interpretation has two sides: an epistemic 
and a constitutive one.
101
 The epistemic aspect involves determining the content of the law as 
it is. The constitutive task consists in making an authoritative decision which itself co-
determines what the content of the law is.
102
 Importantly, on occasion this authoritative 
decision or judgment changes the content of the law that was considered in the epistemic 
task.  
 
So what can be said to be the content of a particular law? This is the critical question. This is 
where the confusion most legal theorists labour under comes in. The problem is that lawyers 
and legal scholars are not sufficiently informed as to how the content of positive law is 
related to its authoritative sources. These authoritative sources are necessarily linguistically 
created. To put the dilemma alternatively: lawyers are routinely not privy to what determines 
the contents of ordinary linguistic texts.  
 
To simplify: textualists or literalists think the content of the law is seated in the semantic or 
natural meaning of the sentences composing the relevant legal materials. Purposivists regard 
the content of the law as the underlying purpose (value, or normative goal) of the sentences 
composing the relevant legal provisions. Because these respective approaches err in their 
conception of what constitutes the content of the law, neither can be accepted as a plausible 
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possible to know, but rather with what is. (‘Ontology’ denotes doctrines about the nature of reality, of what is.) 
The difference between ontology (constitutive matters) and epistemology (epistemic matters) is therefore the 
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 Soames “Toward a Theory of Legal Interpretation” (2011) http://www-
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interpretative theory. Hence, normally a literalist characterises the content of a legal text (i.e. 
the law it enacts) as the (semantic) – the natural or ordinary or dictionary – meaning of the 
text. But – and this is crucial – as the pre-eminent contemporary analytic philosopher Scott 
Soames makes clear:
103
 
 
Contemporary philosophy of language and scientific linguistics distinguish the meaning of a sentence 
from its semantic content relative to a context, both of which are distinguished from (the content of) 
what is said, asserted, or stipulated by an utterance of the sentence. Although in some cases the three 
types of content coincide, while in still others the final two do, there are a variety of cases in which the 
third differs from the other two. In every legal case in which there is such a difference, it is the third – 
asserted or stipulated content that is required by any defensible form of textualism. Failure to recognise 
this – due to confusing the three types of content with one another – has led to serious errors in the law 
itself, as well as to theoretical errors about the relation of the law to its authoritative sources. 
 
And to elaborate, consider the following: 
 
Just as what I say, and commit myself to, by uttering a sentence, is often a function of more than its 
semantic content, so “what the law says,” and is committed to, is often a function of more than the 
semantic contents of relevant legal texts. Just as you have no standing to reinterpret my remark to 
conform to your moral and political views, simply because the meaning of my sentence doesn’t fully 
determine the content of my remark, so judges applying the law have no standing to reinterpret it, 
simply because the linguistic [semantic] meanings of the relevant legal texts don’t fully determine the 
content of the law.
104
 
The broad idea can be illustrated by way of a diagram. 
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‘Assertion’ is what gives the content of the law (just as it makes up the content of our 
utterances in conversation). ‘Semantic meaning’, roughly speaking, comprises the relatively 
stable, abstract, conventionally fixed meanings of words in the public language. ‘Semantic 
meaning relative to a context’ refers to the context-dependence of the latter: context should 
make clear whether, in using, for example, the word ‘fair’, I mean ‘light in colour’ or a sense 
of ‘rightness, justice, impartiality, etc’. (The dictionary tells us all the possible meanings or 
senses of any given word – semantically speaking.) Though indeed context-bound, this type 
of ambiguity occurs at the semantic level; it is a semantic ambiguity. It is entirely 
distinguishable from the broader pragmatic context in which a speech act is performed, or 
indeed, legislation is adopted. ‘Pragmatic background context of utterance’ therefore denotes 
the wider situation in which speakers (legislators) and interpreters find themselves: the 
general institutional (legislative) setting, a corporate or commercial way of understanding 
certain terms, and other relevant factors necessary to comprehend the (statutory) utterance. 
Each of these three elements co-constitutes what is asserted. The relative contribution of each 
element to what is asserted is intrinsically variable, and cannot be determined in advance. 
 
So the correct view is that the content of a law is that which the authoritative lawmaker 
asserts (stipulates or otherwise prescribes by adopting an authoritative text).
105
 So, as in an 
ordinary conversation, where the assertive content is not in general equivalent to the 
meanings of the sentences used, nor with the interlocutors’ purposes in uttering what they 
utter, the assertive content of a legal text cannot in general be identified with the semantic 
(ordinary) meanings of the sentences of the legal text, nor with the policy goals motivating 
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lawmakers.
106
 It follows that literalism is false, but so is purposivism: the content of a legal 
text can also not be identified with any normative improvement of what the relevant 
lawmakers asserted.  
 
Traditional literalism is mistaken for another reason. I said that legal interpretation has two 
aspects: epistemic and constitutive. When interpreting a legal provision, one’s task is first and 
foremost epistemic: one has first to discern the content of the law. Literalists are (in)famous 
for denying or playing down the constitutive role of interpretation. When confronted with 
inconsistency, vagueness or opaqueness in the law, they turn to dictionaries and the dictates 
of conventional usage, in the hopes of discovering hard-to-discern legal content that is 
‘already there’.  
 
Their efforts are better spent justifying the introduction of novel legal content, in the case of a 
vague or unclear legislative provision: it cannot be denied, contra literalism, that the courts 
have a (very) legitimate (if secondary) legislative or law-making role to play – which is of 
course tempered by a principle of judicial deference. So literalism is ill-conceived for at least 
two reasons: one, it cannot correctly gauge legal content because legal content can almost 
never legitimately be said to be the equivalent of the semantic meaning of the sentences 
comprising the relevant legal rule. Existing legal content is neither original intent, nor is it 
original meaning: it is rather the content originally asserted by lawmakers in enacting or 
adopting the legal text in question.
107
 Two, it denies the ancillary – though genuine and 
indispensible – role the judiciary plays in making new law, or changing (epistemically 
identified) legal content. 
 
So errors in the law can result because literalists confuse three different types of content – the 
meaning of a sentence, its semantic content relative to a context, and what is asserted. 
Conflating meaning and assertion is ubiquitous in legal theory and practice. The consequence 
is a confusion of two distinct interpretative precepts: fidelity to the meaning of the 
lawmaker’s legislative language versus fidelity to the content of what the lawmaker asserted 
in using that language.
108
 I want to illustrate the foregoing with two examples: this will show 
how (often) momentous matters can turn on seemingly pedantic linguistic squabbles; getting 
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the facts about language right matters.  Scott Soames is fond of using the following real-life 
case of Smith v United States which was decided by the US Supreme Court not too long 
ago.
109
 I will detail the main points briefly and thereby also touch on the issue of the role of 
legislative intent in legal interpretation (about which more will be said later on). The issue 
was whether Smith’s attempt to trade a firearm for drugs constituted a use of a firearm – if 
so, the law dictates that he incur additional penalties.  No definition of ‘use of a firearm’ 
could be found in the legislation applicable to the matter. Hence, the court appealed to the 
semantic or ordinary (or natural) meaning of that phrase.  The court’s conclusion is that it is 
plain that attempting to trade a firearm for drugs constitutes using the firearm within the 
everyday or ordinary meaning of that term. Can one legitimately say: person X ‘used’ his 
firearm by offering it in exchange for drugs? Of course: that phrase can be ordinarily used 
thus, and since ordinary use is the assumed test for the content of the law, Smith did 
relevantly use his gun, and so must incur additional penalties.  
 
But is the court’s assumption that the content of the relevant statute is supplied by the 
ordinary, semantic meaning of the words used legitimate? There was an interesting dissent by 
Justice Scalia: he says the ordinary meaning of ‘use’ cannot be said to include using a firearm 
in an attempt to trade it for drugs.
110
 Rather, to speak of ‘using a firearm’ is to talk about 
using it for its distinctive purpose, that is, as a weapon. So, his argument is: indeed one can 
‘use’ a firearm as an article of exchange, but that is not the ordinary meaning of ‘using’. To 
support this, he provides an example. He says the objective falsity requirement for a perjury 
conviction would not be met where a witness answers negatively to a prosecutor’s question 
whether she had ever ‘used a firearm’, even though she once sold her grandfather’s rifle to a 
rifle-collector.  
 
Soames opines that the salient feature of this case concerns how “a shared conflation of the 
meaning of the statutory language with the content of the resulting statute leads to an 
incoherent debate in which the dissent and the majority talk past each other”.111 Indeed, the 
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court was right to hold that ‘uses a firearm’ occurs in the text with its ordinary meaning; it is 
also correct to say that uses other than as a weapon (i.e. as an article of commerce) is 
included in its ordinary meaning. But the key is this: the court is wrong to think that this 
offers up the content of the relevant statute, “…the law that the statutory language was used 
to enact”, that this shows that the law includes uses of firearms other than as weapons.112 In 
fact the natural or ordinary meaning is silent regarding the manner of use.
113
 The court should 
not pursue semantic meaning: because semantic meaning was silent about the manner of use, 
the task of the court “…was to infer what Congress asserted from the incomplete semantic 
content” in the legislation.114 What “…Congress should be taken to have asserted” is what the 
court should be after: Congress’ assertion was that “an additional penalty will be added to 
crimes in which a firearm is used as a weapon”.115 So, that the semantic meaning is open-
ended or vague, and seems to include an almost unlimited number of cases, does not dictate 
that the law is so undefined.  
 
For instance, the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia in this dispute took the following 
line: even if the legislature understood itself as prohibiting only a narrow range of uses of a 
firearm (i.e. uses as a weapon) – even if that is the legislature’s assertion – this is not the end 
result or what it achieved because the semantics it used did not expressly exclude a broader 
range of cases.
116
 This line of reasoning is patently absurd. Putting aside for the moment the 
fact that previously unanticipated cases inevitably always arise, a piece of legislation cannot 
ever exhaustively cater for every eventuality; this is owing to the nature of language, namely 
that it is invariably and irreversibly vague and open-ended. It is wholly untenable to lay the 
basic fact of vagueness at the doorstep of the legislature. This point is trite in the philosophy 
of language and in scientific linguistics. For some reason, many jurists have failed properly to 
digest it. They have failed to process the following datum: semantic meaning routinely 
(radically) underdetermines the entire linguistically based content of an utterance or of the 
law (i.e. assertive content). Interpreters (judges) should always try to gauge what the 
legislature asserts or stipulates, not what the words used in the assertion mean. 
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It would not be hard to cite such instances occurring in South Africa (or, for that matter, 
anywhere else). Just as in America where the top court in the country fatally confused 
meaning and assertion, our own Constitutional Court was recently responsible for that very 
same blunder, in  Justice Alliance of South Africa v President of the Republic of South Africa 
and Others (‘the Justice Alliance case’).117 There the court (quite disconcertingly) opined that 
it is “obliged to determine objectively the meaning of the constitutional provision [in 
question] irrespective of the meaning as perceived by Parliament.”118 
 
This case concerned whether Parliament had prescribed a constitutionally acceptable 
procedure for the extension of Ngcobo CJ’s term as Chief Justice. The legislation which in 
section 8(a) afforded the president the power to extend Ngcobo CJ’s term was apparently 
adopted at the same time as the relevant constitutional amendment which provided for 
parliamentary extension of such terms. Appealing to the semantic meaning of the 
constitutional text as the definitive criterion for the identification of a constitutional rule (i.e. 
to simplify, the semantic meaning of the rule stipulating ‘only an act of Parliament can 
extend the term of office of a Constitutional Court judge [beyond the legally stipulated 
period]’), the court shuns the argument that, owing to the contemporaneous enactment of 
both laws, Parliament was ‘open-eyed’ in adopting both laws and did not understand itself to 
be adopting a statutory provision in conflict with the constitutional amendment.
119
 The 
interpretative approach the court employs is strikingly spurious: the court thinks it can 
override the legal assertion Parliament effected, by reference to the stringent semantic 
meaning of the words Parliament employed. 
 
Disconcertingly, the court implicitly says the way in which Parliament understood the law 
(i.e. the legal assertion Parliament enacted) is not binding on the Constitutional Court (i.e. the 
way in which the Constitutional Court has to interpret the law). The doubtful validity of this 
stance should be patently obvious. Such an approach would, given the open-endedness of 
language (a fortiori the language of constitutions), warrant judicial opportunism. Over and 
                                                 
117
 Freedom Under Law v President of Republic of South Africa and Others, Centre for Applied Legal Studies 
and Another v President of Republic of South Africa and Others [2011] ZACC 23;CCT 53/11, CCT 54/11, CCT 
62/11 (29 July 2011). 
118
 Para 60. 
119
 Though I cannot here properly elaborate why, I think the decision the court ultimately reached (relying on 
this questionable semantic meaning approach) was the correct one. My view calls into question the correctness 
of the premise that Parliament in fact understood itself to be adopting a statutory provision harmonious with the 
constitutional amendment. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
40 
 
above obvious theoretical problems, what legitimate (authoritative) grounds exist upon which 
the Constitutional Court can insist, where Parliament’s intended content is discernible, that its 
interpretation should prevail over that of Parliament? Besides preposterously laying the basic 
fact of linguistic vagueness at the doorstep of the legislature, the Constitutional Court, then, 
also unwittingly opens a Pandora’s Box of issues involving the hierarchy and authoritative 
bases of the respective branches of the state.
120
 
 
As I noted earlier, this conceptual confusion is entangled with the question of the relevance of 
legislative intent. I also said that the entire dispute between literalists and purposivists is 
misconceived. Neither theory accurately represents the way language works. The dispute, and 
the respective contribution of each approach, is essentially irrelevant. This is so because they 
both commit the fallacy of conflating meaning and assertion. I also say this debate is 
misconceived because these outlooks or theories indefensibly overlap. For instance, the 
Constitutional Court is generally thought to be an advocate of purposivism (or some kind of 
value-activating variant thereof); however, this cannot be squared with the categorically 
literalist (textualist) dictum of the Justice Alliance case which I cited earlier. Yet another 
reason for the speciousness of the traditional alternatives (literalism and purposivism) – and 
this finally brings me to the issue of intent – is their ill-advised dismissal of the role of 
legislative intent in legal interpretation.   
 
Legal theorists have, in recent times, taken to professing the irrelevance of legislative intent. 
The fact that the agent of a ‘legislative speech act’ is usually not a single language user but a 
group must be a big part of the reason for this. It is common to think that striking epistemic 
problems render it impossible to discern true intent. Literalists often fear an interpretative 
blank cheque in terms whereof interpreters are able to advance their own policy preferences 
under the pretext of gauging real legislative intent. The idea is that legislative intent is 
basically illusory: the model of the more or less unitary cognitive (intentional) state of an 
individual cannot easily be extrapolated to the context of statutory law-making. Purposivists 
thus normally ignore an investigation into intent and instead pursue the underlying purposes 
or values seated in legal provisions.  
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But linguistic meaning cannot be said to have priority over all the intentions of the 
legislature; as well, appeals to intent are still necessary even where linguistic meaning is 
clear.
121
 Thinking otherwise is again attributable to the fallacy of confusing meaning and 
assertion: it must be borne in mind that what language users intend to assert constitutes an 
integral element – together with the semantic meaning of the words used – in forming what 
they actually do assert. In this way “…the intentions of lawmakers are directly relevant to the 
contents of the laws they enact”.122 In this sense legislative intent can be constitutive. Often 
such constitutive intentions will be easily discerned, and so too the relevant assertive 
contents: in this sense only, intention can be said to be unimportant, since no further appeal is 
required in order to identify the completed assertion (the legal content).  
 
The dismissal of intent – confused though it may be – derives usually from a well-founded 
interpretative principle which is associated with notions like judicial deference, the separation 
of powers, the rule of law, and the like. Courts are tasked with, not creating or changing, but 
interpreting or applying the law enacted by the legislature: constitutive changes in the content 
of the law must be avoided save in special cases. This is correct. The problem in traditional 
legal theory is that the concept of ‘intent’ or ‘legislative intent’ is not sufficiently rigorous. 
One has to bear in mind the fundamental distinction between illocutionary intentions and 
perlocutionary intentions.
123
 Illocutionary intent provides the law’s content: it instantiates an 
assertion by virtue of one’s audience recognising one’s intention to do so. Perlocutionary 
intent consists in causing or effecting something as a result of one’s assertion. This 
distinction is descriptive (factual): the existence of such a distinction cannot be doubted.  
 
I will illustrate the conceptual point with a simple example. Imagine the following 
(ridiculous) situation: a small community has a town council which has the responsibility to 
legislate on matters affecting the community; it has a small tribunal of sorts settling disputes 
as well. Of late an alarming amount of children belonging to the community have been 
harmed by cars speedily reversing from their driveways into the streets of the community 
where the children often play. Measures were subsequently taken to ensure drivers would be 
especially vigilant and cautious with respect to children playing games in the streets of the 
community. After further investigation it was found that a major contributing factor to the 
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increasing amount of incidents of children being harmed in this way was that children of the 
community had become engrossed with playing a particularly addictive game specifically apt 
to be played in the streets. The town council thus (rather rashly) saw fit to legislate to the 
following effect: ‘it shall be a misdemeanour, subject to specified penalties, if a member of 
the community plays a game of any sort in any of the streets of the community’. Policeman 
Paul then encountered Father Frank passing a rugby ball with his son (Simon) partially in a 
community street and partially on Frank’s driveway.  
 
What are the legally relevant intentions here? The town council here enacted a law by 
adopting a text with the illocutionary intent that its linguistic performance be recognised as 
asserting that members of the community who play games in the community streets thereby 
commit a misdemeanour. This illocutionary intent supplies the content of the relevant law; it 
is constitutive of the resultant (legal) assertion. A correct understanding of the relevant legal 
assertion entails the proper comprehension or identification of illocutionary intent. For this 
reason, illocutionary intentions cannot be done away with in any theory of legal content or of 
legal interpretation. Recall that the perlocutionary intent is the intent to effect a certain result 
owing to one’s assertion. Here the perlocutionary intent is the intention by the council to 
reduce or eliminate bodily harm to children, primarily arising from motor vehicle collisions. 
That is to say, the perlocutionary intent is the larger reason or purpose (the public policy 
being advanced) behind the legal content (the legal content, that is, which encapsulates 
illocutionary intent). 
 
Legal interpretation starts with the epistemic task – that is, the starting point is the attempt to 
discern legal content (the entire linguistically based assertion); it is not an attempt to discern 
linguistic or semantic meaning (since, as I have said, this normally underdetermines what is 
said or asserted). So it is the job of the courts (and normal interpreters) to identify, not invent 
or modify or normatively ‘improve’, in the first instance, what the lawmaker has asserted by 
adopting the relevant legal text. If this epistemological task can easily be achieved – so that 
assertive content is accurately gauged – legal interpreters may ignore the lawmakers’ 
perlocutionary intentions save in certain special cases.  
 
Naturally this sounds easy and is somewhat oversimplified. But it actually is theoretically 
sound. In other words, the epistemological aspect of interpretation should not be 
overemphasised or regarded as having a monopoly over legal interpretation; that is to say, the 
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existence of special cases should not be played down. An analysis of these exceptional cases 
is a complex and fundamentally important matter which I cannot adequately (fully) tackle in 
this thesis. One such case – which I will presently discuss – is vagueness. Thus, if the 
asserted content is vague – one cannot therefore epistemically gauge legal content – and the 
facts essential to the resolution of the case in question fall within the scope of said vagueness, 
then the task of interpretation becomes constitutive. This means that the act of interpretation 
has to constitute or make the law (within principled limits): an authoritative decision by the 
court will itself co-determine the content of the (epistemically uncertain) law. In other words, 
where such vagueness is encountered – or where another such special case presents itself – 
interpreters or the courts will have to appeal to perlocutionary intentions. HLA Hart makes 
the following observations regarding the character of vagueness:
124
 
 
In all fields of experience, not only that of rules, there is a limit, inherent in the nature of language [my 
emphasis], to the guidance which general language can provide. … Whichever device, precedent or 
legislation, is chosen for the communication of standards of behaviour, these, however smoothly they 
work over the mass of ordinary cases, will, at some point where their application is in question, prove 
indeterminate; they will have what has been termed an open texture [emphasis in the original]. 
 
Therefore, if the assertion provided by the content of the law is vague and the facts essential 
to the resolution of the matter at hand falls in the range of such vagueness, the law as it is – 
factually – does not dictate the correct result. That is to say, descriptively – speaking to the 
epistemic side of interpretation – the law runs out. Hence it is with respect to the constitutive 
side of interpretation in which normative or evaluative considerations inevitably crop up; put 
simply, the interpreter is then, properly speaking, faced with a choice, in attempting to 
resolve the vague case. 
 
Why should this be so? Again, no one has put it more eloquently than Hart: 
 
[T]he reason is that the necessity for such choice is thrust upon us because we are men, not gods. It is a 
feature of the human predicament (and so of the legislative one) that we labour under two connected 
handicaps whenever we seek to regulate, unambiguously and in advance, some sphere of conduct by 
means of general standards to be used without further official direction on particular occasions. The 
first handicap is our relative ignorance of fact: the second is our relative indeterminacy of aim. 
                                                 
124
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Previously unanticipated facts continually crop up. It is easy to suppose that the legislature 
foresees piecemeal enrichments of legal content by the judiciary. Alternatively put, the 
legislature knows it is not God; we all know this. Incremental exceptions can legitimately 
emerge by judicial sharpening. The legislature should be regarded as being aware that such 
sharpening or enrichment is unforeseeable in advance and is best effected incrementally by 
the courts.  Perhaps surprisingly, the basic fact of vagueness is often useful: passing a law 
creates a strong, but defeasible, assumption that behaviour contrary to it is discouraged; 
couching the law in broad language gives an incentive to refrain from behaviour which might 
fall into that category.
125
 In other words, it may sometimes be a good thing that, owing to the 
vagueness of legal prescriptions, people oversubscribe to those prescriptions: the larger 
reason or purpose may be more frequently actualised.
126
 And, the recognition that legal 
content is (judicially) defeasible diminishes the drawbacks associated with an excessively 
universal description of the stipulated behaviour.  
 
So, not only is the original assertive content, enacted by the adoption of a certain provision, 
much richer and more nuanced than the literal meaning of the sentence(s) used to express it, 
this original assertive content cannot be said to encompass all further exceptions and 
sharpening which is the result of legitimate interpretation and judicial application. The 
legitimacy and necessity of constitutive interpretation is borne out in the case of vagueness. 
Normative judgments regarding which modifications of existing legal content best promote 
the legislative rationale will sometimes be required. Clearly, in my example above, Father 
Frank and (son) Simon passing a rugby ball partially on the community street should not be 
included in the legal provision’s extension; including this instance would probably have an 
effect contrary to advancing the relevant normative goal. The difficult question, naturally, is 
when a slide from epistemic interpretation to constitutive interpretation is warranted. When 
can one move from mere identification of existing assertive content, to effecting positive 
changes in the law’s content? I have already discussed vagueness, which is one such case. 
(To recap: here the full linguistic contents of the controlling legal materials and the relevant 
facts fail to yield any determinate outcome.)
127
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 Soames “Interpreting Legal Texts: What is, and What is Not, Special about the Law” (March 2007) 
http://www-bcf.usc.edu/~soames/sel_pub/Interpreting_Legal_Texts.pdf (accessed 07-08-2011) 14. 
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Another is when an outcome is determined by the relevant legal materials but is legally 
incorrect.
128
 So a single result is dictated by the full linguistic contents of the authoritative 
legal materials but it is legally wrong. More precisely: the existing law and the facts of the 
case entail an unforeseen verdict which does not advance the purposes for which the law was 
adopted, whilst also violating either its rationale or the rationales of other laws.
129
  
 
Frank and Simon’s case probably qualifies as such an instance. It cannot be legally correct to 
hold either of them liable under the relevant provision. As I have argued, the literal meaning 
of the words used does not give the content of the law. But even the assertive content in this 
imagined case does not seem rich enough to provide the correct result (in which Frank and 
Simon are innocent). Can the assertive content of the rule be deemed to be something along 
these lines: it is prohibited that members play games likely to injure children, so that Frank 
and Simon are not targeted because their innocent passing game is not likely to harm anyone? 
Frank is supervising and can oversee matters, thereby diminishing the likelihood of injury. 
After all, the law originated because children (without supervision) became engrossed with a 
particular game (not supervised rugby ball passing), resulting in decreased vigilance by the 
involved children, and ultimately in their injuries. But it still seems a stretch to so limit the 
assertive content. (There is after all a distinction between what one actually says in a given 
context and what one would say, if one thought about it more carefully.)
130
 If so, we have 
crossed over to constitutive interpretation and the move is justified in order to avoid a legally 
incorrect result.  
 
This does not show that judges have the authority to “…rewrite laws the literal application of 
which would violate their own views of what should, or shouldn’t be legal”.131  Rather, 
because most laws are somewhat indefinite and broad, judges are authorised to effect small 
modifications to harmonise it with what the lawmaker was trying to accomplish, where the 
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 16. As mentioned, I cannot expound each special case in detail. Appropriate elaboration is provided in case 
such an instance emerges in corporate regulation later. 
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 Soames “Toward a Theory of Legal Interpretation” (2011) http://www-
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literal application of a law to a case contravenes the clear intent guiding the lawmakers in 
adopting it.
132
 
 
The final instance in which constitutive changes may be warranted, and perlocutionary 
intentions may be relevant, is when a set of facts generates an inconsistency, not between a 
law and the purposes for which it was adopted, but between the content of one or more 
equally authoritative laws, so that inconsistent verdicts are entailed by the contents of the 
laws and the specific facts of the case.
133
 The interpreter then has to “…fashion the minimal 
modification of existing legal content that removes the inconsistency and allows a single 
unique verdict to be reached, while maximising the fulfilment of the discernible legislative 
rationales of the laws in question”.134 
 
 
2.3 Towards the Outlines of a Theory of Legal Interpretation (or Some Interpretative 
Guidelines and Useful Distinctions and Concepts) 
 
 
As just indicated, I want to explain a brief outline here, not (per se) a theory. Mainly I want 
methodically (and tersely) to bring together some of the theoretical points expounded above. 
The larger point of this is that getting the theory and the philosophy right from the outset 
should enable me to do at least two things. I will be equipped, first, with the necessary rigour 
and conceptual apparatus to deal with the terminological problems in the Act in a 
sophisticated manner. Secondly, the interpretations and proposals I offer up later will stand 
on firmer theoretical (authoritative) ground and so should not be legally empty. Now 
scientific linguistics and the philosophy of language are highly technical fields, the most 
important recent advances of which are not easily accessible to the jurist. But I believe the 
most pertinent lessons can be outlined (as I have already attempted above) without gross 
oversimplification.
135
 I briefly enumerate the necessary guidelines below. 
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 18-19 (emphasis in the original). Literal application here refers to an interpretation in accordance with the 
strict semantic meaning of the laws in question. 
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 12. 
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First: there can be no serious argument supporting the conclusion that a specific law requires 
exactly what its words seem literally to mean. Just as what a speaker conveys often fails to be 
fully determined by the linguistic meaning of the sentences uttered, the content of the law is 
often not supplied by the mere linguistic meaning of the sentences used to enact it. Semantic 
(conventional) meaning often radically underdetermines the assertion intended to be 
conveyed; literal meanings thus cannot give the content of the law. Meaning, therefore, is 
sometimes but a guide to interpretation. 
 
Second: vagueness (explained above) is a fundamental fact of language.
136
 In part because of 
this, the previous point holds water. Hart spoke of the open texture of language; language 
philosophers refer to the austerity, non-transparency or indefinability of meaning. Roughly, a 
linguistic (legal) text is vague when it is insufficiently precise to advance a certain aim in a 
certain context, e.g. a legal dispute: the phrase on which the case turns is not clear-cut enough 
to dictate a verdict. More technically: a vague provision is one which is susceptible to 
borderline cases, in that there is no rigid boundary between instances where the term applies 
and instances where it does not. Is a skateboard a ‘vehicle’? Does it constitute a relevant ‘use’ 
if you use a gun to trade it for drugs? What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
application of a term like ‘game’? Most of our linguistic terms defy exhaustive or rigorous 
description: necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of linguistic terms are 
seldom in the offing. And usage by competent speakers is the highest authority regarding the 
issue of the proper application of a linguistic term. The important lesson for the law is this: 
that the language used is capable of different (variable) content in some other context is 
irrelevant. We need to discern the lawmaker’s assertion by gauging the meaning together 
with the specific contextual features in which the lawmaker enacted the law. So we must go 
beyond meaning if we are to gauge legal content tenably. The open-endedness or vagueness 
of language, in other words, cannot be laid at the doorstep of the legislature. 
 
Third: following from the second point, legal content must be seated in the entirely 
linguistically based content of a legal text, on pain of committing the fallacy of conflating 
meaning and assertion. There is a relatively systematic set of relations which holds between 
the semantic (conventional) meaning of a sentence, and the peculiar (pragmatic) content 
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Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
48 
 
expressed by a sentence on a specific historical occasion.
137
 Simply put, there is a distinction 
between (conventionally determined) semantics, and (historically, contextually determined) 
pragmatics.
138
 Pragmatics, simply put, concerns “whatever information is relevant, over and 
above the linguistic properties of a sentence, to understanding its utterance”.139 Legal content 
is the resultant assertion arising from the semantic-cum-pragmatic information-generating 
process.
140
 It is thus possible, and often necessary and legitimate to invoke contextual 
features in order to discern legal content: the context of a relevant statute in its entirety, 
background assumptions inherent in a certain practice or field of law, historically determined 
features, and the like. 
 
Fourth, intention is the central, organising concept weaving together these contextual 
features. It is important to remember the distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary 
intentions (outlined above), and in particular, when the latter should be invoked.  
 
Fifth: there is a distinction between epistemic and constitutive interpretation. The first and 
chief task of interpretation is (epistemically) to identify the relevant legal assertion (as I have 
been at pains to point out, not the meaning). In case one of the special cases laid out above 
emerges, the interpretative task becomes constitutive, whereby incremental changes may 
have to be judicially effected.  
 
Sixth, there is a corresponding distinction between semantically hard cases and genuinely 
hard cases.
141
 This distinction hinges on the difference between the semantic content of legal 
texts and their entire linguistically based content (i.e. the complete assertive content); it also 
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 See in general Bach “The semantics-pragmatics distinction: what it is and why it matters” (1999) 
http://userwww.sfsu.edu/~kbach/spd.htm (accessed 29-05-2012). He states: “It is a platitude that a sentence’s 
linguistic meaning generally does not determine what is said in its utterance and that the gap between linguistic 
meaning and what is said is filled by something called “context”. The intuitive idea behind this platitude is that 
there are different things that a speaker can mean, even when using his words in a thoroughly literal way… . 
What one says in uttering the words can vary, so what fixes what one says cannot be facts about the words alone 
but must also include facts about the circumstances in which one is using them; those facts comprise the 
“context of utterance”” (7). 
138
 Some philosophers of language speak of the distinction between sentence meaning and speaker meaning. I 
prefer to stay away from this classification because it paints a confused picture of ‘meaning’. Meaning is 
conventional and belongs under semantics; the speaker’s relation to his utterance is pragmatic, so that 
background assumptions and intentional features are at play here, and not semantic rules. 
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 Bach “The semantics-pragmatics distinction: what it is and why it matters” (1999) 
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corresponds, not rigorously, but roughly, with the epistemic/constitutive distinction. A case is 
semantically hard if its facts and the meanings of the relevant legal texts fail to determine the 
legally correct result. As I have been arguing, meaning is not equivalent to legal content: 
hence the interpretative (epistemic) task must go further, that is, the full linguistic (legal) 
assertion must be gauged. This task is still epistemic – one is discerning the original legal 
assertion and not improving or modifying it constitutively. Only when a case is genuinely 
hard is one called to interpret constitutively: that is where the entire linguistically based 
content embodying the pertinent law– i.e. the pragmatic (contextual) enrichments, on top of 
semantic meaning; in other words, the full legal assertion – and the relevant facts fails to 
determine the legally correct outcome.  
 
This leads me to the seventh point: philosophy draws a distinction between descriptive 
(factual) matters and normative (evaluative, prescriptive) matters. This, again, roughly 
corresponds to the distinctions just drawn. In general, legal interpretation is a factual or 
descriptive task. This is also to say: the primary task of legal interpretation is epistemic – 
identifying the law enacted via authoritative sources – and not constitutive (constructing or 
modifying the law). Correspondingly, “…the slide from semantically hard cases to genuinely 
hard ones should be avoided”.142 This is the point I have been making all along: the proper 
object of legal interpretation is to ascertain the content of the relevant assertion; it is not to 
determine linguistic meaning. In other words, avoiding this slide is avoiding the fallacy of 
conflating meaning and assertion. In special cases, when a case is genuinely hard, we have to 
move, roughly speaking, from ‘the descriptive’ to ‘the normative’; in such genuinely hard 
cases, constitutive interpretation is necessitated.   
 
A last – the eighth – thought: taking into account what I have said above, as well as taking 
vagueness seriously,
143
 one might say the following: A legal rule can be said to represent a 
strong, but defeasible, assumption that behaviour contrary to it is discouraged. 
 
2.4 Concluding Remark 
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 Soames “Interpreting Legal Texts: What is, and What is Not, Special about the Law” (March 2007) 
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An obvious question is prompted: precisely which pragmatic (contextual) considerations, 
then, are relevant to the determination of legal content? I doubt that there is an easy, 
uncontroversial answer to this question. Often this will comprise self-evident background 
assumptions – e.g. in the Smith case described above: it can safely be assumed that the 
legislature asserted use as a weapon/firearm (and not some wider notion including using a 
gun as an article of exchange). These are commonsensical pragmatic tools. In addition, there 
must be legal pragmatic tools. 
 
In this regard, chapter 1 of the 2008 Act is important, particularly sections 5 and 7. But, 
because these seem so abstract and excessively idealistic, it is difficult to see how these 
‘values’ will be decisive in any interpretative dispute. In reality, it is likely that the traditional 
understandings and associations of commercial lawyers will remain. Perhaps this is not easily 
squared with the emphasis in the reform process on plain language. Moreover, since many of 
the sections in the 2008 Act are poorly drafted, a careful balance must be struck: on the one 
hand, quite an expansive licence for normative improvement may be afforded because of 
obvious errors, but, such interpretative modifications must be effected according to principled 
criteria and only where necessary, on the other. Though the articulation of the pragmatic 
elements to be considered in interpretation is a tricky matter, I think any attempt at its 
exhaustive articulation is counter-productive. The best approach is an ad hoc one: the key is 
to justify interpretative moves which do not follow self-evidently from the legal content. This 
is the method I will adopt throughout this work. 
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Chapter 3 
The solvency and liquidity requirement 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Following the initially incomplete shift from capital maintenance to solvency and liquidity, 
the 2008 Act now makes a clean break with capital maintenance. It dramatically expands the 
scope of application of the solvency and liquidity requirement. Over and above being a 
necessary condition for all distributions, this requirement presents itself as a critical 
protective device in a great many transactions influencing the rights of creditors. Compliance 
with the requirement is also necessitated in the event of an amalgamation or merger,
144
 where 
a company gives financial assistance in connection with the acquisition of its shares,
145
 or 
makes a loan/gives other financial assistance to directors.
146
 The importance of the concept to 
the new corporate law regime in South Africa cannot be overstated.  
 
A  single standard for the regulation of all corporate distributions to shareholders is thus 
introduced; and this was one of the main objectives of the company law reform process. The 
requirement is the decisive means by which the interests of creditors are safeguarded. A 
rigorous legal (and philosophical) analysis is required to make sense of the various mechanics 
of the test, as its content is not self-evident from the Act. As the requirement, a fortiori from 
the point of view of corporate creditors, comprises the fundamental condition for 
distributions, ascertaining its content and untangling its dynamics, could pave the way for a 
clearer understanding of the deeper logic or underlying motif of the distribution provisions. 
Concretely, the distribution provisions prescribe as requirements various conditions attaching 
to solvency and liquidity.  
 
A coherent understanding of solvency and liquidity could profitably inform the content of 
opaque distribution requirements. At any rate, due to the prevalence of the concept in the 
provisions dealing with distributions, a clear understanding of its content is necessary. Before 
actually scrutinising the relevant sections of the Act, it is useful first to do two things. Briefly 
taking a normative (evaluative) line, it will be beneficial to consider wider views on the topic, 
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as well as broader rationales for mechanisms like solvency and liquidity. A brief discussion 
of pragmatic or purposive tools (as interpretative aids), in the second place, then follows. 
These points could well have a bearing on a cogent interpretation of the Act. 
 
3.2 Normative Considerations 
 
As an entry point into an analysis of the 2008 Act’s provisions on solvency and liquidity, in 
order to gain some perspective on the legislature’s apparent policy decisions and the chosen 
wording, it is useful first to raise some evaluative points.  
   
Now the American influence in the 2008 Act is clear enough. The Model Business 
Corporation Act (the Model Act) is clearly felt in many of the provisions of the 2008 Act; the 
Model Act has been embraced as the foundational company law statute for thirty of the 
American states.
147
 In this context, James Hanks has provided an interesting analysis of South 
Africa’s new legal capital regime (understood as the rules covering contributions to capital by 
shareholders and distributions from capital to shareholders).
148
 His analysis is particularly 
relevant, considering that he played an important role in devising the provisions of the 2008 
Act.  
 
While lauding many aspects of the new legal capital system ushered in by the 2008 Act – 
even noting that the 2008 Act improves in certain areas on the Model Act – he nevertheless 
believes there is room for improvement. He regards the level of creditor protection accorded 
by the 2008 Act as untenably high. In that sense, he seems to be representative of the 
mainstream liberal approach common in America. He doubts whether company law should 
even include provisions aiming at the protection of creditors when distributions are made to 
shareholders.
149
 He opines that creditors do not place great weight on legal capital 
requirements like solvency and liquidity conditions at any rate.  
  
He further states that the need for both a solvency and a liquidity element is overkill; that is, 
that only a liquidity element is necessary.
150
 In short, the Act employs a twofold test: the 
solvency part requires that the assets of the company equal (or exceed) its liabilities, whereas 
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the liquidity aspect stipulates, roughly, that the company should be able to pay its debts as 
they become due in the ordinary course of business. Hanks sees no use for the former 
element, only believing the latter to be necessary. His argument goes as follows: if a 
company’s assets exceed its liabilities but it is unable to pay its debts in the ordinary course 
of business, it is of no use to creditors
151
 Conversely, where there is a deficit of assets over 
liabilities but the company is able to pay its debts in the usual course of business, according 
to Hanks, there shouldn’t really be a problem.152 In that sense, then, the solvency component 
is thought to be redundant.  
 
Additionally, it is claimed that the solvency test tacitly assumes that all the liabilities are 
currently due and payable, but that this is hardly ever entirely the case.
153
 The solvency 
element is thus not a reliable and useful yardstick of the financial situation of the company 
for creditors. It is deemed unduly restrictive. A disincentive for investors thus emerges, if this 
argument is sound. Knowing that it will be harder to obtain a distribution from the company 
in return for their investments, investors will be deterred. Hanks sees default rules, private 
ordering and transparency as the hallmarks of the company law statutes of the future.
154
 He 
also questions whether the directors should be the ‘ultimate guarantors’ of the creditor 
protection mechanism (as they also approve the improper distribution) – noting moreover that 
often shareholders are also directors.
155
 In light of fraudulent conveyance statutes and the 
protections of contract law, Hanks submits that no corporate law protection is needed – even 
for weaker, unsophisticated or unsecured creditors.  
 
This throws up the question whether it is desirable to differentiate creditors and concomitant 
(levels of) protection. To be sure, corporate creditors make up a heterogeneous group, as a 
range of different creditors somehow connected with the company can be identified: private 
parties, including consumers and employees, suppliers, legal persons, victims of the 
company’s wrongful conduct. One can further distinguish voluntary from involuntary 
creditors, as well as drawing a line between sophisticated or secured creditors (able to secure 
surety or other collateral agreements by virtue of substantial bargaining power) and weaker or 
unsophisticated private parties or small business creditors who are not in a position to obtain 
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collateral or security. It is often, probably correctly, stated that – barring protection against 
fraud – sophisticated creditors do not need statutory protection: essentially only default 
protection mechanisms which can be negated should be supplied.
156
 As for involuntary 
(delictual) creditors, it could well be that this should be a separate legal project, independent 
from corporate law, as an undifferentiated approach may result in less efficiency for contract 
creditors.
157
 Corporate creditors should quite likely not be afforded a single, unified set of 
protections.
158
 No doubt many distinct areas of the law provide for creditor protection. Where 
a particular class of creditor is concerned – e.g. delictual creditor, pensioner, employee, and 
the like – and protection is warranted, it could indeed be beneficial if this treatment comes 
from the discrete bodies of law concerned with these stakeholders – i.e. the law of delict, 
pension law or labour law.
159
 In this way the generalised creditor protection provided for in 
company law can profitably be tailored to that species of creditors it is arguably meant for: 
competent contracting creditors.
160
  
 
A functional or contextual approach to creditor protection seems to be called for: in the 
particular context – e.g. distributions, the South African legal system, etc. – the various risks 
need to be discerned, so that an appropriate level of creditor protection for each respective 
stakeholder can be devised. This also needs to be remembered when comparing creditor 
protection schemes in different jurisdictions. Not every legal system will employ the same 
underlying philosophy of creditor protection. 
 
At every turn it is also worth recalling that limited liability is the reason for the requirement 
of solvency and liquidity. The near-universal regime of capital maintenance was the result of 
the loss by creditors of the right to hold equity holders personally liable on business debts:
161
 
and so solvency and liquidity naturally serve a similar function. The particular pervasive 
worry under discussion in this thesis is that of asset dilution: the reduction of the size of the 
corporate asset pool available to creditors by the making of distributions to shareholders 
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(which often occurs in the region of insolvency).
162
 Shareholders and directors have a 
compelling incentive to remove value from creditors in the region of insolvency and to make 
inefficient decisions.
163
 It should be borne in mind that, all other things being equal, any 
distribution will raise a corporation’s likelihood of default, even though the increase will 
often be negligible. Any distribution from company assets to shareholders necessarily shifts 
some of the risk of the future business activities from the shareholders to the creditors. 
Fundamentally: If funds are allowed to flow from the company to shareholders without 
assurances that all creditors will be paid in due course, a limit to these distributions must be 
devised. Abstractly, assets are open to distribution if it can be expected with sufficient 
certainty that the company will not need these assets to satisfy its debts. 
 
However, at the same time, it should also be remembered that the making of distributions 
naturally attracts investors. Accordingly, the rules regulating limitations on distributions must 
balance these divergent interests in view of economic efficiency considerations.
164
 
Essentially, the gains enjoyed by creditors in increasing the level of creditor protection should 
outweigh the efficiency losses suffered by shareholders and vice versa.
165
 
 
What is more, contrary to what is often supposed, corporate creditors do not face basically 
different risks as compared with creditors of natural persons; limited liability likely does not 
create unique risks but rather only massively increases existing risks (with the same 
character).
166
 Neither companies nor natural persons have unlimited funds. Unlimited liability 
does not entirely eliminate opportunistic behaviour. Specifically concerning ex post 
devaluation of claims owing to opportunistic behaviour, corporate- and natural person-
debtors differ in quantitative, not qualitative, terms.
167
 There is no distinction in kind, merely 
in degree. Consider the case of a natural person near insolvency who transfers his assets to 
his spouse with a view to preventing creditors from realising their claims against him.
168
 It is 
only that companies as debtors differ to the extent that they are radically more inclined to act 
opportunistically, as directors and shareholders are not directly liable towards the creditors.
169
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Moving away from the creditor protection philosophies and returning once more to some 
more concrete evaluative points concerning solvency and liquidity specifically: it has been 
submitted that the “internationally acknowledged bottom-line test for permissible 
distributions is a two-part distribution test”.170 Hanks’s criticism of the solvency element 
cannot simply be taken at face value. The solvency element might well be desirable – even 
necessary – insofar as it acts as a reliable shielding device in respect of long-term 
obligations.
171
 The main reason seems to be that the liquidity component does not “ask 
whether ‘existing’ assets cover ‘existing’ obligations but confers upon directors the discretion 
to assume that ‘existing’, legally accrued liabilities shall be covered by future assets and 
profits the accrual of which depends on future operations of the company”.172  
 
No dependable benchmark seems to be in the offing in terms whereof long-term liabilities 
will be matched in future profits.
173
 Exclusively opting for a liquidity test might result in a 
situation where traditional solvency (accrued assets covering accrued liabilities) need not be 
satisfied and where no consequential statement can be made regarding the future solvency of 
the company as regards long-term obligations.
174
  
 
In this sense, then, an argument seems to emerge to the effect that the solvency element 
serves an important function and so should not be jettisoned: it has to ensure a minimum 
protection of sorts for long-term obligations. It could well work against the interests of 
several stakeholders if the solvency element is abandoned – certainly amongst them, the 
present and former workforce as regards pension liabilities, as well as the general public, 
taking into account, for instance, provisions catering to the environment.
175
  
 
Hanks complained that the solvency test assumes that all liabilities are currently due. But, it 
is also true that where liabilities are in fact presently due and payable, it is not invariably 
prudent to regard those debts as covered by projected or future profits. Furthermore, doing 
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away with the solvency test would leave directors with less guidance in practice.
176
 This line 
of reasoning is taken seriously in many places: support for it can be found in the Netherlands, 
the US, and in New Zealand.
177
 Therefore, it certainly appears that there are sound reasons 
for requiring both a solvency and a liquidity element. 
 
3.3 Pragmatic Issues 
 
In order properly to facilitate economic growth and enable smoothly functioning commercial 
enterprise, corporate law has to be certain, clear and accessible. The 1973 Act was 
categorically complicated, opaque and anomalous; for it to be barely functional countless 
amendments had to be effected. A cohesive and comprehensible philosophy or inner logic 
was compromised in the utilisation of this untidy, piecemeal reform process. But now South 
Africa has a new Act. The aim in the drafting process was always to make the 2008 Act 
simpler, easier, more accessible, and more efficient. It was always the aim in the drafting of 
the 2008 Act to create a more investor-friendly company law system, to make the system 
more flexible, modern, transparent, and predictable; and to harmonise South African 
company law with best practice internationally.
178
  
 
It is no secret that these lofty and vague aims have not really been actualised.
179
 Similar 
problems as with the 1973 Act, it is becoming clear, beleaguer the 2008 Act. Instead of 
incremental amendments, a completely new Act was introduced; but a ‘clean slate’ approach 
was not followed.
180
 Where old legal provisions satisfy the objectives of the new corporate 
law regime and embody the objects of constitutionalism, it is supposed to subsist as part of 
the new company law regime. Cassim maintains that this “conservative middle-path 
approach...causes difficulties and conflict throughout the Act in blending the old with the 
radically new philosophical underpinnings of modern company law”. 181  The legislature 
fervently adopted a plain-language approach in the drafting of the 2008 Act; but this has 
often led to significant ambiguity and uncertainty.  
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To recapitulate, one of the aims of this thesis is to provide a workable interpretation of the 
solvency and liquidity requirements and the distribution provisions. This is done on the basis 
of the framework sketched in Chapter 2, as well as the relevant pragmatic aids put forward in 
this section. It is later pointed out where substantive revision is necessary, as the current 
language simply cannot reasonably bear a functioning, logical and efficient content. 
 
One’s first port of call naturally has to be the language of the 2008 Act. Section 7 spells out 
the purposes of the Act. Not surprisingly, these are quite vague. The encouragement of 
entrepreneurship, enterprise efficiency, the promotion of investment, the productive use of 
capital, the spreading of economic risk, inter alia, are listed. More interestingly, section 5(1) – 
read with section 7 – requires that the 2008 Act has to be interpreted and applied in such a 
way as to give effect to the purposes listed in section 7.  
 
It is difficult to conceive how a court should go about giving effect to such wide objectives in 
a given case. Cassim contends that a clear and unambiguous legislative provision must be 
applied – if it bears on the facts in question – even if it is inconvenient or absurd.182 Which is 
to say, presumably: section 5(1), read with section 7, must be applied, notwithstanding the 
broad language in which the purposes are couched. But, by the same token, he believes the 
purposes set out in section 7 are prefatory; and that this is how they should be treated. 
183
 
Most probably, then, Cassim reckons the direct injunction of section 5(1) should not be taken 
too seriously.   
 
Moreover, section 5(2) provides that a court ‘may’ consider foreign company law, insofar as 
it is appropriate, when a court interprets or applies the Act. It is probably true that US law 
should now play an important part in this regard, considering the significant influence of the 
Model Act. But English company law – in particular the common law on companies (no 
‘clean slate’ approach is advocated) – should continue to exert some influence. Canadian and 
Australian law, as well as the corporate law of New Zealand, might also be relevant, because 
of some borrowed provisions from those jurisdictions.   
 
It is unavoidable that sections 5(1) and 5(2) have to be played down somewhat. The legal 
content – the legislature’s legal assertion – is clear enough, however. These provisions might 
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at first blush appear to provide important legal and jurisprudential backing to the use of 
certain pragmatic tools in the interpretation of the Act. If a certain provision of the Act is 
opaque, and can convincingly be related to a pertinent purpose mentioned in section 7, such 
an interpretation could attain some legitimacy. Likewise, especially where the unclear 
provision in question has been borrowed from another jurisdiction, an interpretation made 
through the lens of that jurisdiction, rendering the provision more logical and efficient, could 
acquire more legitimacy via section 5(2). The hope would be that the purposes can profitably 
act as legally sanctioned tie-breakers of sorts. One is hopefully made aware of the prevailing 
rationales behind the Act, and this could well be of use in the face of an interpretative puzzle. 
Theoretically, this sounds appealing, but it is difficult to imagine a situation in which it would 
actually play out in this way (particularly with reference to section 5(1)). The listed purposes 
are simply too vague; they often seem to be open-ended, repetitive and fanciful ambitions or 
values, rather than concretely realisable purposes. It would not easily make sense to read 
highly technical company law provisions – like those of corporate finance law – in the light 
of these broad values.  
 
There is, moreover, the possibility of conflicts between the purposes. The 2008 Act must be 
interpreted in a way that enforces the purposes of section 7. But what if one purpose is at 
odds with another in a particular case? For instance, it would not be hard to imagine an 
instance where ‘the promotion of the compliance with the Bill of Rights’ clashes with 
‘enterprise efficiency’. Tension between, for example, enforcing employment rights and 
giving effect to efficiency is not difficult to envision. The fear would be that, contrary to the 
injunction of section 5(1), the judiciary would first decide the matter, and ex post facto, 
justify its decision with reference to one or more of the listed purposes. This would not be 
highly unusual, as it frequently happens in numerous legal areas. In very many matters of 
legal interpretation, an intuitive sense (or bias) can sway an interpreter a certain way, and 
certain parts of the legal materials (to the exclusion of other parts) are relied upon to 
substantiate this preconceived inclination. Descriptively speaking, it will be useful to see how 
the courts have dealt with the issue, now that the 2008 Act is operational, and to see whether 
(and to what extent) this phenomenon presents itself.  
 
In Nedbank Ltd v Bestvest 153 (Pty) Ltd; Essa and another v Bestvest 153 (Pty) Ltd and 
another (Companies and Intellectual Property Commission and another intervening), which 
concerned an application for business rescue, the court refers to the section 7 purposes of the 
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2008 Act, as well as the injunction in section 5, stating that it is not “particularly 
innovative”.184 Nevertheless, referring to the purposes in section 7, the court is of the view 
that a “fresh approach” to company law is introduced insofar as the foundational values of the 
Constitution have to be promoted, and the spirit and purposes of the Act have to be 
honoured.
185
 Mention is also made in this context of section 39(2) of the Constitution to the 
effect that all law must be interpreted through the prism of the Bill of Rights.
186
 In particular, 
a parallel is drawn between section 5(1) of the 2008 Act and section 39(2) of the Constitution 
on the one hand; and section 5(2) of the 2008 Act is compared to section 39(1)(c) of the 
Constitution, on the other.  
 
The latter pair represents the optional reliance on foreign law, whereas the former pair deals 
with the compulsory reliance on a set of values or purposes – the purposes of section 7, and 
the values of the Bill of Rights, respectively. The mandatory pair is most problematic. It 
contains a definite injunction with unclear content. What if the values or purposes conflict – 
which receives precedence? Despite the court’s reference to the purposes of the 2008 Act, 
sections 5 and 7 doubtless did not play anything like a decisive role in the outcome of the 
case. The case naturally turned on the specific provisions involving business rescue. The 
most that could be said is that the court’s analysis of section 5 and 7 led to a purposive 
interpretation of the business rescue provisions – and not that any specific purpose in section 
7 proved decisive. Even section 7(k) – which deals with business rescue – was not strictly 
‘given effect’, as the application was denied, and so, strictly, an efficient rescue was not 
expedited (even if the test for allowing these types of applications put forward in this case 
was fairly wide.) This is not to criticise the court’s judgment, but only to illustrate the 
awkward interpretative scheme under discussion. The court certainly makes a point of saying 
that the 2008 Act will require novel thinking in several areas and it can no doubt be argued 
that a decision of this nature could well (eventually) spur additional, more radical changes in 
the Act, deriving from a more nuanced and holistic view of interpretation. The necessity for 
purposive interpretation, the mandate to read the Act commensurately with constitutional 
values, and the requirement to understand the provisions of the 2008 Act contextually, in 
light of the totality of the Act, is spelled out in no uncertain terms.
187
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The next case in which sections 5 and 7 also came up is Ex parte Gore NO and Others NNO 
(in their capacities as the liquidators of 41 companies comprising King Financial Holdings 
Ltd (in liquidation) and its subsidiaries), which was the first case in which the new statutory 
remedy of piercing the corporate veil was considered.
188
 Here the legislation’s interpretative 
scheme comes up much later in the judgment.
189
 The court nowhere elaborates on which 
specific purpose(s) it is giving effect to, but instead merely adds the reference to section 7 in 
order to bolster an argument that has already been made on different grounds. By the time the 
court considered sections 5 and 7, it seemed already to have decided to pierce to the corporate 
veil on the basis of its understanding of the facts and the relevant legal principles. It appears 
to be justifying throughout why it can do so: the court focused on the broad wording of the 
provision and concludes that the old test for piercing the corporate veil has not been 
materially changed.
190
 The tenor of the decision is always gesturing towards a wider, more 
liberal application of the test. But the ratio is still encompassed by the considerations 
underpinning the established test for piercing the corporate veil. That is, the court found that 
a group of companies had been used by their controllers in a manner which constituted 
unconscionable conduct as required by the provision. The court then (tentatively) proceeds to 
expand on the parameters of a potentially wider approach to piercing the corporate veil, given 
the wider wording in the 2008 Act. However, it is clear that the reference to ‘purposes’ is 
something of an afterthought, rather than being a constitutive element in the court’s 
reasoning.  
 
A similarly perfunctory reference appears in Peninsula Eye Clinic (Pty) Ltd v Newlands 
Surgical Clinic and others,
191
 which involved the reinstatement of a company’s registration 
in terms of section 82(4) of the 2008 Act, and specifically whether the reinstatment was of 
retrospective effect. The court finds that the practical purpose of reinstatement would be 
severely diminished if it did not have the effect of restrospectively restoring the corporation’s 
personality (and reinvesting it with title to its property).
192
 To add weight to this 
commensensical claim, the court states that the section 7 purposes would not be furthered if 
the effect was not retroactive. But the court does not cite any particular purpose in this regard. 
The court sees itself as taking heed of section 5’s injunction.  In a footnote, the court submits 
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that the emphasis in section 7 is on “simplicity, flexibility, efficiency and predictability”.193 It 
is unclear why these should be regarded as the most important purposes. It is also not clear 
whether these purposes exactly served a tie-breaker function. Rather, the court saw these 
purposes as congenial to its general course of reasoning.  
 
The DH Brothers Industries (Pty) Limited Gribnitz NO and others case was decided shortly 
after the previous case and dealt with issues surrounding business rescue.
194
 The court’s point 
of departure in this case was to turn to sections 5 and 7 of the Act. In this case the court was 
ultimately to set aside a resolution placing a company under business rescue. Instead of using 
one of the purposes in section 7 to bolster an argument it wants to make, the court essentially 
had to give practical content to section 7(k) in order to counter a contrary argument. In doing 
so, the court had also to consider some of the other mentioned purposes of section 7. The 
court says that section 7 does not back the acceptance of a business rescue plan at all costs.
195
 
The “rights and interests of all stakeholders” have to be balanced; and creditors certainly fall 
under “stakeholders”, according to the court.196 Part of the reason creditors’ rights have to be 
taken seriously in the business rescue process is that, were it not so, other section 7 purposes 
would be violated, argues the court. In this regard the court could appeal to vague purposes, 
such as providing a predictable environment for the efficient regulation of companies, 
promoting the development of the economy, promoting investment in the South African 
markets, creating optimum conditions for investment, and so on – the implication being that 
creditor protection is an important goal of the Act.
197
 
 
The most recent case in which section 7 played a role is Boschpoort Ondernemings (Pty) Ltd 
v Absa Bank Ltd.
198
 In this case the court, inter alia, had to determine the test for solvency in 
liquidation proceedings. The court argues that a company’s commercial, not mere factual, 
insolvency constitutes a ground which justifies an order for that company’s liquidation. 
Factual insolvency is simply where a company’s liabilities exceed its assets; commercial 
insolvency is where a company cannot pay its debts even though its assets exceed its 
liabilities.
199
 The court states that this position has stood the test of time, and points to several 
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logical reasons why this is so.
200
 Signigicantly, the court then goes on to say that, were the 
converse position to prevail, section 7(1) would be undermined. That is, if the test for 
solvency were factual, a predictable and effective legal environment for the adjudication of 
the liquidation of companies would be undermined.
201
 The court seems to paint section 7(l) as 
being quite instrumental to its reasoning. In truth, the same conclusion could be reached by 
reference only to the other logical reasons furnished by the court.
202
 It cannot be denied, 
looking at the extremely vague, open-ended content of section 7(l), that the section could 
very well be used as justification for a great variety of incongruous assertions. That is not to 
say that the court’s reasoning is unsound. The converse of the court’s ultimate conclusion 
might indeed hamper predictability and efficiency in the regulation of companies. It is just 
that section 7(l) is not decisive in the court’s reasoning.203 
 
Mention should also be made of section 158, which provides for remedies to promote the 
purposes of the Act. Courts are required to develop the common law so as to improve the 
realisation of the rights contained in the Act. This is, once again, indicative of the middle-
path approach, in which old law is preserved, to the extent that it is consistent with the goals 
and provisions of the 2008 Act and the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
(henceforth ‘the Constitution’).204 The content of the common law appears to be uncertain 
now. But anything inconsistent with the law ushered in by the 2008 Act clearly cannot stand. 
Section 158(b)(i) requires that the Commission, the Panel, the Tribunal or a court “must 
promote the spirit, purpose and objects” of the Act; section 158(b)(ii) says that “if any 
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provision of this Act...read in its context, can be reasonably construed to have more than one 
meaning” the court/Commission/Panel/Tribunal “must prefer the meaning that best promotes 
the spirit and purpose of this Act”. This provision is naturally related to the listed purposes in 
section 7 but also goes beyond it. A strikingly similar provision is found in the 
Constitution.
205
 Given the vague nature of ‘spirit and purpose’, this type of provision is not 
without problems. Like the provisions just discussed, it is unlikely to have any real utility or 
serve a meaningful tie-breaker function.
206
  
 
A final remark which ties this section with the preceding chapter, is apposite. I have already 
mentioned the emphasis in the drafting process on plain or ordinary language.
207
 Though the 
extent to which the drafters succeeded in this endeavour is debatable, the object was to word 
the Act in simple, clear and accessible terms.
208
 Primarily, then, this is how the authoritative 
lawmakers intended the Act to be construed – in a commonsensical, and predictable manner. 
It thus seems reasonable to assume that the legal content of the 2008 Act should be identified 
in this way. It seems that excessively complex or technical interpretations should in the main 
be eschewed. However, this model all but breaks down where the legislature’s very 
coherence and good sense is open to question. A measure of creativity will be necessitated, as 
inventive interpretations are unavoidable. In such cases, it is just that careful justifications 
have to be proffered.  
 
3.4 The 2008 Act: The Components of the Solvency and Liquidity Test 
 
The stage is now set to consider the various facets of the solvency and liquidity test. Below I 
look at the two distinct components of the test, I reflect on the assets and liabilities that are to 
be considered in an application of the test, I evaluate the position of preference shareholders, 
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and inquire into the time when the test should be considered and satisfied. I also analyse the 
way in which the test is to be applied. It is admitted that this approach of treating the 
solvency and liquidity requirement in a compartmentalised way often lends itself to a 
measure of overlap, as well as anachronism. However, the minutiae of the relevant 
provisions, in my view, throw up vital thematic talking points which can (and, it is submitted, 
should) be separately tackled. The hope is ultimately that the language of the provisions 
coheres, as well as that the underlying philosophical issues fit together appropriately. These 
points apply for this chapter; but they equally apply to the relationship between solvency and 
liquidity on the one hand, and the distribution provisions on the other. Hence, overlapping 
considerations follow as a matter of course, as the Act inextricably links these two areas (i.e. 
satisfaction of the  financial restrictions is required to satisfy the  the requirements for 
distributions). 
 
The elements or components of the solvency and liquidity test can be found in section 4 of 
the 2008 Act. The solvency part is contained in section 4(1)(a) and the liquidity part in 
section 4(1)(b). Satisfying both elements constitutes necessary and sufficient conditions for 
passing the test: it is necessary to meet both requirements and this is sufficient for passing the 
test. As a limitation on distributions, the solvency part means the assets of the corporation 
should exceed its liabilities after the distribution has been factored in. As a result, 
distributions can only be made out of net assets. In contradistinction, the liquidity part 
denotes the capacity of the company to service its debts as they become due.
209
 
 
The practically significant difference between the capital maintenance test and a solvency test 
is that the capital maintenance test necessitates a margin over solvency tantamount to the 
company’s share capital. It is the ‘guarantee fund’ of the company which the shareholders 
built up which constructs this margin. In that sense, Van der Linde is probably right to claim 
that satisfying the capital maintenance test entails the satisfaction of a simple solvency test 
(not the collective solvency and liquidity requirement).
 210
 But, at the same time, 
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particularising the capital maintenance test to the South African context, that remark likely no 
longer holds water. A lot can turn on the meaning ascribed to capital. The narrow 
interpretation afforded by the South African courts as to what precisely could and could not 
be paid back to shareholders, as well as the fact that capital was not immunised from business 
risks, could very well mean that a simple solvency test is not without more satisfied in the 
application of capital maintenance. At any rate, what is certain is that meeting the capital 
maintenance requirement does not entail compliance with the liquidity test; there is no 
conceptually necessary connection between the two. For that reason, in order properly to 
safeguard the interests of creditors, legal systems with capital maintenance regimes often 
supplement capital maintenance with a liquidity test.
211
  
 
As regards the liquidity test, South Africa has opted, not for the balance sheet test based on 
current assets and current liabilities, but a cash flow analysis. A cash flow prediction is 
identified by the phrasing “that the company will be able to pay its debts as they become due 
in the ordinary course of business...”.212 On this approach, in addition to current assets, credit 
extended to the company, as well as future income is taken into account; likewise, not merely 
current liabilities, but also prospective liabilities are considered.
213
 It follows that the choice 
of this approach could influence the valuation of contingent liabilities, as future assets and 
liabilities are accounted for by the cash flow analysis. This approach, however, does not 
reflect another sea change in company law; it was also the line taken by the 1973 Act after 
the 1999 amendments. 
 
Van der Linde claims that distinct theoretical justifications underlie the solvency element on 
the one hand and the liquidity element on the other.
214
 On her view, the solvency requirement 
asserts beforehand the final precedence of creditor interests over that of shareholders by 
preventing the corporation from favouring the shareholders through a partial liquidation.
215
 
On the other hand, the liquidity component is said to legitimate two things: the foundational 
expectation of creditors to be paid on time, and the supposed representation a company 
makes upon the incurrence of a debt that it reasonably expects to be capable of paying when 
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the debt is due.
216
 It would be unfair for a company to compromise its liquidity through the 
making of distributions to its shareholders where it made a tacit representation of liquidity at 
the outset.
217
  
 
While not without merit, the distinction Van der Linde draws in this regard is perhaps 
somewhat pedantic. The pervasive object or justification of capital maintenance, solvency, 
and liquidity is arguably quite unitary. These concepts principally aim at safeguarding the 
interests of creditors: ensuring that they are paid back in full and on time. Both the solvency 
and liquidity requirement speak to the ultimate priority that creditors enjoy over shareholders. 
One can, for instance, also maintain that the company makes an implicit representation, not 
only that it expects to pay when the debt is due, but also that it will not privilege the 
shareholders over the creditors through a partial liquidation. It is more a matter of whether the 
obligation in question is a long-term one or not. Even inquiring as to which test is stricter 
proves unhelpful. It will hinge on the specified mechanics of applying each in their particular 
context.
218
 It remains, then, to study the unique mechanics of the respective elements, as 
enshrined in the 2008 Act. 
 
A further conceptual point is in order.  It has been stated that the primary focus of this thesis 
is distributions. It is submitted that a self-contained analysis is possible, even though a 
measure of overlap, especially with acquisitions by a company of its own shares and 
acquisitions by a subsidiary in its holding company, is invariably discernible. Unique 
considerations certainly underpin each of these broad themes. That is in spite of the fact that 
the aforesaid acquisitions legally do in fact constitute ‘distributions’ in terms of the Act – 
under section 1(a)(iii)(aa) and (bb) – and need to comply with section 46 (the principal 
distributions provision, governing the requirements for making a distribution) – 48(2)(a) of 
the Act explicitly requires this. Economically speaking, the effect on the company’s financial 
position of a payment to shareholders is identical, regardless of whether it is a dividend paid 
to all shareholders or a pro rata acquisition of shares by the company.
219
 Notwithstanding 
these points, an acquisition is not the same as a distribution. Every distribution is not also an 
acquisition. But every acquisition entails the making of a distribution. So it is just that some 
                                                 
216
 226. 
217
 226. Of course, it should be borne in mind that this could be said to be the basis for the law, yet there is no 
actual requirement to make the representation in question. 
218
 Schön "Balance Sheet Tests or Solvency Tests—or Both?."European Business Organization Law Review 7, 
no. 1 (2006): 181-198, 189. 
219
 Hanks “The new legal capital regime in South Africa” (2010) AJ 143. 
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distributions (as defined in section 1 in the 2008 Act) are distributions pursuant to the 
acquisitions of shares.  
 
The link between the distribution provisions and the solvency and liquidity requirement is 
provided at various places in section 46.
220
 The solvency and liquidity test is set out in full in 
section 4 and reads as follows: 
 
‘(4) Solvency and liquidity test 
(1) For any purpose of this Act, a company satisfies the solvency and liquidity 
test at a particular time if, considering all reasonably foreseeable financial 
circumstances of the company at that time— 
(a) the assets of the company, as fairly valued, equal or exceed the liabilities of the company, as fairly 
valued; and 
(b) it appears that the company will be able to pay its debts as they become due 
in the ordinary course of business for a period of— 
(i)  12 months after the date on which the test is considered; or 
(ii)  in the case of a distribution contemplated in paragraph (a) of the 
definition of ‘distribution’ in section 1, 12 months following that 
distribution. 
(2) For the purposes contemplated in subsection (1)— 
(a) any financial information to be considered concerning the company must 
be based on— 
(i)  accounting records that satisfy the requirements of section 28; and 
(ii)  financial statements that satisfy the requirements of section 29; 
(b) subject to paragraph (c), the board or any other person applying the 
solvency and liquidity test to a company— 
(i)  must consider a fair valuation of the company’s assets and liabilities, 
including any reasonably foreseeable contingent assets and liabilities, 
irrespective whether arising as a result of the proposed distribution, 
or otherwise; and 
(ii)  may consider any other valuation of the company’s assets and 
liabilities that is reasonable in the circumstances; and 
(c) unless the Memorandum of Incorporation of the company provides 
otherwise, when applying the test in respect of a distribution contemplated 
in paragraph (a) of the definition of ‘‘distribution’’ in section 1, a person is not 
to include as a liability any amount that would be required, if the company 
                                                 
220
 Sections 46(1)(b), and 46(1)(c) chiefly invoke the solvency and liquidity requirement. The rest of the 
subsections of section 46 essentially structure the practical considerations going into a consistent and proper 
application of the test. 
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were to be liquidated at the time of the distribution, to satisfy the 
preferential rights upon liquidation of shareholders whose preferential 
rights upon liquidation are superior to the preferential rights upon 
liquidation of those receiving the distribution.’ 
 
The test will apply to sections 44 (financial assistance for subscription of securities), 45 
(loans or other financial assistance to directors), 46
221
 (the requirements for making a 
distribution), 48 (company or subsidiary acquiring company shares), and 113 (amalgamations 
or mergers) of the 2008 Act.
222
  
 
3.4.1 The Solvency Component  
 
The Companies Amendment Act 3 of 2011 has improved the 2008 Act in certain respects. 
Certainly the solvency element, as enshrined in the 2008 Act, has benefited from this 
amendment endeavour. Before its enactment, the position was that the solvency part of the 
test was passed “at a particular time” if, “considering all reasonably foreseeable financial 
circumstances of the company at the time the assets of the company or, if the company is a 
member of a group of companies, the consolidated assets of the company, as fairly valued, 
equal or exceed the liabilities of the company or, if the company is a member of a group of 
companies, the consolidated liabilities of the company, as fairly valued”. The reference to 
group assets and liabilities served only to confuse. Plainly, if the company is not a member of 
a group, its assets must simply equal or exceed its liabilities (where both are fairly valued). 
And if it is part of a group, the consolidated assets of the company must equal or exceed the 
consolidated liabilities of the company (where both are fairly valued).  
 
The term ‘consolidated’ was used for companies that formed part of groups, but not for a 
single company. This was a curious choice. Following the plain language approach – the way 
the legislature seemingly wanted the Act to be read, which thus should get one closer to the 
full legal content – ‘consolidated’ was probably interchangeable with a term like ‘aggregate’ 
(which also cropped up in previous versions), which is loosely to be interpreted as ‘taken 
together’ or ‘as a whole’. But naturally this is implied; it surely must also apply to the case of 
a single company. And so the term is redundant. Singling the term ‘consolidated’ out only for 
membership to a group of companies might also suggest that the legislature wanted to include 
                                                 
221
 See chapter 4. 
222
 See 3.1 and 3.4. 
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the assets and liabilities of all the companies in the group. The legislature’s full assertion 
seems to militate against this construal, however. Additionally, this could mean that an 
insolvent company could pass the solvency test by invoking the assets of other companies in 
its group, patently to the detriment of corporate creditors.
223
 The effect would be that the 
assets of the group (and thus also of holding companies and co-subsidiaries) would have to be 
taken into account each time a company in the group makes a distribution.
224
  
 
It is encouraging to see the amendment address these concerns. The simpler formulation 
seems to steer clear of these concerns. The aim of the solvency test – together with the 
liquidity test – is to protect creditors: this is done if every individual company by itself is 
required to pass the test, whether it forms part of a group or not.
225
 Certainly, a different 
analysis will be called for in case a subsidiary purchases shares in its holding company. In 
this event, the value of the subsidiary should not be counted twice in determining the value of 
its assets. 
 
It seems this distinction between individual companies and companies in a group was likely 
tailored to prevent evasion of the financial restrictions. Paradoxically, as explained, the exact 
opposite could ensue, where the aggregate assets and liabilities of the group are considered 
and an individual insolvent company in a group could pass the test by relying on the assets of 
other companies in the group – the financial restrictions are evaded and creditors could 
suffer. If this were to be true, it could create the extremely difficult situation where, 
ostensibly, the legislature intends something different from the semantic meaning of the 
words it employed. The legislature intended to prevent evasion (by hypothesis) – and this 
certainly would not seem a fanciful reading – but the semantic meaning of the provision 
entailed the opposite. I have argued that the job of the interpreter is to gauge the full legal 
assertion enacted by the law (not the semantic meaning, nor simply the intent). I do not 
purport to have an easy solution to this type of conundrum; in each particular case one simply 
                                                 
223
 Jooste “Issues relating to the regulation of ‘distributions’ by the 2008 Companies Act” (2009) 126 SALJ 627, 
641. 
224
The point also applies if one has regard to the technical meaning ascribed to the term in accountancy. In 
accounting, consolidation is a term of art meaning that the shares held in another company would not merely be 
included at their value but that the assets and liabilities of the entities will, for accounting purposes, be evaluated 
together. However, it would be legally unacceptable because they are still distinct entities and so creditors may 
be over- or under-protected as a result. 
225
 It is interesting to note that, in the four drafts of the Companies Bill, it is the first draft which has now been 
returned to by means of the recent amendment; the initial unadorned version turns out actually to be the best, 
and the legislature ultimately realised this. See Jooste “Issues relating to the regulation of ‘distributions’ by the 
2008 Companies Act” (2009) 126 SALJ 627, 641-2. 
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has to attempt to reasonably discern the assertion of the legislature – understood as the entire 
linguistically based content, including intent, pragmatic considerations, and semantic 
meaning. Fortunately, in this case, the amendment has obviated this concern. 
 
Van der Linde believes the regulation of distributions in the group context should be confined 
to cases where a subsidiary makes a distribution to the shareholders of its parent company.
226
 
In this event, it must be clarified whether the test should be applied to the subsidiary and the 
holding company independently, to the subsidiary and the holding company together (as a 
unit), or to the group a whole.
227
 Van der Linde suggests that the test should be met by both 
the holding company and the subsidiary.
228
 Van der Linde also bemoans the fact that the 
solvency test alone – not in combination with the liquidity test – was regarded as relevant in 
the group situation.
229
 After the amendment, this criticism no longer stands.  
 
In comparison with certain other jurisdictions, Van der Linde deems the South African 
solvency test to be “relatively lenient and out of step with international standards”.230 Barring 
the case where the liquidation preferences of preference shareholders have to be considered, 
the 2008 Act does not provide for a solvency margin: the threshold is simply that the assets 
equal the liabilities following a distribution; the assets need not exceed the liabilities. In view 
of the discussion above concerning the views of Hanks, it is astounding to see how starkly 
corporate law scholars can diverge on this issue.
231
 Hanks would not only baulk at the 
suggestion of a solvency margin, but would even do away with the solvency requirement 
altogether – and essentially argues that creditor protection is not really the domain of 
corporate law. As the matter has been dealt with at some length above – and since I chiefly 
want to offer up an analysis of the Act as it is – I will leave the theoretical-normative debate 
there.  
 
                                                 
226
 Van der Linde “The solvency and liquidity approach” (2009) 228. 
227
 228. 
228
 228. See further Bhana “Company law implications of conferring a power on a subsidiary to acquire the 
shares of its holding company” 2006 Stell Law Review 232, 239. 
229
 Van der Linde “The solvency and liquidity approach” (2009) 228. 
230
 228-9. The jurisdictions she points to in this regard include California, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, 
and the American Model Business Corporation Act. Though, it should be noted, regarding the latter two, that 
she is referring to liquidation preferences of classes of shareholders who have priority over the shareholders to 
whom the distribution is being made (I consider the issue of preference shareholders below). Apparently, Van 
der Linde is not excessively displeased with the lack of a solvency margin, as she does not suggest a reform 
proposal to this effect, see Van der Linde Aspects 569. 
231
 See 3.2 above. 
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3.4.2 The Liquidity Component  
 
The liquidity test will be passed if, considering all reasonably foreseeable financial 
circumstances of the company at the time, it appears that the company will be capable of 
paying its debts as they become due in the ordinary course of business, for a period of twelve 
months.
232
 Further, regarding distributions, in the event that the distribution is in the form of a 
transfer of money or property, the time period ends twelve months after the date on which the 
distribution is made.
233
  
 
No time period was specified in section 85(4) of the 1973 Act; whereas now it must appear 
that the company will remain liquid for a twelve-month period following the distribution. 
Rule 5.90(g) of the Listing Requirements of the JSE Limited in fact does provide for a twelve-
month period. There is no universal agreement on the desirability of instituting a fixed time 
period. As Van der Linde points out, a time limit is imposed in the United Kingdom. But the 
liquidity component is not anchored to a time limit in California, New Zealand or in the 
Model Act.
234
 This is also true of Australia.
235
 Van der Linde reckons the imposition of a time 
limit is undesirable; she opines that “the ordinary course of business” of each corporation 
should be the decisive determinant in assessing its liquidity.
236
 Jooste, however, was critical 
of the 1973 Act which failed to provide a fixed time period and welcomes the predictability 
and certainty of the newly introduced twelve-month period.
237
  
 
Van der Linde is sceptical because, as she sees it, the time limit “may disadvantage creditors 
of companies that have clearly foreseeable longer-term commitments that are not payable 
within twelve months”.238 While the twelve-month mark is not devoid of arbitrariness, there 
is probably little warrant for extending the period further specifically to accommodate these 
creditors. Longer periods also make calculations more difficult. On Van der Linde’s view, if 
it really is necessary to implement a time limit to safeguard the interest of creditors, the best 
way to do so is to create a presumption that the company failed to satisfy the test should it be 
                                                 
232
 Section 4(1)(b) of the 2008 Act, quoted in full above. 
233
 Section 4(1)(b)(ii). 
234
 Van der Linde “The solvency and liquidity approach” (2009) 229. 
235
 Corporations Act 2001 – Sect 254T (1)(c). 
236
 229. 
237
 Jooste “The maintenance of capital and the Companies Bill 2007” (2007) 124 SALJ 715. 
238
 Van der Linde “The solvency and liquidity approach” (2009) 229. 
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liquidated within a particular period of time.
239
 In relieving the creditors (or the liquidator) of 
the burden of proof, creditor protection is said to increase: creditors will then not need to 
prove that the assessment was unwarranted if the corporation is in fact liquidated shortly after 
the distribution.
240
 This makes sense, but quite substantial legislative amendments will be 
required to achieve it; and the need for this is hardly pressing.
241
 Even Van der Linde does 
admit that the current time limit does provide certainty.
242
 Probably, no more hairs need 
splitting on this issue.  
 
It appears that causality does not have a role to play under the liquidity component in the 
2008 Act.
243
 The test explicitly calls for the position to be determined immediately after a 
distribution has been made and therefore implicitly discounts the effect of the distribution.
244
 
A distribution will thus be unlawful even where the company is at any rate illiquid and it is 
not the distribution which causes it. A causation requirement here would focus on the specific 
effect of a distribution on the corporation’s capacity to service its debts; the payment should 
not render the company unable to pay its debts.
245
 The test must then be applied by reference 
to the moment before the distribution is made.
246
 However, it would seem that there is no 
need for a causality requirement in this context.  To protect creditors, a company should not 
be allowed to make distributions where it is already illiquid or it is foreseeable that illiquidity 
would be caused by something else. Once a company is illiquid creditors of course have to 
rely only on solvency but distributions which increase illiquidity further reduce the likelihood 
that a company will again become liquid. 
 
Van der Linde tentatively proposes the introduction of a presumption that a company which 
is liquidated within a specified period of time should be regarded as having failed to comply 
with the solvency and liquidity requirement and that it should be paired with a causation 
requirement. Lack of causation should then be allowed as a defence which shareholders can 
                                                 
239
 229. A two-year period combined with a reverse onus (as described) appears in the Close Corporations Act: 
payments to members made within two years of the winding-up of a close corporation can be recovered unless 
the members can establish that the corporation passed the solvency and liquidity test at the time of the payment 
(section 70(2) of the Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984). 
240
 229-230. 
241
 See 4.1 and 4.2. 
242
 229. 
243
 230. The position was the same in the 1973 Act. 
244
 230. 
245
 See section 52(1)(c) of the Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984; in California the payment should not seem 
“likely to result” in inability to pay (see section 501 of the California Corporations Code); see Van der Linde 
“The solvency and liquidity approach” (2009) 230. 
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appeal to with a view to escaping liability for the return of distributions they receive.
247
 
However, she ultimately concludes that it is perhaps best that a clean liquidity test prevails: 
causation and presumptions do not seem necessary. And the twelve-month time limit is quite 
instructive and would clearly provide helpful guidance.  
 
It should be noted that the 1973 Act also used the phrase “in the ordinary course of 
business”. 248  In a previous version of the 2008 Act, the legislature omitted the word 
“ordinary”. Provided that there is a sufficient connection to the business of the company, 
then, ostensibly, debts not normally incurred must be considered as well. Jooste deemed it 
prudent to include all debts.
249
 There seems to be no warrant for making the test this strict. 
Ultimately the legislature thought better of it. The resulting formulation is the same as the 
1973 Act on this score.  
 
3.5 Which Assets and Liabilities are considered?  
 
The 2008 Act breaks from the old company law regime in this regard: whereas the 1973 Act 
lacked specific guidelines regarding which assets, liabilities, and debts are to be considered in 
the determination of a company’s solvency and liquidity (though it did require a fair 
valuation of assets),
250
 the 2008 Act is more elaborate. It says that “any financial 
information” to be taken into account regarding the company must be based on accounting 
records and financial statements that meet the requirements of sections 28 and 29, 
respectively.
251
 Section 28(1) requires accounting records to be complete and accurate, 
whereas section 29(1)(d) requires compliance with financial reporting standards.  
 
As the liquidity component essentially consists in a prediction of the corporation’s cash flow 
situation concerning the following twelve months, it may be hard solely to rely on recorded 
financial information in its application.
252
 In section 4(1) one encounters “reasonably 
foreseeable financial circumstances” whereas in section 4(2)(a) the phrase “financial 
information” is used. Quite clearly, these are not interchangeable. Ostensibly “financial 
information” is a narrower concept. Van der Linde states that the liquidity test should 
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 See section 70(2)(c) of the Close Corporations Act. 
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 Section 85(4)(a) of the 1973 Act. 
249
 Jooste “The maintenance of capital and the Companies Bill 2007” (2007) 124 SALJ 719. 
250
 Sections 85(4)(b), 90(2)(b) and 38(2A)(a)(i) of the 1973 Act. 
251
 Section 4(2)(a) of the 2008 Act. 
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therefore be based on financial information in the company’s records and statements, in 
addition to foreseeable circumstances that may influence the company’s capacity to service 
its debts.
253
 But the same can be said for the solvency element, as the introductory part of 
section 4(1) covers 4(1)(a) as well. 
 
Section 4(2)(b)(i) ensures that the solvency and liquidity test is based on a “fair valuation of 
the company’s assets and liabilities.” This is compulsory. The optional part is given in section 
4(2)(b)(ii), which provides that the board or other person applying the test “may consider any 
other valuation of the company’s assets and liabilities that is reasonable in the 
circumstances”. Essentially, the legislature seems to be saying: the board must consider a fair 
valuation and may consider another reasonable valuation. But jurisprudentially these terms 
are roughly co-extensive. It is difficult to envision circumstances in which a valuation that is 
not fair nevertheless amounts to a valuation which is reasonable in the circumstances. 
Conversely, if there already is a “fair” valuation, it is probably unlikely that another valuation 
would be “reasonable”. The legislature’s legal assertions are not really coherent here. But it is 
probably easy enough to discern what it intended to achieve. The compulsory part shows that 
the legislature wanted to impose a minimum valuation threshold. The valuation has at least to 
be “fair”. Unfair valuations are not allowed. It seems there is a default or established 
valuation which can generally be dubbed fair. The discretionary or optional part suggests a 
recognition on the part of the legislature that an alternative – non-standard – valuation 
method should also be allowed, so long as it is reasonable. It is, in other words, an attempt to 
create flexibility. Because what a default (“fair”) valuation is supposed to be is not spelled 
out, the relationship between the two provisions does not really work. However, it is possible 
that these terms should be read against a different background or pragmatic context. 
Probably, the mandatory (default) part refers to generally accepted accounting principles (e.g. 
historical cost accounting); whereas the optional, discretionary part likely connotes current 
value and appraisal methods. The fair value balance sheet, in accounting terminology, 
however, in general supplies information about the current value of assets and liabilities, not 
the historical cost.
254
 Are lawyers and judges expected to engage in these types of questions? 
The desirability of indiscriminately inserting technical accounting terms in legislation on 
company law is open to question. The most that can be said about this confusing issue is that 
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 Haldeman, R.G “Fact, Fiction, and Fair Value Accounting at Enron” (2006) The CPA Journal, November, A 
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the attempt at flexibility here may be laudable, in that, inter alia, a valuation method 
particularly congenial to the type of business can be used. In the Model Act section 6.40(d) 
achieves something to this effect. It allows reliance either on “financial statements prepared 
on the basis of accounting practices and principles that are reasonable in the circumstances or 
on a fair valuation or other method that is reasonable in the circumstances”. While itself 
perhaps not the model of clarity of drafting, it is possible that the Model Act influenced the 
drafting of this provision in the 2008 Act. As illustrated, the wording of the 2008 Act on this 
does not achieve the desired effect. Certainly, an amendment is needed. 
 
According to section 4(2)(b)(i), reasonably foreseeable contingent assets and liabilities – 
including those that will arise from a proposed distribution, or otherwise – must be included 
at their fair value. In the 1973 Act,
255
 as well as in earlier versions of the 2008 Act, no clarity 
was supplied in respect of whether contingent assets and liabilities must be taken into account 
in determining the solvency and liquidity of the company.
256
 Strangely, contingent liabilities 
had to be considered when applying the solvency test of section 38(2A) of the 1973 Act; 
section 38(2B) explicitly required contingent liabilities to be taken into account.
257
 Its 
exclusion from one of the first drafts of the 2008 Act was thus curious. Generally, then, the 
drafters gradually started dealing with the issue, but to begin with, in a disharmonious way. 
Therefore, the clarification provided in section 4(2)(b)(i) in the 2008 Act, stating that 
contingent assets and liabilities indeed have to be taken into account, is welcome -- a measure 
of uncertainty is eliminated.
258
 Clearly, section 4(2)(b) now requires contingent assets and 
liabilities to be considered for the purposes of both the solvency and liquidity test.
259
 Jooste 
infers from this that the term “liabilities” used in the solvency component (in section 4(1)(a)) 
and the term “debts” used in the liquidity component (in section 4(1)(b)) “are used 
interchangeably”. It is a little strange that the legislature opts for different words in this 
regard; but I submit that Jooste’s interpretation here is correct. 
 
Van der Linde notes that, in accounting terminology, contingent assets “are assets that the 
company may acquire in the future”; importantly, contingent assets and liabilities “are not 
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 Section 85 of the 1973 Act. 
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 Jooste “The maintenance of capital and the Companies Bill 2007” (2007) 124 SALJ 715, 720. 
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required to be reflected in financial statements in terms of international accounting standards 
and international financial reporting standards, and will also not appear in accounting 
records”.260 She correctly remarks that “[t]his confirms that ‘financial information’, which 
may only be based on compliant financial statements and accounting records, must 
necessarily be a fairly narrow concept...”.261 So the application of the solvency and liquidity 
test entails more than merely consulting statements and records.
262
  
 
Essentially, then, on Van der Linde’s view, the inclusion of the concept “contingent” signals 
(or confirms) that liquidity and solvency does not merely have to be determined with 
reference to properly compiled financial statements and accounting records. Overall, on my 
reading of the Act, also considering the structure of the relevant sections, Van der Linde’s 
interpretation is vindicated. This reading links up well with the concept of “financial 
circumstances”. It was stated earlier that “financial circumstances” is broader than “financial 
information”.263 Van der Linde’s preceding points bear this out. Additionally, it should be 
borne in mind that “financial circumstances” appears in the all-important introductory, all-
encompassing section 4(1). The layout no doubt suggests that “financial information” is but 
one of the constituent parts making up the broad concept of “financial circumstances”. The 
latter is the focal point structurally; and the broadness of the concept “contingent” confirms 
the broadness of “financial circumstances”. Moreover, even just semantically, it is doubtless 
arguable that “financial information” seems narrower: it likely connotes something like 
financial facts and figures. In contrast, semantically, “financial circumstances” evokes 
something much wider: probably a collection of factors and conditions, loosely speaking, is 
called to mind.
264
  
                                                 
260
 Van der Linde “The solvency and liquidity approach” (2009) 231, footnotes omitted. So a contingent liability 
does not as yet exist, but it may arise in the future. A provision, on the other hand, is a liability which already 
exists, but the amount and timing thereof is uncertain. I do not think enough emphasis is placed on the quite 
important words preceding “contingent”, namely “reasonably foreseeable”. Of course, this markedly narrows 
the boundaries of contingent assets and liabilities.  
261
 231. 
262
 231. 
263
 It should be noted that material contingent liabilities often have to be accommodated in notes to annual 
financial statements. 
264
 This by itself cannot be decisive, in my view. But together with the preceding points, I think a convincing 
case emerges. In an attempt to heed the lessons of chapter 2, this was probably the legislature’s assertion. The 
semantics (as briefly expounded above) complements the pragmatic elements (here the structure and the use of 
the word “contingent”, for instance) to supply (what I discern to be) the legal content or assertion of the 
legislature. Though, as I have been at pains to stress in chapter 2, one should always guard against committing 
the fallacy of conflating meaning and assertion, perhaps a fair amount of stress or weight can legitimately be 
placed on the ordinary, semantic meaning of the words,by virtue of the legislature’s championing of the ‘plain 
language approach’. (Again, however: the semantic meaning of the words cannot by itself provide the legal 
content.) 
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It can probably not be said that the addition of contingent assets and liabilities in section 
4(2)(b)(i) of the 2008 Act, and especially its relationship with the other parts of the section 
(just discussed), is without problems; but it just about works. A reasonable valuation 
proffered by a valuator need not necessarily be reflected in accounting records. In that case it 
will simply not constitute financial information. But, as just illustrated, it need not; ample 
provision is made for it still to be included in the test as long as it is reasonable.  
 
It can certainly be asked why contingent assets are rendered subject to the condition that they 
must be considered “whether they arise from a distribution or not”, as it is quite unlikely that 
a contingent asset would arise from a distribution.
265
 The insertion of contingent assets and 
liabilities which will arise from the specific distribution or transaction being proposed stands 
as a strange requirement. Beside it being unclear as to how contingent assets would be 
created by a distribution, this requirement ostensibly clashes with the precept that the 
solvency and liquidity test must be met immediately after completing the distribution or other 
transaction.
266
 As soon as a distribution has been made or completed, liability is terminated, 
meaning the need to include it as a liability vanishes. Van der Linde correctly surmises that 
the requirement is likely aimed at the situation where the distribution comprises an incurrence 
of a debt or obligation which is not immediately enforceable.
267
 In that event, the solvency 
and liquidity test must be passed when the distribution is authorised.
268
 All in all, on the issue 
of contingent assets and liabilities, there is certainly room for improvement in the Act. 
 
It seems that the 2008 Act fails to regulate the position of liabilities under previously 
authorised but unexecuted distributions. These liabilities – which are existing, not contingent 
liabilities – have to be included for purposes of the solvency component, according to Van 
der Linde.
269
 She suggests that these liabilities cannot be deemed debts due in the ordinary 
course of business (for purposes of the liquidity element) since they “are enforceable only 
while the company is solvent and able to pay its debts”.270 The duty to distribute being a 
rather unique debt, this proposal is sensible. It makes sense for these liabilities to fall below 
                                                 
265
 Van der Linde “The solvency and liquidity approach” (2009), 231. 
266
 231. 
267
 231. 
268
 Section 46(4)(b). As Van der Linde notes, the requirement cannot operate in the event that the obligation is 
immediately enforceable, as intended in section 46(4)(a) (231). 
269
 231. 
270
 231. 
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the threshold of ‘the ordinary course of business’. The enforceability of these unique duties is 
no doubt in question should the business no longer constitute a going concern. At least, this 
theme requires specific regulation; it must be known whether these debts are relevant or not. 
Van der Linde points to the Model Act as guidance on this score.
271
 Section 6.40(g) explicitly
tackles the issue: claims in respect of previously authorised distributions – other than the 
distribution in respect of which the test is being applied – have to be disregarded if their 
enforceability is dependent on the corporation’s solvency and liquidity at the time of 
payment. This approach is laudable. As the issue whether these claims could ever be deemed 
debts due in the ordinary course of business is undoubtedly an open one, it falls on the 
legislature to make a decision (to close the issue), and provide clarity.  
3.6 Preference Shareholders 
According to section 4(2)(c) of the 2008 Act, an application of the solvency and liquidity test 
in respect of a distribution which takes the form of a transfer of money or property carries a 
caveat. Unless the memorandum of incorporation states that preferential liquidation rights 
indeed have to be taken into account as liabilities, the person applying the solvency and 
liquidity test should not include as a liability any amount that would be required to satisfy the 
preferential rights upon liquidation of classes that have priority over the liquidation rights of 
those receiving the distribution, if the company were to be liquidated at the time of the 
distribution. As the Act currently stands, section 4(2)(c) will only be activated if the recipient 
shareholders also have liquidation rights that are preferential, but rank behind the preferential 
liquidation rights of another class.
272
 Because ordinary shareholders do not have preferential
liquidation rights, the final mention in section 4(2)(c) of “preferential [liquidation] rights” 
should have been only ‘liquidation rights’. 
This is a strange and regrettable provision. When discussing the emergence of ‘legal capital’, 
Hanks even states, as a general rule of sorts, that the solvency test “treats liquidation 
preferences of stock superior to the shares on which the dividend is supposed to be paid as 
liabilities unless the Charter specifically provides otherwise”.273 The default rule enshrined in
271
 232. 
272
 This has been paraphrased (the verbatim text quoted above under section 3.3 is slightly different). The crux 
of the difference is that the paraphrased version drops the third and final mention in the Act of the word 
‘preferential’. In my formulation I follow Van der Linde (232, see footnote 64). 
273
 Hanks “The new legal capital regime in South Africa” (2010) AJ 139. 
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the 2008 Act asserts exactly the opposite: In the determination of the company’s liabilities, 
any amounts needed if the company were to be liquidated at the time of the distribution to 
satisfy the preferential rights upon liquidation of preference shareholders are explicitly 
excluded (unless the memorandum of incorporation provides otherwise). When applying the 
solvency and liquidity test, therefore, preference shareholders are not sufficiently 
protected.
274
 
 
Several additional quandaries and puzzles can be raised here. To begin with, the Act 
mistakenly speaks of the solvency and liquidity test: preferential liquidation rights of 
preference shareholders are relevant for the solvency, not the liquidity, component, for 
liquidation rights cannot be deemed debts due in the usual course of business.
275
 No legal 
requirement enjoins consideration of fixed preferential dividends with a view to evaluating 
the corporation’s capacity to service its debts in the usual course of business.276 
 
The rationale behind confining the caveat of section 4(2)(c) to distributions by way of 
transfers – thereby excluding distributions in the form of incurrence or forgiveness of an 
obligation – is unclear.277 Van der Linde opines that the position regarding parts (b) and (c) of 
the definition of “distribution” is uncertain.278 Naturally, then, regarding the treatment of 
parts (b) and (c), there are only two possibilities.
279
 Van der Linde thinks they are both 
absurd.
280
 Either preferential liquidation rights have always to be considered; or they never 
have to be considered, irrespective of the provisions of the memorandum of incorporation.  
 
This might be too narrow a view. The Act is silent on parts (b) and (c); it is certainly arguable 
that the provisions of the memorandum of incorporation can play a part. Jooste tentatively 
embraces the first alternative.
281
 Since nothing is said of distributions by way of debts being 
incurred, or an obligation or forgiveness of waiver – contained in parts (b) and (c) – the 
                                                 
274
 Jooste “Issues relating to the regulation of ‘distributions’ by the 2008 Companies Act” (2009) 126 SALJ 627, 
643. 
275
 Van der Linde “The solvency and liquidity approach” (2009), 232. This is also tacit in the excerpt by Hanks 
above. 
276
 232. 
277
 232; Jooste “Issues relating to the regulation of ‘distributions’ by the 2008 Companies Act” (2009) 126 SALJ 
627, 643. 
278
 Van der Linde “The solvency and liquidity approach” (2009), 232. 
279
 232. 
280
 232. 
281
 Jooste “Issues relating to the regulation of ‘distributions’ by the 2008 Companies Act” (2009) 126 SALJ 627, 
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preferential rights of preference shareholders have to be included in determining the 
company’s liabilities, says Jooste.282 Van der Linde seems to be non-committal on the best 
construal of the current wording in the Act. But saying the alternatives are absurd is perhaps 
overstating it; they will only be unacceptable if they are not subject to the memorandum of 
incorporation.  
 
Jooste advocates the most lucid stance. The Act only says preferential rights are excluded 
from the determination of the liabilities for part (a). It might seem a touch fanciful to submit 
that, owing to the Act’s silence in respect of parts (b) and (c), it follows that a positive 
obligation to the contrary is imposed for these unmentioned parts. But this is in fact the 
preferable view; and it is not absurd. It must also be remembered that companies can decide 
the issue for themselves through the memorandum of incorporation. This is expressly stated 
for the (a) part; and it is implicit for the rest. We are only concerned with an alterable default 
rule. And if the Act expressly advocates an exclusion exclusively for the (a) part, it seems 
logical that the default rule should swing the opposite way for the (b) and (c) parts. 
 
Hanks helpfully explains the dynamics underlying the issue, saying that 
 
the balance sheet solvency test [the solvency test] treats liquidation preferences of stock superior to the 
shares on which the dividend is supposed to be paid as liabilities unless the charter specifically 
provides otherwise. 
Whether to include such an opt-out in the terms of preferred stock is always an important matter for the 
corporation, the prospective preferred stock investors and their counsel to consider. On the one hand, 
the investors and their counsel may not be inclined to agree to an opt-out, and insist on having their 
senior liquidation preference treated as a liability, which will result in a dollar-for-dollar additional 
block on the corporation’s power to make distributions to junior stockholders, thus increasing the 
cushion of assets available for payment to creditors and to the preferred stockholders. However, the 
preferred share investors also have an interest in the corporation’s being able to raise additional 
common and other junior equity, which will serve as further support for the corporation’s ability to pay 
the preferred equity dividends and, if necessary, its liquidation preference. Thus, the potential preferred 
investor will often agree to the opt-out.
283
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 644. 
283
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Clearly, it is best to have an alterable – not a compulsory – rule on this issue. But the 
legislature unfortunately starts from the wrong premise. It seems an amendment is definitely 
required.  
 
Notably the 2008 Act only addresses preferential rights on liquidation. There is not any 
mention of fixed preferential returns on shares ranking ahead of those in respect of which a 
distribution is made.
284
 It is not really known whether such returns must be considered. It is 
perhaps curious that the provision does not deal with all the rights that are subordinated (or 
treated equally) to those of the shareholders who receive the benefit, for the purpose of which 
solvency and liquidity must be determined.  
 
All in all, the South African position in this regard is unequiovocally out of step with 
international standards. The position in the Model Act,
285
 California, and New Zealand 
specifically accommodates preferences to shareholders in these circumstances: the interests 
of preference shareholders are safeguarded through qualifications or adjustments to the 
solvency component.
286
 California also supplies a precedent for the provision of arrear 
cumulative dividends.
287
 
. 
Van der Linde sums up the situation and the reason for a proposed amendment by saying that  
 
[i]t is difficult to justify why a company that has chosen to provide preferential rights to the return of 
capital should be allowed to make distributions to ordinary shareholders that will endanger those rights. 
At least, if the memorandum [of incorporation] is required to provide expressly that liquidation 
preferences will not be taken into account when distributions are made, potential investors in 
preference shares will be alerted to this fact and can make an informed decision.
288
 
 
                                                 
284
 Jooste “Issues relating to the regulation of ‘distributions’ by the 2008 Companies Act” (2009) 126 SALJ 627, 
643. 
285
 Section 6.40(c)(2). 
286
 Van der Linde “The solvency and liquidity approach” (2009), 232. She also notes that preference 
shareholders are also afforded protection under capital maintenance systems like the United Kingdom and 
Delaware. As regards dividends, the entrenchment of the right to receive dividends follows from the terms of 
issue of the preference shares. As regards liquidation preferences, protection accrues, quite naturally, by way of 
the rule that contributed capital – including the capital in respect of which the preference is enjoyed – has to be 
maintained (233). 
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It is interesting to note that the provision under discussion was the subject of an amendment 
under the Companies Amendment Act 3 of 2011. Regrettably, none of the issues tackled here 
were addressed and the provision remains a disappointment.   
 
3.7 When should the solvency and liquidity test be applied? 
 
The timing for the application of the solvency and liquidity requirement is another important 
and difficult consideration. In this regard it is vital to separate two aspects: the moment the 
test should be considered, and the moment with reference to which the requirements must be 
met.
289
 As to the former, the test must be considered at the time the company intends to make 
a proposed distribution.
290
 Van der Linde concludes this is a reference, not to the time of the 
initial authorisation (of the distribution), but to the time of an intended transfer of money or 
property.
291
 Regarding the latter – the time at which the test must be satisfied – the 2008 Act 
designates different timing rules correlating with different types of transactions. The general 
rule is evidently that the test must be satisfied after the completion of a distribution or 
transaction.
292
 The effect of financial assistance must be gauged “immediately after providing 
the financial assistance”, 293  and “upon implementation” when it comes to mergers or 
amalgamations.
294
 The details are spelled out below. 
 
A special timing rule, moreover, applies to a distribution in the form of an incurrence of an 
obligation or debt.
295
 Section 46(4)(a) stipulates that the effect of this kind of distribution 
must be determined by reference to the time it is authorised (and not when the obligation or 
debt is satisfied). The test must be met, that is, “at the time that the board resolves that the 
company may incur that debt or obligation; and...[does] not apply to any subsequent action of 
the company in satisfaction of that debt or obligation, except to the extent that the resolution, 
or the terms and conditions of the debt or obligation, provide otherwise”.296 Van der Linde 
speculates that this holds even where the company “will only incur the obligation at a future 
                                                 
289
 233. 
290
 Sections 46(1)(b) and 46(4) of the 2008 Act.  
291
 233. Paragraph (a) of the definition of a distribution as a transfer by a company of money or property is said 
to confirm this; each payment would hence constitute a distribution (233). 
292
 Section 46(1)(b) – the test must be satisfied “immediately after completing the proposed distribution”. 
293
 Section 44(3)(b)(i) and section 45(3)(b). 
294
 Section 113(1). 
295
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 Section 46(4). 
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date or subject to fulfilment of a condition”.297 A sound interpretation of this provision is 
tricky since, not only the financial limitations, but also all the requirements of the provision 
(including the board resolution), must be applied at the time of the resolution.
298
  
 
Jooste is critical of the exception created by section 46(4)(a). He is of the view that the test 
should be satisfied after the debt has been incurred, not at the time of authorisation.
299
  He is 
sceptical of the exception  because no reason exists for a departure from the general rule. The 
critical time is only after the (proposed) distribution has been made; likewise the test must be 
satisfied after the debt has been incurred.In addition, nothing is said of the forgiveness or 
waiver of a debt.
300
 Conceptually, this kind of distribution is similar; it is merely the converse 
of an incurrence of debt. The general rule arguably applies to this type of distribution, since 
no exception was created specifically for it.  Jooste’s argument is in effect, because the 
incurrence of the debt amounts to the actual distribution, the general rule should apply, just as 
it does for forgiveness and waiver.  
 
The purported justification for the exception introduced in section 46(4)(a) ostensibly would 
run along the following lines. One should take proper account of the fact that the 
shareholders’ rights to company property or money is always subservient to that of the 
corporate creditors. Property or money can only be distributed if, at the time of the transfer, 
the financial requirements will be satisfied. Specifically: once the transfer has been 
completed, the company must still be financially viable. In contrast, when distributing a duty, 
a shareholder acquires a right – for this purpose the shareholder becomes a creditor – which is 
enforceable regardless of whether the company is solvent and liquid at the time of 
enforcement.  
 
Though the intention of the legislature is fairly clear, its assertion is in the final analysis not 
well supported. The moment of authorisation should not be the relevant time for determining 
solvency and liquidity where obligations are distributed. Solvency and liquidity is only 
determined once: since it is the duty that is distributed, the distribution for all intents and 
purposes occurs when the duty originates. This should be the relevant time. The moment of 
authorisation will probably approximate more closely to this time, as compared with the 
                                                 
297
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moment of actual payment (performance of the obligation). Nevertheless, the pertinent date 
or time should be the date or time of the genesis of the duty. A creative interpretation, in view 
of the interpretation theory espoused in chapter 2, cannot remedy this defect. A substantive 
amendment will be necessary. 
  
 
The further problem with the current wording is that distinguishing the various types of 
distribution is no easy task. Usually, in the payment of dividends, upon the approval by the 
company, the shareholders will acquire the right to a dividend, whilst the company will be 
under a duty to pay on the date stipulated in the approval. Hence, even in the case of 
dividends, a duty exists before the distribution is made. It seems that the ultimate determinant 
of which timing requirement applies in a particular case is the actual formulation employed 
by the company when determining that a distribution will be made. The question will be 
whether the specific formulation most closely aligns with the essence of a paragraph (a) 
distribution, or with a paragraph (b) distribution.  
 
A useful comparison can in this context be made to the Model Act. As with most systems the 
financial limitations have to be satisfied at the moment of giving effect to a distribution, 
while the Model Act accepts that this can occur at different points in time for different 
distributions.
301
 The general timing principle is that distributions take effect on the date of 
authorisation (if, and only if, payment is made within 120 days of the authorisation).
302
 In the 
event that payment occurs in excess of 120 days after the authorisation, the financial 
limitations must be satisfied at the time of actual payment.
303
 Where a duty or debt is 
distributed, the test must be passed on the date the duty or debt is distributed. This is so 
unless each payment is made subject to the company’s solvency, and the debt is subordinated 
to the debts of ordinary trade creditors.
304
 Like the 2008 Act, special timing rules operate in 
the case of the distribution of indebtedness. The Model Act, however, uses the date on which 
the debt is incurred as the central point of reference.  
 
The Model Act further adds the useful qualification that this rule will apply only where the 
shareholder will become an ordinary creditor after distribution. The provision accordingly is 
                                                 
301
 Section 6.40(e) read with (g) of the Model Act. 
302
 Section 6.40(e)(3) of the Model Act. 
303
 Section 6.40(e)(3) of the Model Act. 
304
 Section 6.40(e)(2)(g) of the Model Act. 
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more carefully formulated than its South African equivalent.The difference in timing rules 
can be explained by the status of a shareholder’s claim regarding a previously authorised 
distribution: where a shareholder gets an unconditional and unsubordinated claim which is 
immediately enforceable, the test must be met when the claim originates.
305
 Where the claim 
is subordinated, the requirements must be satisfied at the time of actual payment.
306
 
 
The distinction drawn at the beginning of this section, between the moment the test should be 
considered, and the moment with reference to which the requirements must be met, has not 
been cleanly enacted in South Africa. Section 4(1) speaks of “at a particular time” and “at 
that time”. It seems that these phrases refer to the time at which the test must be met. But the 
provision says that “reasonably foreseeable financial circumstances...at that time” must be 
considered. This might cause confusion because the assessment of solvency and liquidity 
must obviously be carried out in respect of reasonably foreseeable facts at the time the test is 
considered. It could thus be said that the future date is invoked in respect of the first quoted 
phrase, whereas the time the test is considered seems to be suggested by the second phrase. 
Reasonably foreseeable financial circumstances would only be relevant to solvency if 
solvency had to be measured in respect of a future date.  
 
What is more, section 4(1)(b) gives rise to a similar problem: the period over which liquidity 
must be determined is said to start when the test is considered. It would seem that the 
legislator here wanted the starting point for the liquidity period to commence at the same time 
as the point from which liquidity has to be determined. The introductory portion of section of 
4(1) covers the liquidity part too: “all reasonably foreseeable financial circumstances...at that 
time”, which again makes sense only if it refers to the moment that liquidity is considered 
(not the moment with reference to which the test must be passed). An amendment unbundling 
the two parts in the introduction to section 4(1) is needed to solve these problems. That said, 
it is difficult, notwithstanding the careless drafting, to interpret these provisions incorrectly. 
A sensible interpreter should be able to make sense of these provisions. But, at the same time, 
it certainly should not be so difficult to gauge the content here and it is submitted that an 
amendment clarifying the timing elements is necessary. The timing dilemmas under this 
section will be analyzed below particularly with distributions in mind.
307
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 Van der Linde “The solvency and liquidity approach” (2009), 235. 
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Furthermore, these provisions become problematic when they are applied in conjunction with 
s 46. Section 46(1)(c) read with section 46(4) is consistent with section 4 as regards part (a) 
and (b) distributions. But, according to section 4, the liquidity period for a part (c) 
distribution must be determined from the time when the resolution is made while section 
46(4) does not expressly require that liquidity and solvency for part (c) distributions must be 
determined at the time when it is resolved to make a distribution. As I have argued, 
previously part (b) and (c) distributions should be considered on the same footing.
308
 
Amendments are needed to this effect. In such an amendment, exceptions to the section 
46(1)(c) rule should be clear; and the relationship between this section, section 46(4) and 
section 4 should be coherent.  
 
Finally, in terms of section 46(1)(b), solvency and liquidity must be considered from the time 
of the distribution in the case of part (b) distributions. However, section 46(4) takes the board 
resolution as its point of reference. It could perhaps be argued that section 46(4) does not 
override section 46(1)(b) which is not formulated with reference to resolutions of the board. 
Though hardly a model of clarity, upon reading the provisions, the relationship between these 
sections still can be read to make sense. A particular kind of distribution – part (b) 
distributions – is treated separately: it is stated that the general requirements for distributions 
are modified with respect to this particular type of distribution. Liquidity and solvency in 
terms of s 46(1)(b) must also be determined with reference to the time of the resolution rather 
than the time of completing the distribution. That is to say, the legislature’s assertion here is 
probably just about coherent, as section 46(4) is meant to prevail over section 46(1). 
 
3.8 How should the test be applied? 
 
Several options emerge here. It remains to analyse the legislature’s choices regarding the  
manner of application of the solvency and liquidity test. 
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Crucially, it should be settled whether an objective or subjective enquiry is called for. Section 
46(1)(b) is the decisive provision for purposes of answering this question.
309
 A company is 
prohibited from making a distribution “unless it reasonably appears” that the company will 
satisfy the test after completing the proposed distribution. There is no mention of the 
(subjective) belief or the perspective of the board. We are not told to whom it should so 
“reasonably appear...”. It seems appropriate to assume that the test must therefore be applied 
from the perspective of an objective bystander.  
 
Objective standards often apply by virtue of the qualifier ‘reasonably’. It is submitted that an 
objective, rather than a subjective, test has been adopted. Van der Linde maintains that the 
existence of a reason or ground upon which a conclusion could reasonably be reached is the 
“determining factor”.310 The facts constituting these grounds do not have to be assessed from 
the perspective of the board. But, in evaluating compliance, only the facts that were 
reasonably available at the time of the distribution can be considered in ascertaining whether 
the test is satisfied. A court may hence consider all the relevant facts but it is confined to the 
facts available at the time of the distribution, as opposed to facts available when the decision 
was made.  
 
The next important issue is the choice in section 4 of working with a prediction of solvency 
and liquidity as compared with actual solvency and liquidity, in determining whether the 
board has properly authorized a distribution. As for solvency, it is clear that this component 
hinges on a prediction of the position immediately after completion of the distribution (or 
transaction), and not the actual financial position of the corporation. In a similar vein, the 
liquidity test is also based on a prediction. As the predictive element of the solvency and 
liquidity test is built in, the test will be satisfied even in case the prediction later turns out to 
be inaccurate (if the prediction was at least reasonable). 
 
Equally, if the prediction was unreasonable at the time, but subsequently turns out to be 
accurate, the distribution is nevertheless unlawful.
311
 Van der Linde points out that a potential 
conflict with insolvency law looms here as a distribution which is legitimate in terms of the 
                                                 
309
 All the distribution provisions, including this one, receive detailed attention again, in the following chapter. 
The considerations highlighted under this section – as with the previous sections – do not amount to the final 
word on the issues raised. 
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 Van der Linde “The solvency and liquidity approach” (2009), 235. 
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Act because insolvency could not be predicted could still be a disposition without value in 
insolvency law, because of actual insolveny.
312
 However, she probably overstates the point. 
Insolveny and company law in these situations supplement one another. This is also the case 
with many other transactions. 
 
The broad equivalent of the solvency component in California is based on a prediction (made 
immediately before the distribution).
313
 Under the Model Act the lawfulness of a distribution 
is dependent on the company’s actual (not predicted) compliance with the test when the 
distribution is made. But the Model Act provides that a distribution can only be made if the 
company will be solvent and liquid after making it (which is measured from the authorisation 
if payment occurs within 120 days).
314
 Hence, while lawfulness is indeed contingent on 
actual compliance, a prediction of the company’s future financial position is still required.  
 
But, the precise extent to which the determination of liquidity and solvency will be predictive 
will depend on the reason for which it is analysed. It will therefore be difficult to harmonize 
the predictive elements of the definition of solvency and liquidity with the more specific 
provisions where solvency and liquidity requirements are applied. For our purposes it is 
particularly relevant to determine how the solvency and liquidity requirement will be applied 
in the context of distributions. Several provisions impact on this topic. Section 46(1)(b) 
determines that a distribution inter alia only be made if it “reasonably appears” that these 
requirements will be met. Section 46(1)(c) similarly requires that the directors must 
acknowledge that they have reasonably concluded that the solvency and liquidity test has 
been met. Section 46(6) imposes liability on a director who did not vote against a distribution 
although he knew or reasonably should have known that any of the requirements in s 46(1) 
were not met.
315
 Section 77(4)(a)(i) excludes liability where the solvency and liquidity test is 
actually not met after a distribution has been made. Section 77(4)(a)(ii) excludes liability 
where it was reasonable at the time of the decision to distribute, to think that the solvency and 
liquidity requirement would be met after the distribution had been made. Apparently section 
46(1)(b) (although the Act is also open to a different interpretation here) and 77(4)(a)(i)  
work with actual solvency and liquidity. They are prospective only in that liquidity will still 
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 236. In an insolvent winding-up, in order to evaluate whether the payment will be voidable or not, the actual 
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of 1936). 
313
 Van der Linde “The solvency and liquidity approach” (2009) 236. 
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have to be determined with reference to a future period. The other provisions require that 
decisionmakers make a reasonable assessment of liquidity and solvency at the time of 
decisionmaking. They accordingly are predictive in the strict sense. 
 
 
However, van der Linde contends that the rationale for the above distinction disappears 
because of the way in which the distinction is worded in the 2008 Act. That is, the predictive 
element has been built into the solvency and liquidity test itself, meaning “there is no basis 
for working with actual solvency and liquidity”. 316  For this argument she relies on the 
introductory, all encompassing part of section 4(1), which covers both the solvency and 
liquidity elements. She proposes the following solution: that the phrase “considering all 
reasonably foreseeable [financial] circumstances at the time” be deleted from the introductory 
sentence of the solvency component and inserted at the start of the liquidity component.
317
  
 
This appears to be a relatively tidy solution and her suggestion may be a laudable 
improvement overall. However, it is doubtful whether Van der Linde is right in her initial 
observation. Though the predictive element is indeed built into the solvency and liquidity 
test, I do not see why actual solvency and liquidity cannot be gauged after the fact, which 
means that liability could be ascertained in terms thereof. Section 4 is predictive, whereas 
section 46(1)(b) and 77(4)(a)(i) invoke the actual financial position of the company. Sections 
46(1)(c), 46(6)(b) and 77(4)(a)(ii) introduce an objective (or factual) but predictive yardstick, 
serving as the limits of directorial liability, which exist independent of the predictive 
functioning of the solvency and liquidity test in section 4. 
 
A rigorous scheme emerges in terms whereof a distinction is made between applying the test 
for the purpose of determing the lawfulness of distributions on the one hand and the liability 
of directors for unlawful distributions on the other.
318
 Authorization by directors and their 
ensuing liability if this not properly done, must be premised on a prediction about the 
corporation’s solvency and liquidity. For this reason sections 46(1)(c), 46(6)(b) and 
77(4)(a)(ii) which concern liability and actions of directors are predictive. Section 77(4)(a)(i) 
is not predictive but is necessary to limit liability with reference to actual solvency and 
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liquidity. Rather than being concerned about the accuracy of predictions, however, creditors’ 
interests are impacted by actual solvency and liquidity.
319
 Mere non compliance with the non-
predictive section 46(1)(b) will mean that a distributions will be unlawful and this will be in 
the interest of creditors because distributions will be recoverable from shareholders, but it 
will not by itself lead to liability for directors. The scheme certainly can be clarified and 
simplified. The role which section 46 plays in determining the lawfulness of a distribution 
irrespective of liability can be expressed more clearly. The relationship between the liability 
provisions in section 46 and the limitation provisions are not unproblematic.
 320 
 Nevertheless 
the basic tenor of these provisions is clear. 
 
The next issue to be considered is the nature of the duty to apply the solvency and liquidity 
test – in this sense one can speak of a positive or a negative duty.321 Is a passive or an active 
approach to solvency and liquidity followed; does the company (and its board) bear a positive 
or a negative duty? Under sections 85(4) and 90(2) of the 1973 Act, payment was allowed as 
a general rule, unless there were reasonable grounds to believe the company was insolvent or 
was incapable of paying its debts. This was, in other words, a passive approach.  
 
Under the 2008 Act, however, positive steps are required from the board to establish solvency 
and liquidity. But this is expressed in a rather curious manner, as the language adopted is far 
from unified. The particular action which the board is required to take with respect to 
solvency and liquidity is variously described. Looking at sections 44 and 45 – concerning the 
financial assistance transactions – the board has to be “satisfied” that the company will meet 
the test. Regarding section 46 – distributions – the board must adopt a resolution 
acknowledging it has “applied” the test and “concluded” that the company will satisfy it. As 
to section 47 – when cash is distributed in lieu of capitalisation shares – the board has to 
“consider” the test, as well as be “satisfied” that the company will satisfy the test. Regarding 
mergers and amalgamations the board must “consider”322 the test and “reasonably believe”323 
it will be satisfied. In all of these situations, therefore, the required manner of application of 
the solvency and liquidity test is differently described. Van der Linde believes that these 
                                                 
319
 Van der Linde “The solvency and liquidity approach” (2009) 236. 
320
 It may be difficult to distinguish the roles of the liability provisions in section 46 and the exclusion 
provisions in section 77(4), see further 5.4. Van der Linde “The solvency and liquidity approach” (2009) 236 the 
last paragraph, which distinguishes authorization and liability, seems to add to this confusion. 
321
 Van der Linde “The solvency and liquidity approach” (2009) 237. 
322
 Section 113(4)(a). 
323
 Section 113(4)(b). 
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subtle differences will cause unnecessary complexity.
324
 The acknowledgement in the case of 
distributions is a unique case (I will focus more closely on this in subsequent chapters).  
 
Apart from that, can one reasonably speak of a meaningful or practical difference between 
concluding, being satisfied, and reasonably believing? Certainly an argument can be made 
that the variation in expression is deliberate; that the legislature had something particular in 
mind when using each of these terms; a different legal assertion may technically have been 
enacted. But, supposing no amendments are in the offing and these terms will remain, it is 
probably of no consequence. For practical purposes, there is no difference between 
concluding and being satisfied the test will be met. Nevertheless, this is not true of the phrase 
“reasonably believe”. This formulation is ubiquitous in legal materials and it may come with 
a fair amount of baggage.  
 
Likewise: does considering and applying the test amount to the same thing? For all intents 
and purposes, it appears so. Where a board of directors concretely is obliged to realize one of 
the mentioned provisions, and is enjoined, say, to “consider” the test, from the point of view 
of the board members, the board may just as well have been enjoined to “apply” the test. 
Nevertheless, in order to avoid any confusion, an amendment integrating these terms is 
desirable, so that one term is consistently and uniformly used. Notwithstanding the 
differential formulation, it is certain the board bears a positive duty to consider or apply the 
test.
325
 
 
3.9 Conclusions 
 
It is now clear that a solvency and liquidity test is the chosen method for protecting creditors 
in the case of distributions to shareholders (and other transactions potentially influencing 
creditor interests). On the basis of the arguments above, it appears this test is a suitable 
limitation on distributions to shareholders. The pervasive function of the test in terms of the 
2008 Act seems to be a generally positive move. It has, however, been shown that the 
introduction of a solvency and liquidity philosophy in the 2008 Act is beset with 
demonstrable problems. These mainly go to the mechanics of its implementation; in this 
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 Van der Linde “The solvency and liquidity approach” (2009) 237. 
325
 Van der Linde “The solvency and liquidity approach” (2009) 237. 
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regard the Act has not been carefully and thoughtfully worded. The rectification of some of 
these problems is possible through shrewder formulation and meticulous cross-referencing.  
 
Van der Linde maintains that “the lack of nuanced application of the test in the different 
contexts of authorisation, validity and liability can only be corrected by substantive 
revision”.326 It has been briefly suggested where and to what extent this will be necessary. 
Later in the study positive proposals (with accompanying commentary) are advanced.
327
 It is 
probably already fair to conclude that the purposes of section 7 play no role in the 
interpretation of solvency and liquidity. This conclusion will possibly hold for the 
distribution provisions, and most likely corporate finance as a whole. As a pragmatic tool, it 
may prove more beneficial to view the distribution provisions through the prism of the 
dynamics of solvency and liquidity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
326
 240. 
327
 See chapter 6 below. 
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Chapter 4 
Authorisation of a Distribution, Acknowledgement of Solvency and Liquidity, and 
Related Requirements  
 
4.1 Introductory  
 
The 2008 Act does not regulate different kinds of distributions separately. Instead the aim is 
to deal with distributions to shareholders in a unified way by defining the term “distribution” 
and subjecting instances complying with this definition to the same requirements. This 
strategy does not really work because of the flawed drafting of the relevant provisions. It 
often appears as though the legislature did not intend to bring about certain effects which 
would seem to follow from the language employed. Especially in these cases a nuanced 
understanding of legal interpretation and the limits of authoritative law-making is required.  
 
But some parts of these provisions are simply mistakes and need to be corrected as soon as 
possible. The obvious example is the arbitrary extension of the regulation of distributions to 
apply within the group context. It is only the acquisition of shares by a subsidiary in its 
holding company which needs to be regulated. The inclusion of the qualifier “indirect” in the 
definition of “distribution” is arguably sufficient to counteract possible circumvention of the 
Act by groups of companies. Moreover, when compared to payments for shares under a court 
order, the exclusion of payments under the appraisal remedy from the definition of 
“distribution” is questionable.328 
 
Barring those made in compliance with a court order or pursuant to an existing obligation, 
distributions must be authorised by the board of directors.
329
 This must be distinguished from 
an acknowledgement of solvency and liquidity: before making a distribution, the board of 
directors must acknowledge that it has applied the solvency and liquidity test and has 
reasonably concluded that the company will satisfy the test immediately after completion of 
the proposed distribution.
330
 As will be explained, the 2008 Act does not consistently and 
rigorously distinguish these two elements. These requirements will probably cultivate 
responsible directorial behaviour in connection with distributions, but numerous problems 
                                                 
328
 Van der Linde “The regulation of distributions” (2009) TSAR 500. 
329
 See sections 46(1)(a)(i) and (ii) of the 2008 Act. 
330
 Section 46(1)(c). 
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emerge in this context and it is the object of this chapter to flesh these out and to hint at the 
ultimate form of workable solutions. This will prove a complex task. 
 
It will be seen that the considerations which crop up under this heading are coloured by the 
dynamics of the financial restrictions spelled out in the previous chapter; and both these 
collective themes are in turn inextricably tied to the issues which crop up under directorial 
liability. Examples are easy to come by. The myriad difficulties surrounding solvency and 
liquidity (spelled out in the previous chapter) obviously come up in the requirement of the 
acknowledgment.
331
Also, the fact that the distinction between the authorisation and the 
acknowledgment is not soundly devised can be gauged from the fact that liability is imposed 
on directors on grounds of their participation in the authorisation and not the 
acknowledgment. Arguably, because directors are liable solely in connection with their 
failure to comply with the financial limitations, their liability should be contingent on 
participation in the acknowledgment.
332
 These are the types of problems that will be 
considered below. But final conclusions will only be drawn by the end of the next chapter, as 
the full picture will then be discernible, with directorial liability completing the picture. 
Precisely because of their interdependence, logically schematising the various issues is 
difficult. The best approach may simply be to go through the provisions in the order in which 
they appear in the Act. 
 
4.2 Section 46 of the 2008 Act 
 
It is extremely difficult to make sense of all the provisions of section 46; and its relationship 
with solvency and liquidity on the one hand, and directorial liability on the other is 
sometimes cumbersome and often intractable. It is therefore essential to reproduce the actual 
wording of the section below. This will also be useful for the analysis in subsequent chapters. 
 
46. Distributions must be authorised by board.—(1) A company must not make any proposed 
distribution unless— 
(a) the distribution— 
(i) is pursuant to an existing legal obligation of the company, or a court order; or 
(ii) the board of the company, by resolution, has authorised the distribution; 
(b) it reasonably appears that the company will satisfy the solvency and liquidity test 
                                                 
331
 Also see section 46(1)(b) which invokes the solvency and liquidity test. 
332
 This is the view of Van der Linde, see 496. 
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immediately after completing the proposed distribution; and 
(c) the board of the company, by resolution, has acknowledged that it has applied the solvency 
and liquidity test, as set out in section 4, and reasonably concluded that the company will 
satisfy the solvency and liquidity test immediately after completing the proposed 
distribution. 
(2) When the board of a company has adopted a resolution contemplated in subsection (1) (c), the 
relevant distribution must be fully carried out, subject only to subsection (3). 
(3) If the distribution contemplated in a particular board resolution, court order or existing legal 
obligation has not been completed within 120 business days after the board made the acknowledgement 
required by subsection (1) (c), or after a fresh acknowledgement being made in terms of this subsection, 
as the case may be— 
(a) the board must reconsider the solvency and liquidity test with respect to the remaining 
distribution to be made pursuant to the original resolution, order or obligation; and 
(b) despite any law, order or agreement to the contrary, the company must not proceed with 
or continue with any such distribution unless the board adopts a further resolution as 
contemplated in subsection (1) (c). 
(4) If a distribution takes the form of the incurrence of a debt or other obligation by the company, 
as contemplated in paragraph (b) of the definition of “distribution” set out in section 1, the requirements 
of this section— 
(a) apply at the time that the board resolves that the company may incur that debt or 
obligation; and 
(b) do not apply to any subsequent action of the company in satisfaction of that debt or 
obligation, except to the extent that the resolution, or the terms and conditions of the debtor obligation, provide 
otherwise. 
(5) If, after considering the solvency and liquidity test as required by this section, it appears to the 
company that the section prohibits its immediate compliance with a court order contemplated in 
subsection (1) (a) (i)— 
(a) the company may apply to a court for an order varying the original order; and 
(b) the court may make an order that— 
(i) is just and equitable, having regard to the financial circumstances of the company; and 
(ii) ensures that the person to whom the company is required to make a payment in terms 
of the original order is paid at the earliest possible date compatible with the company 
satisfying its other financial obligations as they fall due and payable. 
(6) A director of a company is liable to the extent set out in section 77 (3) (e) (vi) if the director— 
(a) was present at the meeting when the board approved a distribution as contemplated in this 
section, or participated in the making of such a decision in terms of section 74; and 
(b) failed to vote against the distribution, despite knowing that the distribution was contrary to 
this section. 
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Broadly, three requirements emerge for the making of a distribution. First, distributions have 
to be authorised by the board of directors (except those made in compliance with a court 
order or pursuant to an existing legal obligation).
333
 Second, it must reasonably appear that 
the company will satisfy the solvency and liquidity test immediately after completing the 
proposed distribution.
334
 Lastly, the board of the company must acknowledge that it has 
applied the solvency and liquidity test and has reasonably concluded that the company will 
satisfy the test immediately after completing the proposed distribution.
335
  
 
As to the first requirement, one could question what is meant by “existing legal obligation”. 
As a general rule distributions are made in terms of existing legal obligations at any rate. On 
the face of it the intention seems clear enough, as it is paired with “court order”: an 
authorisation will be required in cases where the board is afforded a measure of discretion in 
respect of a distribution – i.e. cases where the distribution is not dictated by an external 
fact.
336
 The striking thing about the authorisation requirement is that the board now has all the 
power. Under the 1973 Act shareholder approval was required. This is no longer the case. 
The 1973 Act did not impose directorial liability for unlawful distributions. The 2008 Act 
does. Hence, it arguably makes sense to afford this expansive power to the board. As to 
timing: it seems the authorisation by the board can be given at any time before the 
distribution is made. 
 
The question is prompted whether the memorandum of incorporation can still validly provide 
that shareholder approval is a requirement for a distribution. Section 46 is clearly not an 
alterable provision.
337
 Thus section 15(2)(a)(iii) must be complied with. This provision 
stipulates that the memorandum of incorporation may include any provision which imposes a 
higher standard, greater restriction or more onerous requirement on the company than would 
otherwise apply under an unalterable provision (i.e. section 46) of the Act. So the question 
becomes: would adding such a requirement to the memorandum of incorporation impose a 
more onerous requirement than would apply if mere board authorisation was required? It is 
not clear from whose perspective exactly the requirement should be stricter or more onerous. 
                                                 
333
 Section 46(1)(a)(i) and (ii). 
334
 Section 46(1)(b). 
335
 Section 46(1)(c). 
336
 I do not mean ‘agency’ in a legal sense. 
337
 Section 1 “unalterable provision”. 
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This might depend on the specific stakeholder under consideration.  It accordingly is 
impossible to provide an absolute answer to this question. 
 
Van der Linde takes the view that a company’s memorandum of incorporation can impose 
the requirement of shareholder approval (in addition to the statutorily required board 
authorisation).
338
 But this view is not substantiated. Presumably she takes it for granted that 
adding the shareholder approval requirement renders the (overall) requirement(s) more 
onerous. Intuitively, this seems to be the better view. I think the Act indeed allows such a 
requirement to be imposed in the memorandum of incorporation. Plainly, if the memorandum 
of incorporation so provides, there is an additional obstacle before the distribution will be 
allowed. Board and shareholder approval is then necessary and this surely constitutes “a 
higher standard”, “a greater restriction” or a “more onerous requirement”.339 If merely board 
approval was required, intuitively, a less onerous requirement for a distribution would 
apply.
340
 
 
I turn now to the second requirement: that it must reasonably appear that the company will 
satisfy the test immediately after completing the distribution. This is clearly an objective 
test.
341
 At first blush, this provision seems self-evident (the ensuing analysis will later suggest 
why this may not be the case). This provision ostensibly makes clear that compliance with the 
solvency and liquidity test, as encompassed in section 4, is mandatory for all distributions. 
The phrase “it reasonably appears” enjoins the company to consider objectively determinable 
facts.
342
 It is not enough to assert that the time at which solvency and liquidity must be 
determined for the purpose of section 46(1)(b) is the time at which the distribution is 
completed. The question is from which point must it be considered. It may be cogently 
argued either that this provision uses the time when the company decides to make a 
distribution or the time at which the distribution has been made. However, it is suggested that 
the latter view is preferable. So far, the purpose of the three parts under section 46(1) seems 
obvious: the first part refers to the authorisation, the second the solvency and liquidity test, 
and the last part the acknowledgment.  
                                                 
338
 492. 
339
 Section 15(2)(a)(iii). 
340
 The Act says the memorandum of incorporation may include any provision “imposing on the company” a 
more onerous requirement than would otherwise apply. I believe my analysis is consistent with the perspective 
invoked – i.e. that of the company.  
341
 See 3.8 above. 
342
 See 3.7 above: the issue of timing here is mirrored in my discussion of section 4 of the 2008 Act. 
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The third requirement pertains to the acknowledgment. This requirement is rather sloppily 
worded. It can easily be divided into two parts. The first part says that the board must 
acknowledge that it has applied the solvency and liquidity test (as contained in section 4); the 
second part continues “and reasonably concluded that the company will satisfy” the test 
“immediately after completing the proposed distribution”. The following interpretation thus 
seems possible: the Act merely requires that the directors have to declare that their 
conclusion is reasonable, not that their conclusion actually has to be reasonable.
343
 But this 
does not seem very plausible; all things considered, this does not seem to me to be the 
legislature’s assertion.  
 
It would be excessively fanciful or pedantic to read the Act in such a formalistic way. It 
seems obvious that the legislature intended to convey that the board has to acknowledge it 
has applied the test wherein it in fact reasonably concluded the company will meet the test 
after completing the distribution. Either the actual “reasonable conclusion” is implicit in the 
acknowledgment mentioned in the first part; or the second part explicitly ensures there will 
be a reasonable conclusion. Otherwise the acknowledgement’s function would be in question. 
The context of the provision appears to confirm this. The provision does not say: the board 
must acknowledge that it reasonably concluded the test will be passed. The “reasonably 
concluded” part is separate; it seems to be emphasised. The perlocutionary intent – or larger 
reason – behind this provision is to guarantee the making of a proper acknowledgement of 
solvency and liquidity in the case of all distributions, ensuring responsible distributions not 
compromising the position of creditors (and shareholders). The illocutionary intent – which 
provides the law’s ultimate content – here seems to compel a recognition on the part of the 
interpreter that an acknowledgment has to be made and that it has in fact to be based on a 
reasonable conclusion of solvency and liquidity.
344
 Nevertheless the careless drafting would 
ideally need reformulation to avoid any confusion. 
 
It appears that section 46(1)(a) operates independently of section 46(1)(c): the resolution 
acknowledging the application of the solvency and liquidity test is required even if the 
                                                 
343
 Directors could perhaps be liable if the statement is false but, on this reading, not under this provision; a 
reasonable conclusion in fact is not required but only an acknowledgement that there was a reasonable 
conclusion. (On this reading, it is possible that liability can be imposed on directors if it becomes apparent that 
the acknowledgement was intentionally incorrect or fraudulent.)  
344
 See especially pages 41 to 42 for an explanation of the distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary 
intentions. 
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distribution itself was not authorised by the board of directors but is pursuant to a court order 
or existing legal obligation. Some cases, thus, require board authorisation; all cases require an 
acknowledgement of solvency and liquidity. The resolution authorising a distribution must be 
kept apart from this acknowledgement. It is questionable, however, whether the legislature 
has consistently done so. It seems the board can make the acknowledgement at any time 
before the distribution. But does the acknowledgement have to be made before the 
authorisation? The Act does not prescribe a particular sequence as regards the authorisation 
and the acknowledgement. It is doubtful whether much can be inferred from the order in 
which the requirements are laid out – i.e. the authorisation is mentioned first. This issue is 
especially crucial because it influences directorial liability for unlawful distributions. It could 
well be that, in all cases where an authorisation is required, it should occur after the 
acknowledgement has been made. If this were not so, liability could follow if a director 
authorises a distribution knowing that an acknowledgement is yet to be made (i.e. knowing 
that all the requirements of section 46 are not satisfied).  
 
The introduction of a declaration or formal acknowledgement resolution of solvency and 
liquidity, in principle, seems laudable. Along with auditor confirmation, this is also 
mandatory in England; and a solvency certificate has to be signed in New Zealand; something 
similar can also be seen in the Model Act.
345
 A positive duty is imposed on directors, 
meaning the likelihood of unlawful distributions prejudicing the interests of creditors (and 
shareholders) is diminished. On the other hand, it is also true that the requirement reduces 
flexibility, as a particular date emerges for the application of the financial restrictions.
346
 To 
address this, the possibility of a reconsideration is also provided for: section 46(3) caters for 
this in terms of a 120 day rule. Section 46(3) has to be read with 46(2). These two provisions 
together cause quite a bit of trouble.  
 
Section 46(2) states that when the board has made an acknowledgment, the relevant 
distribution must be fully carried out, “subject only to subsection (3)”. The board thus has a 
duty to distribute after it made the acknowledgement, subject to section 46(3). Essentially, 
what section 46(3) requires is that, if the distribution has not been completed within 120 
                                                 
345
 See section 173(3)(5) of the British Companies Act 1985, section 714(3) and (5) of the UK Companies Act 
2006 where it is referred to as  directors’ ‘statement’; section 52(2) of the New Zealand Companies Act 1993; 
section 6.40(g) of the Model Act. See also Van der Linde “The solvency and liquidity approach in the 
Companies Act 2008” (2009) 2 TSAR 224, 238. 
346
 238. 
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business days after the board made the acknowledgement, the board is under a duty, one, to 
reconsider the solvency and liquidity test, and, two, not to distribute unless a new 
acknowledgement has been made.
347
 Literally read, the board will be under a duty to 
distribute once the acknowledgment was made if the aforesaid situation is not relevant. But 
this situation will only be relevant if 120 days have elapsed since the acknowledgment. This 
is clearly an awkward formulation.  
 
If, say, 74 days have elapsed since the acknowledgement (the 46(3) requirements will then 
not apply), the board is under a duty to distribute. But what if the acknowledgment turns out 
to be defective and/or the requirement of section 46(1)(b) is no longer satisfied, and the board 
is aware of this? The Act seems to say that there is nevertheless a duty on the board to 
complete the distribution. But this would be highly undesirable. This provision probably 
derives from the Model Act.
348
 In the Model Act, the 120 day rule operates solely in respect 
of “other distributions”. A reassessment under the Model Act is not possible in the case of a 
distribution of a debt or the reacquisition of shares (unique timing rules operate in these 
cases). Under the Model Act the rule is called for because, for “other distributions”, the test 
must as a general rule be applied at the time of authorisation – save if payment will occur in 
excess of 120 days later.
349
 Specifically, section 6.40(e)(3) states that the time for measuring 
the effect of a distribution for compliance with the financial restrictions for all distributions 
(not concerning the reacquisition of shares or the distribution of a debt) is the authorisation 
date, if the payment occurs within 120 days following the authorisation; if the payment 
occurs in excess of 120 days after the authorisation, however, the date of the payment is the 
relevant date. The 2008 Act, by contrast, mostly uses the time of “making” a distribution as 
the reference point.
350
 It should also be noted that under the Model Act – in contrast with the 
position under the 2008 Act – no particular resolution acknowledging or declaring an 
application of the financial limitations is required.
351
 
 
                                                 
347
 It is submitted that this section further justifies my interpretation of section 46(1)(c). Two things are required 
under section 46(3): a factual reconsideration of solvency and liquidity, as well as an acknowledgment – a 
substantive reassessment is required, in addition to a formal acknowledgment. Section 46(1)(c) proceeds along 
the same lines: a formal acknowledgment is needed, on top of a reasonable conclusion that the company will 
actually meet the solvency and liquidity test. In this sense, it is arguable that the inclusion of two clauses (rather 
than just one) in section 46(1)(c) is (purposefully) functional.  
348
 See section 6.40(e)(3). 
349
 In which case the effect of the distribution must be measured as of the date of payment. 
350
 Van der Linde “The solvency and liquidity approach in the Companies Act 2008” (2009) 2 TSAR 224, 238. 
351
 238. 
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Van der Linde correctly states that the implication of sections 46(2) and (3) is that periodic 
reconsiderations must be performed irrespective of when the corporation intends to proceed 
or continue with the distribution, once the first acknowledgment has been made.
352
  She says 
that a company which does not intend to implement a “distribution within 120 days of its 
authorisation would thus be wise to postpone the initial adoption of the acknowledgment 
resolution until shortly before the intended implementation”.353 However, this solves one 
problem by creating a new one. It will probably subject directors to liability where they 
authorize a distribution knowing that they have not yet acknowledged that the liquidity and 
solvency test is met. Moreover, it may happen that the company will make an 
acknowledgement because they intend to immediately make a distribution but that 
unintended delays between the acknowledgement and completion of a distribution then 
ensue.
354
 The directors are forced to take the initiative with positive steps to evaluate the 
financial position of the company at regular intervals. From this perspective, then, it appears 
that substantive revision of the Act on this score is necessary. A reconsideration (as stipulated 
in section 46(3)(a)) and acknowledgment (as set out in section 46(3)(b)) should be required 
if, and only if, the corporation will imminently proceed with a distribution and an excess of 
120 days have elapsed since the previous consideration and acknowledgement.
355
  
 
But, as already alluded to, there is a further problem. The company must proceed with the 
distribution unless 120 days have elapsed since the acknowledgement. This is also 
awkwardly formulated. Essentially, the board is given 120 days to distribute (based on the 
first acknowledgment). The reason behind giving an acknowledgment a limited shelf life is 
fairly clear. The financial position of any company is not static; and the directors’ forecast of 
the financial position can easily change with time, as business conditions develop. In time the 
reasonable conclusion in an acknowledgment that the financial limitations will be met 
immediately after completing the distribution may no longer hold as the directors’ estimation 
changes over time. Section 46(3) also refers to “a fresh acknowledgment being made in terms 
of this subsection”. Hence, any distribution cannot legally be completed unless there is an 
acknowledgment which is not older than 120 days. The purpose of the requirement of the 
acknowledgment is naturally to ensure the board is focused on the solvency and liquidity 
requirement, to safeguard the interests of creditors. 
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 The acknowledgment is ostensibly accorded such weight that it strangely appears that the 
company will be obligated to carry out what would amount to an unlawful distribution simply 
because of the board’s formal acknowledgment. This is highly problematic. Seemingly, as a 
result, directors would sometimes be forced to incur liability, knowing full well beforehand 
that they would become so liable. Van der Linde speculates that these differing standards 
were enacted in order to distinguish between “the validity of a distribution, on the one hand, 
and the liability of directors, on the other hand”.356 The statement  implies that the import of 
the Act will be that directors will not be liable if they distribute in these circumstances. Given 
this impossible or absurd situation, presumably, it is unlikely that personal liability could 
realistically follow. But this conclusion is of doubtful correctness.  Moreover, a distribution 
will continue to be unlawful. It seems to be unacceptable to force a company into unlawful 
distributions even if directors will not incur liability. 
 
This provision seems to apply irrespective of whether the resolution to authorize the 
distribution was correctly adopted or not. The board could well be placed in an impossible 
situation. On the one hand, it could be that if the acknowledgment is made after the 
authorisation, the relevant directors will incur liability as they would reasonably have to 
know that all the requirements of section 46 have not been met. On the other hand, if the 
acknowledgment is made before the authorisation, the decision to distribute could be deemed 
redundant, as the directors cannot go back on their acknowledgment in any case (provided 
120 days have not yet elapsed since the acknowledgement). The implication is that the board 
can be compelled to make unlawful payments in cases where authorisation is required – 
under section 46(1)(a) – but has not yet been properly given.  
 
An apparently cogent answer can be given to this last concern.  No duty to distribute arises 
where proper authorization is not given: the directors cannot be forced to distribute unless the 
distribution has been authorised properly. Unless the distribution is pursuant to an existing 
obligation or a court order, there must be an authorisation, otherwise the distribution cannot 
be lawfully made – section 46(1)(a) is unequivocal about this. Even if 120 days have elapsed 
without an authorisation, section 46(3) need not be complied with yet (an additional 
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 239. 
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acknowledgment will not be required). A re-acknowledgment will only be needed once there 
has been authorisation.  
 
The truly unfortunate consequence of the particular formulation seems to be that a company 
may have to proceed with and complete a distribution on the strength of the 
acknowledgement despite the fact that the company no longer appears to meet the financial 
restrictions within the 120 day period. In this sense, then, there is a striking incoherence in 
section 46. Sections 46(2) and (3) – read together, as the Act requires – are not consistent 
with the all-important objective injunction of section 46(1)(b). It is true that section 46(1)(c) 
obligates the board to base its acknowledgment on the financial position of the company 
immediately after completing the distribution, but the company could easily no longer 
reasonably appear to pass the test when it distributes within 120 days.  
 
Considering the immense weight the acknowledgment carries, there should be room for 
reversing or retracting it if it later appears the company will not comply with the financial 
restrictions. However, the Act does not expressly allow for this possibility. It would perhaps 
be necessary to find ways to read this into the Act. Aside from the fact that no express 
prohibition can be found negating a reversal, several points can be made. It should be 
remembered that the board has to reconsider the solvency and liquidity test if 120 days have 
elapsed. And a (re)consideration of solvency and liquidity is routinely paired with the 
requirement of the acknowledgment. This is confirmed by the two clauses included in section 
46(1)(c) where the acknowledgment is mentioned apart from the reasonable conclusion of 
solvency and liquidity; the division of parts (a) and (b) of section 46(3) backs this up as well. 
The implication of a reconsideration of the acknowledgement might hence not be too fanciful 
a stretch. It might in fact be necessary for a proper functioning of the provision. And the 
purpose of the relevant provisions will better be realised.  
 
Alternatively, it might be possible that the distribution can be delayed subject to a further 
acknowledgment. A less likely solution lies in section 77(5) of the Act. This section reads as 
follows: 
(5) If the board of a company has made a decision in a manner that contravened this Act, as 
contemplated in subsection (3) (e)— 
(a) the company, or any director who has been or may be held liable in terms of subsection 
(3) (e), may apply to a court for an order setting aside the decision of the board; and 
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(b) the court may make— 
(i) an order setting aside the decision in whole or in part, absolutely or conditionally; and 
(ii) any further order that is just and equitable in the circumstances, including an order— 
(aa) to rectify the decision, reverse any transaction, or restore any consideration 
paid or benefit received by any person in terms of the decision of the board; and 
(bb) requiring the company to indemnify any director who has been or may be held 
liable in terms of this section, including indemnification for the costs of the 
proceedings under this subsection. 
 
 It therefore requires that the acknowledgment must have breached the Act. The real problem 
arises where the acknowledgement was properly made but circumstances have changed or 
new facts have come to light. Furthermore, the involvement of the courts in this matter is 
hardly the most efficient solution. Certainly this is an area where an amendment is required. 
Such an amendment will have to make clear that the company is not allowed to proceed with 
a distribution should the directors no longer be satisfied that the financial requirements will 
be met. The relevant shareholder should not be able to enforce her claim in these situations 
even though an acknowledgement has already been made. This seems to be the best way to 
secure the needed flexibility. The weight attached to the acknowledgment therefore must be 
reduced. Its function will hardly be achieved if it is utilised in the rigid manner which the Act 
currently envisions.
357
 
 
With these considerations in mind – and without playing down the urgent need for an 
amendment in this area – it is nevertheless important to tease out the best interpretation of 
section 46(2) and (3) as it is currently formulated. There is a way of interpreting these 
provisions which tempers the peremptory character of section 46(2). The content of section 
46(2) could also be that if the distribution is carried out at all, it must at least always satisfy 
the requirements of section 46(3). The phrase “subject only to subsection 3” in section 46(2) 
would then indicate that the obligation applies only if 46(3) has at least been complied with. 
Once an acknowledgment has been made, the distribution can only be carried out if section 
46(3) is also complied with. Some of the difficulties mentioned earlier can be bypassed in this 
way.  
 
                                                 
357
 Van der Linde makes the same point. She uses section 52(3) of the New Zealand Companies Act as support 
for her position, stating that a general prohibition is to be preferred in order to cater for the situation where a 
change in the financial situation of the company occurs between the time of acknowledgment and the time of 
implementing the distribution (239).  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
106 
 
On this reading, where an acknowledgment has been made, and the board realises at a later 
time when the authorisation is to be made that all the requirements of section 46 will no 
longer be met, the board cannot be forced to make the distribution. And if at a later stage the 
board again wants to proceed with the distribution, the requirements of section 46(3) must be 
met. Even if both the acknowledgment and the authorisation have occurred and at the time of 
making the distribution, the directors realise that a requirement of the Act will not be 
satisfied, the board can elude the ostensible duty in section 46(2) and postpone the 
distribution (and the distribution can only be made subsequently, provided the requirements 
in section 46(3) have been satisfied).  
 
Sections 46(2) and (3) in this way ensure the acknowledgment made under section 46(1)(c) 
remains relevant. Section 46(2) then makes sure that periodic acknowledgments will be 
made. The acknowledgment then serves the helpful function of focusing the attention of the 
directors on the solvency and liquidity of the company. I have touched on section 46(3) 
already. It can be said that this section separates the duty not to distribute without 
acknowledgment and the duty to acknowledge. The section essentially prescribes two 
requirements. It does this from two different angles. The first requirement is a reconsideration 
of solvency and liquidity; the second requires a new acknowledgment. But, from the one side, 
there is basically a duty on the board to make an acknowledgment periodically – i.e. every 
120 days. From the other side, the board will only have the right or the competence to make a 
distribution if an acknowledgment has been made in the preceding 120 days. It should be 
clear that all the difficulties spelled out earlier are not fully answered by this creative 
interpretation.  
 
Moreover, it should also be obvious that this interpretation is far from necessitated by the 
wording used. In truth, it is quite a fanciful spin on the wording. On this score, the 2008 Act 
thus, once more, seems to place the interpreter – especially the director – in an exceptionally 
invidious position. Clearly, the intuitive or literal reading of the Act here leads to absurd 
consequences. On any theory of interpretation, licence is granted in this event to depart from 
the ‘ordinary meaning’. 358  A departure will have to proceed in a principled manner. 359 
Certainly the illocutionary intent is not apparent; the larger reason or perlocutionary intent 
                                                 
358
 ‘Ordinary meaning’ is routinely what is spoken of in this context; but this betrays confusion about how 
language works – see chapter 2. I would argue that here, as elsewhere in the 2008 Act, the full assertion or legal 
content leads to absurd consequences. No workable, coherent assertion can readily be discerned.  
359
 See 2.2 above and the parameters sketched in relation to constitutive interpretation. 
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has been hinted at but uncertainty seems to prevail. I think the context of section 46 is 
perhaps the best pragmatic tool for gauging illocutionary intent. Probably, though, there is no 
coherent assertion here. And so a transformative – content-changing – interpretation is 
necessary to make the Act work in this regard. It is submitted that the fanciful interpretation 
outlined above falls into this category. And contextual and commonsensical factors gesturing 
towards this creative interpretation serve as justification for this particular interpretative 
choice, in the face of an incomplete or inadequate legislative assertion. Far-fetched though 
this interpretation may be, the ostensible duty to distribute in section 46(2) can be justifiably 
tempered. It appears, on a ‘normal’ reading that, once an acknowledgment has been adopted, 
the board is obliged to distribute.  
 
In any event, until amendments are effected, it can certainly be said that the solvency and 
liquidity requirement underlies the creative interpretation proposed here: interpretative 
liberties are taken with a view to actualising the goal of solvency and liquidity. A pervasive 
objective of the Act in general and distributions in particular is honoured. From this 
perspective, a measure of legitimacy attaches to the espoused interpretation.
360
 
 
Section 46(4) is the next provision which stands to be considered. However, a detailed 
analysis of this section has already been performed (under section 3.7 above). A few points to 
recapitulate and tie up loose ends: a special rule applies regarding the timing of the 
determination of solvency and liquidity when it comes to the incurrence of a debt or other 
obligation. It will be recalled that problems abound concerning this provision. Principally, not 
only the financial restrictions, but also all the requirements of section 46 – in addition to the 
board resolution – must be applied at the time the board resolves that the company may incur 
the debt. And this should not really be the relevant time. The time at which liability arises 
should be the critical time. It stands to reason that this provision applies to the decision in 
terms of section 46(1)(a). The position is somewhat uncertain where an obligation is created 
in terms of a court order or derives from another legal source. The 120 day rule of section 
46(3) will not apply to distributions made in terms of section 46(4). It has been noted that the 
timing rules in most systems vary according to the kind of obligation incurred; on the whole 
it is arguable that a differentiated approach would have been preferable for better rigour and 
                                                 
360
 Since the legislature’s assertion here is purportedly incomplete or inadequate, solvency and liquidity does not 
strictly serve the purpose of a pragmatic element filling out the assertion (as it seems to do in subtle ways 
elsewhere). Rather, it serves the function of justifying an instance of going beyond assertion. 
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clarity. In this case it likely would have been preferable if the solvency and liquidity test was 
required to be applied at the moment that the obligation is created. Undoubtedly substantial 
amendments are necessary to give proper content to this provision.  
 
As section 46(6) triggers the liability provisions in connection with distributions – and thus 
stands to be assessed in the next chapter which specifically tackles this theme – the last 
provision requiring brief attention in this chapter is section 46(5), which deals with a 
conflicting court order. The board does not have to resolve to make the distribution when a 
court order is made which forces the company to acquire shares – for example, in accordance 
with section 163. However, an acknowledgment that the company will be solvent and liquid 
will still have to be adopted. The company may apply for an order varying the original order 
if a conclusion is reached that the company will not be solvent and liquid after making the 
payment. The court will make the order if it is just and equitable (having regard to the 
financial circumstances of the company).
361
 It also will have to ensure that the recipient is 
paid at the earliest possible date compatible with the company satisfying its other financial 
obligations as they become due and payable.
362
  
 
In this regard the acknowledgment once more serves its function: it will fulfil the important 
procedural purpose of focusing the attention of the board on the question whether it should 
bring a court application. The permissive “may”, and not the peremptory “must”, is used in 
section 46(5)(a), so that the company is not forced to apply to court.
363
 Noncompliance with 
this provision will not lead to liability, as liability flows from the director’s participation in 
the resolution authorising the distribution (which is absent here). It seems general remedies 
will, however, remain available.
364
 This provision will not apply to appraisal rights, as these 
are not distributions. This provision may serve an additional function. If after having adopted 
an acknowledgment of solvency and liquidity in the case where the board has authorized 
                                                 
361
 Section 46(5)(b)(i). 
362
 Section 46(5)(b)(ii). 
363
 The permissive “may” follows in section 46(5)(b) but a different meaning is conveyed here. The 
requirements in (i) and (ii) are not optional. It is just that subsection (b) sets out the limits of the court’s 
competence in this regard. 
364
 Two legal pronouncements or injunctions conflict here: a court order prescribing a distribution, and the legal 
requirement that a distribution must not be made if the financial limitations will not be complied with. 
According to section 46(5) the company is not obliged to apply to the court for a variation of the original order. 
It is submitted, however, that a contravention of section 46(1)(b) would nevertheless render the distribution 
unlawful. General liability provisions such as section 218(2) can still be utilised. In the event that an application 
is brought pursuant to section 46(5), this fact will have to be carefully weighed. The court will have a fairly 
expansive discretion to strike the appropriate balance. 
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distribution in terms of s 46(1)(a)(ii), it later appears that the solvency and liquidity test will 
no longer be met, the company could perhaps utilise this provision. But this will have to be a 
consideration of solvency and liquidity as required “by this section”.365 And, as has been 
pointed out, the Act is strikingly quiet concerning this possibility and so it is questionable 
whether this qualification will be met. Lastly, there appears to be no reason why shareholders 
and the company cannot agree to postpone a distribution. But again, the Act says nothing 
about this. 
 
4.3 Conclusion 
 
There is no necessary conceptual connection between distributions on the one hand, and 
solvency and liquidity on the other. But the 2008 Act specifically adopts a solvency and 
liquidity approach as a restriction on distributions. The way in which the financial restrictions 
have been newly devised necessarily informs the construction of the law on distributions. The 
interplay and interdependence between solvency and liquidity, the authorisation of the 
distribution and acknowledgment of solvency and liquidity, and (tangentially) directorial 
liability has been evidenced in this chapter (in addition to other drafting problems). It has 
been shown that the relationship between the first three issues has not been coherently 
conceived in the 2008 Act. Many of the problems and inconsistencies will necessarily be 
carried over into the domain of the directorial liability for unlawful distributions. A 
consideration of the liability of directors for unlawful distributions, to be tackled next 
(together with incidental issues), thus completes the picture. The stage will then be set for 
appropriate reform proposals.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
365
 Section 46(5) introductory line. 
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Chapter 5 
Directorial Liability for an Unlawful Distribution and Related Issues 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The 2008 Act takes a positive step away from the regime under the 1973 Act by making 
directors potentially liable, not only for unlawful repurchases, but also for unlawful 
distributions. Shareholder liability for receiving unlawful distributions, by contrast, is not 
covered by the 2008 Act.  
 
Van der Linde states that the Act regulates directorial liability “in a coherent fashion”.366 It 
will become clear throughout this chapter that this statement is not entirely true. Similar 
anomalies and uncertainties emerge here as in the previous chapters, again owing to poor 
drafting. It will be seen that often, due to the interdependence of the broad themes under 
consideration in this thesis, conceptual problems in one area have a knock-on effect 
elsewhere. In piecing together the relevant elements at play in the law on distributions, and 
ending in directorial liability, it also becomes clear that the structure of the 2008 Act is 
chaotic and confusing. Discerning the full picture necessitates jumping from one part of the 
Act to another. The liability provisions are set out in section 77, whereas distributions are 
dealt with (mainly) in section 46; and it has also become clear that other provisions scattered 
throughout the Act can also have an impact. 
 
The pervasive influence of the new solvency and liquidity philosophy manifests also with 
regard to the liability of directors for unlawful distributions. Significantly, a director can only 
incur liability for non-compliance with the financial requirements (even though sections 
46(6) and section 77(3)(e)(vi) refer to a distribution contrary to section  46 generally). 
Moreover, the Act imposes an important limitation on the liability of a director for an 
unlawful distribution, by stipulating that liability will only ensue if the company in fact turns 
out to be insolvent or illiquid subsequent to the making of the distribution.
367
  
 
                                                 
366
 Van der Linde “The regulation of distributions” (2009) TSAR 495. 
367
 Section 77(4)(a)(i). 
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The requirements, limitations, and scope of the liability of directors is analysed below; I also 
briefly consider the issue of shareholder liability, after which the chapter ends in a concluding 
remark. 
 
5.2 Directorial Liability  
 
Section 77 of the 2008 Act caters for the liability of directors and prescribed officers. 
Directorial liability for distributions made in violation of section 46 is regulated by section 
46(6) in conjunction with section 77(3)(e)(vi).
368
 In the context of the liability provision, the 
term “director” bears a broader meaning, which encompasses an alternate director, prescribed 
officer and a member of a board- or audit committee (regardless of whether the person in 
question is also a member of the board of directors of the company).
369
 But this is yet another 
instance of a lack of precise and thoughtful drafting. Having regard to the specific provisions 
relating to liability for distributions (and repurchases), it appears that only directors in the 
narrow sense can be held liable, because of the requirement that the director must have 
participated in the board resolution authorising the distribution (see below).  
 
A director will be liable jointly and severally with any other director who is liable for the 
same act. It seems that only other directors and officers can incur liability for the same act. 
The implication is that the director or officer will not incur liability jointly and severally with 
shareholders who received the distribution, because their liability is not contingent on the 
same act – directors will be held liable exclusively for the balance not recovered from 
shareholders.
370
 It is likely better that creditors and shareholders should not be permitted to 
claim against the directors, as a general rule. The company is the appropriate claimant.
371
 
However, the novel statutory derivative action should not be forgotten in this regard: section 
165(2)(d) allows creditors to claim on behalf of the company with the court’s consent. In 
terms of subsections (a) and (b), shareholders and co-creditors can also enforce the 
company’s right of recovery. 
 
                                                 
368
 Section 48(7) read with section 77(3)(e)(vii) addresses liability with regard to an acquisition of shares in 
violation of sections 46 and 48. 
369
 Section 77(1). 
370
 Section 77(4)(b)(ii). See 496 (footnote 106). 
371
 Van der Linde notes that this position accords with most comparable jurisdictions. California is a striking 
exception: section 316(c) of the California Corporations Code explicitly affords shareholders and creditors a 
general right to enforce the liability of directors with regard to unlawful distributions. 
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5.3 The Requirements for Liability  
 
Putting aside, for the moment, the limitations of liability (discussed in the next section), there 
are essentially two requirements for directorial liability for an unlawful distribution. The first 
is that the director must either have been present at a meeting where the board approved the 
distribution or must otherwise have participated in the making of the decision.
372
 The 
requirement of having to be present and to vote is perhaps not proactive enough. Maybe 
directors should bear a duty to contribute to creditor protection more generally. Under section 
74, board resolutions can be adopted otherwise than at a meeting if it is taken by a majority of 
the directors (either by written consent in person or via electronic communication if all the 
directors received notice of the matter to be decided). Ostensibly, a director will have 
participated in the making of a decision where she had been notified of a matter to be decided 
otherwise than at a meeting, but this is not necessarily so. Departures from section 74 are 
seemingly permissible; but the prospective impact of such departures on the functioning of 
section 46 is still unclear.
373
 
 
Quite crucially, from the cross-references in sections 46(6) and 77(3)(e)(vi) to the term 
“approval”, it appears that liability hinges on the director’s participation in the resolution 
authorising the distribution – and not the resolution acknowledging the application of the 
solvency and liquidity test. The second part of section 46(6) refers to the term “decision”. But 
this is merely to link it to the section 74 procedure. And it is clear that “such a decision” 
refers to the approval or authorisation. Van der Linde agrees that this is what the legislature 
asserted (even though she thinks this was a mistake).
374
 I do not think it can be doubted that 
the legislature here asserts that liability depends on the authorisation (as opposed to the 
acknowledgement of solvency and liquidity).  
 
This will have curious effects, however. A director who merely participated in the 
acknowledgement and wrongly concluded that the solvency and liquidity requirement will be 
met will escape liability where she does not also participate in the authorisation of the 
distribution. This will also apply where only an acknowledgment is required. Conversely, a 
                                                 
372
 See section 46(6)(a) and section 77(3)(e) in conjunction with section 74. 
373
 It appears that departures are only permissible in the direction of stricter requirerements, e.g. only a physical 
meeting will suffice. 
374
 496. She says that, even if the acknowledgment is actually what was meant here, it is evident that this 
resolution will also have to deal with the predicted financial situation upon completion of the entire distribution.  
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director who took part in the authorisation but played no part in the acknowledgment could 
incur liability in spite of not participating in the acknowledgement, if she knew the 
acknowledgment was not correctly made. Furthermore, liability cannot be imposed in terms 
of section 77(3)(e)(vi) with regard to distributions pursuant to a court order or an existing 
legal obligation, despite the fact that these are subject to the solvency and liquidity 
requirement.
375
  
 
These instances may well lead to an accountability gap; it is clear that this arrangement has 
not been cogently devised. It should be remembered, though, that a director can nonetheless 
be held liable for breaching her duty of care and skill under a broader liability section.
376
 
More directly, a possible solution might be to base liability instead on an unreasonable 
acknowledgment regarding the satisfaction of the solvency and liquidity test. This is what 
Van der Linde proposes.
377
 But, until such time as proper amendments can be effected, an 
attempt has to be made to gauge the content of the law as it is.  
 
An attempt must be made to establish a logical relationship between the relevant provisions.  
Section 46(1)(b), inter alia, affects the validity of the distribution: non-compliance with this 
section would render the distribution unlawful (even if all the other requirements have been 
met and even where no directors are liable). Non-compliance with this section, that is to say, 
is a necessary and sufficient condition for the invalidity of the distribution. Additionally, a 
director will be liable if he voted against the decision to participate knowing that section 
46(1)(b) was not complied with (knowing that the company will not be solvent and liquid 
after completing the distribution). Liability with respect to section 46(6), in other words, can 
also flow from section 46(1)(b).  
 
The relationship between section 46(1)(c) and liability in terms of section 46(6) is more 
difficult to establish. Notably, a director’s knowledge in respect of compliance with section 
46(1)(b) says nothing about her participation in a section 46(1)(c) acknowledgment. But the 
acknowledgment may yet have probative value: there is a chance that it can show that the 
solvency and liquidity of the company was generally accepted. Where the director 
participates in the acknowledgement, it will likely be more difficult to show that she was 
                                                 
375
 496. 
376
 497. 
377
 496. 
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unaware of non-compliance with section 46(1)(b). But again, all of this presupposes that the 
acknowledgment precedes the authorisation.
378
  
 
Of course, the mere participation of a director in the acknowledgment cannot be said to 
constitute conclusive evidence of her mental state. An application of the solvency and 
liquidity test operates on a prediction of the financial position of the company in the future. 
An acknowledgment might be made at a time when it would be reasonable to suppose the 
company will be solvent and liquid at the critical time. And a director, as I have said, could 
be held liable at the time of the subsequent authorisation should it appear the company will 
no longer satisfy the test at the critical time – i.e. perhaps it is no longer reasonable at this 
later stage to think the company will satisfy the financial restrictions at the critical moment. 
This reasonableness element figures in the limitations of liability which I consider in the next 
section. 
 
The second requirement is that the director must have failed to vote against a resolution 
approving a distribution despite knowing that it is contrary to section 46.
379
 This applies 
equally to a meeting and a decision taken otherwise than at a meeting. A director who fails to 
register her dissent concerning a decision taken otherwise than at a meeting will also incur 
liability.
380
 The knowledge entailed in “knowing” is quite expansive. It does not only denote 
actual knowledge. In addition, a director will be regarded as “knowing” something if she is in 
a position where she reasonably ought to have had actual knowledge, or to have investigated 
the matter to an extent that could have provided her with actual knowledge, or to have taken 
measures which, if taken, could reasonably be expected to have supplied her with actual 
knowledge of the matter in question.
381
 
 
5.4 Limitations of Liability  
 
Section 77(4)(a) limits the liability which directors may incur under section 46(6) read with 
section 77(3)(e)(vi). In other words, two additional preconditions for directorial liability (over 
and above the section 46 requirements for liability) have been enacted. First, the company 
                                                 
378
 See 4.2 above: As I have said, this is not specifically required. But it is arguable that it should, on pain of 
violating the Act. That is, otherwise the board will be authorising a distribution knowing that all the 
requirements of the Act have not yet been met – i.e. the acknowledgment is plainly a requirement of the Act. 
379
 Section 46(6)(b) read with section 77(3)(e)(vi) of the 2008 Act. 
380
 497. 
381
 Section 1, definition of “knowing, knowingly or knows”. 
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should not have satisfied the solvency and liquidity test immediately after making all of the 
distribution.
382
 In effect, as a prerequisite for directorial liability, an objective ex post facto 
solvency and liquidity test is imposed.
383
 The resultant reality of solvency and liquidity thus 
trumps the inaccurate prediction of solvency and liquidity, as far as directorial liability is 
concerned. This will be so irrespective of whether the prediction was reasonable or 
unreasonable. It would not make sense to hold directors liable for an incorrect prediction of 
solvency and liquidity if the company in any event turns out to be solvent and liquid when the 
distribution was made – and so this constitutes a vital limitation of liability.384  
 
This base requirement also make clear that exclusively a breach of the financial limitations 
can lead to directorial liability – despite the references in section 46(6) and section 
77(3)(e)(vi) to a distribution in violation of section 46 as a whole.
385
 As a result, non-
compliance with any of the other requirements will have to be covered by the general liability 
rules of the 2008 Act
386
 
 
At the same time, it appears liability cannot arise with regard to a partial implementation of a 
distribution in contravention of the solvency and liquidity requirement. This is because there 
must be non-compliance with the test after making “all” of the distribution set out in the 
resolution. It is not self-evident why this is necessary. This also creates dissonance with 
section 46(1)(b): here it is simply stated that the company has to satisfy the financial 
requirements “after completing the proposed distribution”. The Act also does not address the 
situation where the company suffers a loss as a result of an improper distribution without, 
however, becoming illiquid or insolvent. The company could attempt a claim for damages 
under section 218(2) in these situations.
387
  
 
The second limitation of liability in terms of section 77(3)(e)(vi) is that it must have been 
unreasonable at the time of the decision to conclude that the company would satisfy the 
                                                 
382
 Section 77(4)(a)(i). 
383
 497. 
384
 497. 
385
 See section 46(6)(b): “contrary to this section”. 
386
 497-8. See sections 75 to 75 of the 2008 Act. 
387
 Though the section is (extremely) broadly worded, a specific shareholder will likely not succeed in bringing 
such a claim. Section 218(3) states that all other rights “a person” may have are unaffected by this section. On 
the back of this, as well as the manifest open-endedness of sub-section (2), it would not appear as though section 
46 (in conjunction with the liability provisions of section 77) and section 218 are mutually exclusive. A cogent 
case can thus theoretically be made here in reliance on section 218(2). However, where liability is explicitly 
delineated (as here), a reliance on section 218(2) is probably bound to fail. 
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solvency and liquidity test after making the relevant distribution.
388
 Though at first blush it 
appears a prudent limitation, it is not without problems. Suppose, pursuant to section 46(6), a 
director fails to vote against a distribution even though she reasonably should have known the 
company will not satisfy the financial requirements. Such director can nevertheless escape 
liability if she can prove it was reasonable at the time of the decision to think that the 
requirements would be satisfied. Is it consistent to maintain that one can act reasonably for 
this purpose and yet not be reasonable enough to foresee non-compliance or to acquire the 
relevant knowledge in the first place? Whilst probably not conceptually incoherent, the 
practicability of the limitation is certainly open to question.
389
 
 
Again, the reason for the use of the term “decision” instead of “resolution” is unclear. In 
section 46(6) it is quite clear that the use of the word there refers to the authorisation of the 
distribution. Even though the legislature forces a reader of the Act to jump around quite a lot, 
these scattered provisions are intended to be read together. On the face of it, it is probably 
plausible, therefore, to assume that “decision” in section 77(3)(e)(vi) is co-extensive with the 
authorisation or decision to distribute.  
 
Van der Linde takes a different line. She tentatively suggests that the different wording is 
intentional: that the legislature means to refer to the resolution acknowledging the application 
of the solvency and liquidity test, not the authorisation.
390
 She thinks the context supports this 
conclusion: the directors “are only required to consider the solvency and liquidity test when 
making that acknowledgment”.391 This is surely mistaken. True, only in section 46(1)(c) – the 
part dealing with the acknowledgment requirement – does the legislature explicitly require 
the board to consider solvency and liquidity.
392
 But, as is abundantly clear from the foregoing 
analysis, the time of adopting the acknowledgment will not be the only time that the board 
has to consider solvency and liquidity.
393
  
 
                                                 
388
 Section 77(4)(a)(ii). 
389
 A distinct construal of ‘reasonableness’ might attach to each of these provisions, rendering it conceptually 
coherent. Something analogous appears in the law of delict, where the ‘reasonable foreseeability’ of fault 
(negligence) is separated from the objective (overall) reasonableness contained in the concept of wrongfulness. 
390
 497. 
391
 497. 
392
 See 4.2 above. 
393
 See 4.2 above. 
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As I have pointed out, there may easily be a time lag between the acknowledgment and the 
authorisation; and the Act seems to have hung liability on the hook of the authorisation, not 
the acknowledgment. A consideration of solvency and liquidity will thus no doubt be relevant 
to the board at the time of the authorisation as well. Van der Linde’s contention is likely 
borne out by her interpretation of section 46(2) and the potentially limited effect that section 
46(1)(b) would then have.
394
  However, Van der Linde’s contention contradicts another of her 
suggestions. Elsewhere, she says a company should be prohibited from proceeding with a 
distribution where the directors are no longer satisfied that the company will meet the 
solvency and liquidity test – a proposition I agree with. But, of course, this implies that the 
board again considers the financial requirements – i.e. after the acknowledgment has been 
made. Van der Linde is thus wrong to state that the directors are only compelled to consider 
the financial requirements when making the acknowledgment. 
 
Van der Linde may well have conflated her prescriptive suggestions with what the Act 
descriptively (actually) asserts. These are two very different things and are best kept apart. A 
sizeable part of my endeavour in this thesis is to tease out the limits of the descriptive task of 
discerning the law as it is. Where the law creates undesirable effects, or is hopelessly 
inefficient or otherwise problematic, substantive proposals for reform are necessary; but these 
proposed improvements are not, it is worth emphasising, the law as it stands. Probably, Van 
der Linde, in this particular interpretative quandary, is trying to link up her interpretation of 
the word “decision” to her prescriptive proposal that directorial liability should be contingent, 
not on the authorisation, but the acknowledgment.
395
 
 
In the light of this confusion, I would obviously suggest an improvement in the wording, 
making it clear whether the authorisation or acknowledgment is intended. As is clear, this 
choice will have to be consistent with the basis of liability: if liability hinges on the 
authorisation, then that should be what is relevant here as well. If liability turns on the 
acknowledgment, then this declaration is the relevant point in time. The proposal I make in 
the next chapter will endeavour to take account of these considerations.  
 
                                                 
394
 See 4.2 above. 
395
 See 4.2 above. In her defence, she does say that the law currently attaches liability to the authorisation (even 
though she deems this a bad idea) (496). 
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My view is that liability must hinge on the director’s conduct in relation to the satisfaction of 
the solvency and liquidity requirement. Given all the problems surrounding the tripartite 
relationship between section 46(1)(a), (b), and (c), the 2008 Act does not offer a clear and 
coherent basis for directorial liability.
396
 The unsophisticated use and confusion of the 
authorisation and acknowledgment necessarily muddies the waters of directorial liability. In 
most comparable jurisdictions, the prerequisites for the liability of directors are clearer. In 
England, California, under the Model Act, as well as in New Zealand, liability is structured 
around directorial conduct in regard to the financial requirements. The 2008 Act’s link 
between directorial conduct and the financial restrictions is tenuous and unclear as a result of 
the confusion between the authorisation and the acknowledgment. Now it is clear that the 
2008 Act has introduced the requirement of a solvency declaration on the part of the directors 
in the form of an acknowledgment. It is not indispensable that a particular system makes use 
of such a declaration but there is nothing wrong with it in principle.
397
 I therefore do not 
propose doing away with the acknowledgment.
398
 It is just that the myriad difficulties 
attaching to it in the 2008 Act – particularly its relation to the authorisation – will need to be 
remedied. 
 
Notwithstanding the uncertainties created by the wording, the introduction of this (second) 
limitation, in my view, carries merit. The requirement softens the objective solvency and 
liquidity standard. In spite of actual insolvency or illiquidity, if the directors acted reasonably 
when making the relevant decision, they will nonetheless escape liability. So, a 
reasonableness standard, serves as a fundamental precondition for liability. Nevertheless, it 
will be difficult to determine the exact relationship between this restriction and s 46(6), which 
requires that a director will become liable only if he knew or reasonably should have known 
that a requirement of s 46(1) was not met. The reasonableness element in both these 
provisions overlaps in a complicated manner. Overall, a reasonableness requirement remains 
an appropriate limitation and the maintenance of this principle will be reflected in the 
proposals I advance in the next chapter.  
 
5.5 Scope of Liability  
 
                                                 
396
 See 4.2 above. 
397
 In fact, I pointed out above that it indeed has some utility. 
398
 A similar mechanism can be found in England and New Zealand, for example. 
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According to section 77(3)(e), a director is liable for any loss, damage, or costs sustained by 
the company as a direct or indirect result of the director’s conduct. The section goes on to 
enumerate various instances which can result in liability, including unlawful distributions.
399
 
The crux is that section 77(4)(b) restricts the liability that can be imposed under 77(3)(e)(vi) 
with regard to distributions in contravention of section 46 to: 
 
the difference between— 
(i) the amount by which the value of the distribution exceeded the amount that could 
have been distributed without causing the company to fail to satisfy the solvency and 
liquidity test; and 
(ii) the amount, if any, recovered by the company from persons to whom the distribution 
was made.
400
 
 
In other words, liability may not exceed the amount by which the distribution goes beyond 
solvency and liquidity.
401
  
 
5.6 The Liability of Shareholders  
 
As I have mentioned, the 2008 Act fails to deal explicitly with the issue of shareholder 
liability with respect to unlawful distributions.
402
 This is regrettable and also rather curious, 
as the previous act under sections 90(4), 86(2) and 86(3) did in fact regulate the issue. It is 
uncontroversial that the common-law rules have to plug the gap.
403
 In other words, in light of 
the absence of particular statutorily regulated liability as regards the receipt of unlawful 
                                                 
399
 Section 77(3)(e)(vi). 
400
 Section 77(4)(b). 
401
 In the case of an acquisition of shares, knowledge of the violation of either section 46 or section 48 is 
required for liability. Van der Linde notes that the scope of liability will differ in the case of an acquisition of 
shares. In the case of section 77(3)(e)(vii), the limitation of the extent of liability will not apply even if the only 
defect in the acquisition was that the payment contravened the financial limitations (499). It thus becomes clear 
that directors involved in an acquisition of shares in contravention of the financial requirements are potentially 
exposed to wider liabiilty in terms of section 77(3)(e)(vii) than directors who are held liable for an unlawful 
distribution. And because payment in respect of an acquisition is tantamount to a distribution, it seems this 
consequence was not intended. Van der Linde proposes that this undesirable effect can be overcome by 
removing the reference to section 46, not only from paragraph (vii) of section 77(3)(e), but also from section 48 
(499). 
402
 Even though, under the directorial liability provisions, there is a reference to amounts recovered from 
shareholders who received distributions (see section 77(4)(b)(ii)). In that sense the Act recognises the concept of 
shareholder liability. 
403
 Jooste, however, strangely seems to think the company cannot recover payments distributed in contravention 
of section 46 and section 48 (“The maintenance of capital and the Companies Bill 2007” (2007) 124 SALJ 715, 
732). He appears to think this because the 1973 Act specifically and categorically allowed it. He thus views the 
2008 Act’s omission of the issue as conscious and intentional. The better view is that the common law regulates 
the situation. The references to shareholder liability in section 77(4) and section 48(6) confirm this. 
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distributions, a claim for recovery will be rooted in the common law. Most likely, then, the 
basis for the recovery of an unlawful distribution would be invalidity or voidness. Invalidity 
could spring, not only from a failure to comply with the financial restrictions, but from non-
compliance with any of the requirements.  
 
Directors are not afforded direct rights of action against shareholders (even though the ambit 
of their liability hinges on the amounts recovered from shareholders).
404
 The possibility of the 
statutory derivative action, however, remains open to directors.
405
 It appears that creditors 
too, with the consent of the court, can bring derivative actions. This is not stated explicitly, 
but naturally a creditor can be a “person” who needs to protect a legal interest of the 
company. The court can only grant the action if it is satisfied that it is necessary or expedient 
to do so in order to protect the legal right of the creditor in question.
406
 Essentially, the 
company could have a claim against a director in terms of section 46(6) or against a 
shareholder for the return of a distribution made to her. But it seems either a shareholder or a 
creditor with the consent of the court could bring these actions on behalf of the company on 
the grounds of section 165(2). 
 
Ostensibly, shareholders will incur liability irrespective of whether they received the 
unlawful distribution in good faith or with knowledge of the illegality. Intuitively, it might 
seem that lack of knowledge or receipt in good faith should be a legitimate defence to 
shareholders. This impulse is more or less confirmed by reference to comparable 
jurisdictions. Van der Linde notes that shareholders are exempted from liability on the 
strength of ignorance of unlawfulness or good faith in the United States of America 
(generally speaking), in California specifically, and in New Zealand.
407
 A similar approach 
applies in England as well, as knowledge of illegality is a prerequisite for shareholder 
liability.
408
 One’s stance on the issue in the final analysis depends on a policy decision either 
                                                 
404
 Under the 1973 Act, on the other hand, in regard to share acquisitions directors could institute direct 
proceedings for recovery. The dissonance on this score between the old and the 2008 Act is not a huge concern, 
according to Van der Linde, who maintains that the amounts can be recovered through the company (Van der 
Linde “The regulation of distributions” (2009) TSAR 495, 499). 
405
 Shareholders, registered trade unions, and any other person with the permission of the court can institute this 
action in order to protect the legal interests of the company (see section 165(2)). 
406
 Section 165(2)(d). 
407
 It is crucial to add, as Van der Linde does, that, in respect of America, the effect of the Uniform Fraudulent 
Transfer Act – which gives a creditor a right of recovery against a shareholder if the distribution left the 
company insolvent or with an unreasonably small amount of capital – counterbalances this relatively more 
liberal or lenient treatment in the corporate legislation (500).  
408
 Section 76 of the UK Insolvency Act. 
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in favour of shareholders or creditors. Probably, protecting the good faith of the shareholder 
leads to the shareholder being privileged over the corporate creditors.
409
 Van der Linde 
regards this as unacceptable and so is happy with the current state of the law. She says this is 
the simplest solution; that is, to hold shareholders liable regardless of whether or not they 
received a distribution in good faith. She contends that any practical difficulties in enforcing 
the recovery – the disruption which would result if recovery is sought from many anonymous 
shareholders of listed shares, the duplicate liability of directors, the potential invocation of 
insolvency law mechanisms to impeach unlawful distributions, etc – should not hamper the 
fundamental principle that corporate creditors should in the final analysis come first 
regarding the repayment of their debts.
410
 Though I agree with the current legal position and 
Van der Linde’s analysis, it would be desirable if the 2008 Act expressly regulates the matter, 
rather than leaving it to the common law.  
 
It should not be forgotten that a different threshold for reclaiming a distribution could apply if 
the domain of insolvency law is entered. Although a distribution might not contravene any of 
the section 46 requirements, it may nevertheless be legally reclaimed, should the distribution 
constitute a voidable preference under insolvency law.
411
 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has shown that the conceptual confusions with respect to the authorisation and 
the acknowledgment carry over into the crucial area of directorial liability. An effort has been 
made, descriptively (in the main), to make sense of the Act as it stands. Tentative suggestions 
have also been made to illustrate the possible shape which prescriptive reform proposals 
should take. It has also been stressed that descriptive interpretation should be kept apart from 
prescriptive or normative interpretative improvements. The interdependence of solvency and 
liquidity, the requirements for distributions, and the liability of directors is now clear. 
Conceptual confusion in one area has a knock-on effect in another.  
 
This chapter, like the previous, has cautiously attempted to delineate the boundaries of 
creative interpretation – i.e. creative interpretation which remains within the confines of 
                                                 
409
 See Blackman et al I Commentary on the Companies Act (2003) 5-77. 
410
 500. 
411
 Insolvency Act 24 of 1936, section 29. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
122 
 
legitimate and authoritative law-making. It has been evident that efficiency, coherence and 
good sense in certain cases require a measure of normative improvement to the text of the 
2008 Act. Other concrete pragmatic tools – such as the purposes of the Act – are hard to 
come by, it was found. Content-altering interpretations will always have to proceed along 
principled criteria; they cannot remain unjustified.  
 
The preceding analysis again confirms how regrettable it is that the 2008 Act has not been 
accompanied by a comprehensive explanatory memorandum or commentary explaining each 
provision of the 2008 Act. Something along these lines can be found in the Model Act, which 
ironically is an important influence and reference point for the 2008 Act. Had an elaborate 
memorandum or commentary been included, striking mistakes and inconsistencies would 
almost certainly not have made their way into the 2008 Act. A concomitant commentary 
spelling out the operation and rationale of the provisions could also have served an 
instrumental pedagogical role for directors, shareholders, creditors, and the general public. In 
keeping with this spirit, I will attempt to explain the provisions I propose in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6 
Proposals for Reform 
 
In this thesis, I have identified various conceptual and terminological problems with the 
regulation of distributions under the 2008 Act. I have suggested ways in which an interpreter 
should make sense of the Act as it is. But it can also be said that there is a way the Act should 
be. What precisely colours this ‘should’ is an anomalous matter. But I suggest a few 
guidelines. And this in turn then constitutes the foundation for the (prescriptive) proposed 
provisions. First, often the idea or broad intention behind a provision is apparent enough; it is 
just that the wording fails to capture it. An attempt will be made to stay close to the larger 
rationale or broader purpose, where the rationale or purpose is sound. Insofar as is possible, 
the terminology of the 2008 Act is used. Generally the aim is as much uniformity as possible 
with the current provisions but it will be seen that some breaks are necessary. Certain key 
legislative decisions are of course left intact.  
 
From the previous chapters, it is clear that the concept “distribution” has to be rigorously and 
coherently defined. It is also clear (and laudable that the 2008 Act requires) that all 
distributions should be subject to compliance with a solvency and liquidity test. Moreover, 
the requirements and mechanics of the solvency and liquidity test should also be coherently 
and comprehensibly set out. The preferential liquidation rights of shareholders should be 
deemed liabilities whenever distributions are made to classes that are of a lower rank. 
 
Furthermore, I have criticised, not only the content, but also the structure of the relevant 
provisions of the 2008 Act, asserting that the Act necessitates jumping from one part to 
another in order to gauge the legal position concerning distributions – at the very least, 
section 1, section 4, and section 46 have to be consulted. But section 77 and certain rules 
deriving from the common law, for instance, can also often be relevant. This comprises a 
highly disjointed regulatory scheme. A fairly large-scale structural overhaul would likely be 
desirable, to make the Act read more easily.
412
 For this reason, I do not number the provisions 
(i.e. to fit into the 2008 Act as it stands). This also means that cross-referencing between 
sections is not possible. Nevertheless, the provisions I propose below are devised to fit into 
the overall framework of the 2008 Act.  
                                                 
412
 I think the way in which the Model Act tackles the issue makes a lot more sense; it no doubt reads more 
easily. 
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Definition of the concept ‘Distribution’413 
 
“distribution” means a direct or indirect –  
 
(a) transfer by a company of money or other property of the company, other than its own 
shares, to or for the benefit of one or more holders of any of the shares of that 
company in respect of his or her shareholding, whether –  
 
(i) in the form of a dividend; 
 
(ii) as a payment in lieu of capitalisation share; 
 
(iii) as consideration for the acquisition by the company of any of its shares. 
 
(b) incurrence of indebtedness by a company for the benefit of one or more holders of any 
of the shares of that company in respect of his or her shareholding; or 
 
(c) forgiveness or waiver by a company of a debt or other obligation owed to the 
company in respect of his or her shareholding, 
but does not include any such action taken upon the final liquidation of the company.  
 
It is thus recommended that the 2008 Act should have an elaborate definition of the concept 
of distribution. The drafters of the 2008 Act indeed introduced a comprehensive definition of 
what constitutes a distribution.
414
 The above formulation continues in the vein of the current 
definition in the 2008 Act but simplifies it somewhat. The three main types of distribution are 
kept intact and liquidation distributions are excluded. The inclusion of paragraph (c), as 
contained in the 2008 Act, builds on the types of distributions found in comparable 
jurisdictions. Though I have been largely critical of the 2008 Act, it has to be said that 
manifest improvements on the 1973 Act are also not hard to find. The inclusion of paragraph 
                                                 
413
 See 1.2.3 above for a discussion of and comparison with the current position. 
414
 The 1973 Act’s regulation of distributions was fragmentary; no inclusive definition of distribution was to be 
found.  
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(c) usefully covers the waiver of a claim for outstanding consideration on unpaid or partly 
paid shares.  
 
Often different shareholder authorisation requirements are set, depending on whether a 
transfer constitutes a dividend or not. But since the 2008 Act does not require shareholder 
approval for any type of distribution, essentially nothing hinges on whether a transfer is 
capable of being classified under a dividend, or one of the other mentioned examples.
415
 The 
idea of an expansive group dimension has been done away with. The word “indirectly” in the 
introductory clause is regarded as wide enough to include distributions by a company to 
shareholders of other companies in the group.
416
 The acquisition of shares by a subsidiary in 
its holding company can certainly have the effect of a distribution. But this should be dealt 
with separately. This way it will be clearer to gauge how the requirements should apply 
particularly to these distributions. Appraisal payments should also be deemed distributions. 
The proposed definition will be wide enough to include such payments. Though a share 
repurchase should be regarded as a distribution and so has to be subject to the requirements 
for distributions, there should be a separate definition of an ‘acquisition’; and additional 
requirements for acquisitions have to be set out elsewhere.
417
  
 
The Making of Distributions
418
 
 
The 2008 Act is especially confusing because of the obscure relationship between the 
authorisation of a distribution, and the acknowledgment of the application of the solvency 
and liquidity test. How does the decision to distribute, the authorisation, the acknowledgment, 
the actual making of the distribution, the validity of the distribution, etc., fit together? These 
elements can be efficiently and coherently conceived in a number of ways. My approach is, 
where possible, to stick closely to the language of the 2008 Act. However, this is a domain in 
which essentially the whole scheme is poorly conceived. What follows is, I think, a simpler 
way of devising the various elements – but it is far from the only way of dealing with the 
issue. 
                                                 
415
 However, the memorandum of incorporation can of course still impose special requirements for dividends as 
compared with other distributions. 
416
 The regulation of distributions in the group context, apart from distributions by a subsidiary to its own 
shareholders, should be limited to cases where a subsidiary makes a distribution to the shareholders of its 
holding company. The test should be met by both the holding company and the subsidiary. 
417
 As I have previously stated, the topic of share repurchases is not considered in this thesis. 
418
 See the discussion in 4.2 above for a comparison and critical commentary of the present state of the law. 
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(1) A company must not make any proposed distribution unless –  
 
(a) it reasonably appears that the company will satisfy the solvency and liquidity test 
immediately after completing the proposed distribution; and 
 
(b) the board of the company reasonably concluded that the company will satisfy the 
solvency and liquidity test immediately after completing the proposed distribution, 
and acknowledged by resolution that it has applied the solvency and liquidity test. 
 
(2) If 120 business days have elapsed since an acknowledgment, as required in 
subsection 1(b), the company may not proceed with the distribution, unless the board 
has reconsidered the solvency and liquidity test in respect of the intended 
implementation of the initial resolution, order or obligation; and has reasonably 
concluded that the company will satisfy the solvency and liquidity test immediately 
after the proposed implementation, and has acknowledged by resolution that it has 
applied the solvency and liquidity test. 
 
(3) If, after having adopted an acknowledgment resolution contemplated in subsection 
1(b), the board is no longer satisfied that the company will satisfy the solvency and 
liquidity test, it shall retract the resolution and not proceed with the distribution.  
 
It is the making, not the authorisation, of distributions which has to adhere to the solvency 
and liquidity test. It will likely aid clarity to abandon the requirement of explicit board 
authorisation.
419
 The decision to make a distribution is nonetheless kept apart from the 
question of the ultimate validity of the actual distribution. These provisions are relatively 
self-explanatory and largely emulate the 2008 Act. Section 1(a) is again obviously an 
objective test. The company has to take into account objectively determinable facts. On the 
other hand, section 1(b) implies a hybrid test – it is an objective test with subjective factors. 
The reasonable conclusion is from the perspective of the particular board in question. On the 
                                                 
419
 Van der Linde also favours an abandonment of the authorisation (Van der Linde Aspects of the regulation of 
share capital and distributions to shareholders LLD dissertation UNISA (2008) 567). But she insists on a 
distinction between the validity of distributions and the decision to distribute (566). It seems difficult to 
untangle the decision to distribute from the authorisation under the 2008 Act. I think matters can be simplified  
by doing away with the requirement of the authorisation.  
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one hand, an objective assessment of the particular facts is called for; “reasonableness” 
suggests a measure of objectivity. On the other hand, the “reasonableness” of the conclusions 
arrived at will have to hinge on information reasonably available to or known by the relevant 
board; the particularity of the board in question thus enters the fray. I have left out a section 
46(2)-type section, given all the problems associated with this curious provision. The 
possibility of a retraction of the acknowledgment is also included. 
 
It will also be necessary to set the effective date of a distribution so that the time for the 
application of the solvency and liquidity test (as well as the enforceability of the distribution) 
is fixed.
420
 
 
Effective Date of a Distribution  
 
(1) If a distribution takes the form of a transfer of money or assets, as contemplated in 
paragraph (a) of the definition of “distribution”, its effective date is the date of actual 
transfer of the money or assets.
421
 
 
(2) If a distribution takes the form of an incurrence of indebtedness, as contemplated in 
paragraph (b) of the definition of “distribution”, its effective date is the date of 
incurrence of the debt. 
 
(3) If a distribution takes the form of the forgiveness or waiver of a debt or obligation, as 
contemplated in paragraph (c) of the definition of “distribution”, its effective date is 
the date on which the liability of the shareholder is extinguished.
422
 
 
In particular, the problematic aspects surrounding the timing for paragraph (b) distributions 
are alleviated by this provision.
423
 
 
The Solvency and Liquidity Test
424
 
 
                                                 
420
 This is also what Van der Linde proposes (568). 
421
 Van der Linde Aspects 568. 
422
 568. 
423
 See especially my discussion under chapter 3, section 3.7 above. 
424
 See chapter 3 for a comprehensive discussion of the solvency and liquidity requirement. 
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The solvency and liquidity test is a suitable and modern yardstick for protecting the interests 
of creditors in the context of distributions. The acknowledgment of solvency and liquidity is a 
welcome positive or pro-active step which directors are forced to take. As long as the 
acknowledgment is not deemed the ultimate determinant of the enforceability of the 
distribution, the imposition of a positive duty on directors in respect of the resolution 
acknowledging the application of the solvency and liquidity test is desirable. 
 
In terms of the 2008 Act, the lawfulness or validity of a distribution is contingent, not on 
actual solvency and liquidity, but on the reasonably foreseeable financial situation of the 
company.
425
 On the contrary, the validity of a distribution should hinge on whether the 
company actually meets the solvency and liquidity test when it makes the distribution. If the 
test is failed, the distribution should be recoverable from the shareholders who received it.  
 
The question of the liability of directors should be treated differently. That must depend on 
directorial behaviour in relation to the application of the solvency and liquidity test.  
Regarding the liquidity component, a twelve-month period, as introduced under the 2008 Act, 
is appropriate. In addition to the liquidity element, a solvency test bolsters the protection of 
creditors in this field. However, the liquidation preferences of preferred classes of 
shareholders should be included under the solvency component, as a default rule – the 
company’s memorandum of incorporation can (explicitly) change this. I do not think it is 
absolutely necessary to provide for a margin over solvency.  
 
It is clear that the information in correctly prepared accounts can be vital to the functioning of 
the solvency and liquidity test. Nevertheless, the validity of a distribution in the final analysis 
should turn on the actual solvency and liquidity of the company when the distribution is 
made. It should not be possible for directors to escape liability where they know that the 
company has suffered a loss since the time stated in the financial statements.
426
 The test must 
be capable of greater subtlety and accuracy.  
 
The timing of the application of the solvency and liquidity test is something which has also 
been extensively analysed. The test should be satisfied at the time when payment occurs. A 
                                                 
425
 The additional limitations of liability I discussed in chapter 5 are exactly that: limitations on directorial 
liability. They do not go to validity or legality.  
426
 Van der Linde Aspects 534. 
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distribution may not be made unless it appears the company will meet the solvency and 
liquidity test immediately after completing the proposed distribution. When the company 
intends to “make” a “proposed” distribution, a resolution acknowledging the board’s 
satisfaction that the company will meet the test must be adopted. The 120 day rule should 
only be relevant for the acknowledgment resolution: the actual enforceability of the 
distribution should not depend on it.
427
 And there should be a prohibition to the effect that a 
company is not allowed to carry out a distribution where the directors are no longer satisfied 
that the financial limitations are met.  
 
(1) A company satisfies the solvency and liquidity test if -  
 
(a) the assets of the company, as fairly valued, equal or exceed the liabilities of the 
company, as fairly valued; and 
 
(b) considering all reasonably foreseeable financial circumstances of the company at 
that time, it appears that the company will be able to pay its debts as they become 
due in the ordinary course of business for a period of 12 months after the date on 
which the distribution has been carried out. 
 
(2) Unless the memorandum of incorporation of the company provides otherwise, any 
amount that would be required to satisfy the preferential rights upon liquidation of 
shareholders whose preferential rights upon liquidation are superior to the rights 
upon liquidation of those receiving the distribution, should the company be liquidated 
at the time of the distribution, must be regarded as liabilities. 
 
A measure of flexibility and leeway is afforded in the broad concept of “reasonably 
foreseeable financial circumstances”. It is probably formalistic to try exhaustively to pin 
down the numerous means by which the company’s financial position can legitimately be 
determined.  
 
Liability for Distributions in Contravention of the Solvency and Liquidity Test
428
  
 
                                                 
427
 535. 
428
 See chapter 5 above. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
130 
 
Directors have to be held accountable for illegal distributions; corporate law also has to cater 
for the recovery of amounts from shareholders which they received in contravention of the 
financial limitations. Both of these topics should be expressly regulated. The 2008 Act only 
explicitly deals with directorial liability. Moreover, that topic is rather disparately 
regulated.
429
 Many of the problems with distributions encountered in the 2008 Act are 
endemic, and a lot of these problems carry over into issues surrounding liability. It will likely 
be desirable, not only to link directorial liability to insolvency and illiquidity in fact, but also 
to the failure to act reasonably or with due diligence in assessing the financial situation of the 
company. The 2008 Act limits liability to participation at the time of authorisation. Rather, 
liability should lie for implementing a distribution in contravention of the solvency and 
liquidity test. The scope of directorial liability must be determined by the contribution of co-
directors and the recovery from shareholders. It may well be desirable to afford a director a 
direct right of recourse against shareholders where the director has already made good his 
liability to the company.
430
 Should the company afterwards recover the amount from a 
shareholder, that director will have to be reimbursed.
431
 Shareholders should be liable with 
respect to any distribution they receive in contravention of the solvency and liquidity test – 
regardless of their knowledge of the violation or whether they acted in good faith. This 
constitutes a policy choice in favour of creditor protection.
432
 
 
(1) A director of a company is liable to the company for the amount of any distribution 
that exceeds what could have been distributed without violating the solvency and 
liquidity test, to the extent that that amount has not been recovered from 
shareholders, if that director – 
 
(a) was present at the meeting and failed to vote against the adoption of a resolution 
in which the board acknowledged that it has applied the solvency and liquidity 
test and reasonably concluded that the company will satisfy the solvency and 
liquidity test, and it was unreasonable to reach that conclusion; or 
                                                 
429
 The Act again forces one to jump around quite a bit: you will need to consult at least section 46, section 
77(3)(e)(vi), and section 77(4).  
430
 Van der Linde Aspects 545. 
431
 545. 
432
 The company, and ultimately the creditors, will more often than not be the big loser, if this were not so. 
Should a sizeable group of shareholders who receive an illegal distribution in good faith be allowed to keep it, 
the potential liability of a small group of directors will be exorbitant. The probability of the company achieving 
a full recovery will be low. And creditors will in the final analysis bear the brunt of a radical reduction in 
company value. 
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(b) had knowledge that the company would imminently make, or proceed with, a 
distribution in circumstances where it was unreasonable to have remained 
satisfied of the company’s solvency and liquidity, and failed to take reasonable 
steps to stop the making of the distribution.
433
 
 
(2) A shareholder or former shareholder who received a distribution made in 
contravention of the solvency and liquidity test is liable to the company for the 
amount of the distribution.  
 
(3) A director who incurs liability in terms of this section is jointly and severally liable 
with any other directors who are so liable. 
 
(4) A director who incurs liability in terms of this section may institute a claim against a 
shareholder to recover the amount of the distribution on behalf of the company, or to 
the extent that the director has already restored the amount to the company, on behalf 
of that director personally.
434
 
 
It remains to tie things up in the final chapter, in which I will draw some general conclusions 
resulting from the study. As I have already provided conclusions to all the themes I covered 
in each respective chapter, it will not be necessary to do so again at any great length. 
Accordingly, the final chapter takes a more philosophical meta-perspective, and reflects, 
amongst other things, on the nature of this study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
433
 570. 
434
 570. 
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Chapter 7 
Concluding Remarks  
 
I have argued that linguistic communication comprises a rich and complex process in which 
semantics and pragmatic (contextual) elements interact – the full content of an utterance, 
what is ultimately asserted, is necessarily the result, not just of intention or meaning, but 
something richer in which these two elements, loosely speaking, interact, together with 
relevant contextual features.
435
 Accurately tracing this process is difficult in the case of a 
simple and clear conversation between two people. In an institutional setting, involving many 
varied actors, the process is even more complex. But I have also shown that it is not 
impossible.
436
  
 
In the case of a relatively unitary, sensible legislature, with more or less clear policy goals, 
and competent expressive capacities, hard cases cannot be eliminated, but the law would be 
clear for the most part. This model breaks down to some extent when one is dealing with a 
legislature that lacks a coherent policy agenda for the particular legislation and poorly 
expresses its purported aims. It is doubtful whether the legislature has succeeded in drafting 
laws that reflect its aims. Moreover, the underlying philosophy or broad aims, at many 
junctures, seems to be difficult to establish.  
 
I have attempted to evaluate the discernible (underlying) aims and their implementation in the 
2008 Act, in this thesis. It has emerged that various parts of the statutory provisions on 
distributions seem to be unworkable. At times the objectives have not been shrewdly devised; 
at other times the wording has been poorly drafted. I have tried to point out where in the law 
on distributions this is the case. I have attempted to show where taking interpretative liberties 
will suffice; and where it will not. Reforms will no doubt be necessary for the areas in which 
the Act is simply incomprehensible in practice.
437
  
 
In order to gauge legal content, it is the (legal) assertion which must be understood.
438
 And 
pragmatic (contextual) features normally play a role here. It has been difficult to identify 
concrete contenders that could play this role when it comes to corporate finance law in 
                                                 
435
 Particularly see the diagram on page 35; and more generally the whole of chapter 2. 
436
 See chapter 2. 
437
 See chapter 6. 
438
 See 2.3 above. 
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general and the law on distributions in particular; an ad hoc approach to this issue was thus 
most congenial. It has been concluded that the purposes of section 7 of the 2008 Act cannot 
really play a significant role in this regard.
439
 An analysis of the case law has confirmed this. 
The rhetoric of the courts often suggests that the section 7 purposes are instrumental in 
deciding corporate law cases, but in truth their role is tangential at best. The purposes prove 
cosmetic, as the ultimate decision is always reached on different, concrete grounds. That is to 
say, the purpose(s) never play(s) a truly substantive or constitutive role in the court’s 
reasoning.
440
 And this is entirely predictable, given the vagueness of the purposes. It was 
found that, rather than having recourse to vague purposes, viewing the distribution provisions 
in the light of the dynamics of solvency and liquidity proved more fruitful.  
 
The question of the linguistic or communicative limits to creative interpretation, in cases 
where the language of the relevant provisions of the Act is highly problematic, has tentatively 
been answered at the various points in this thesis, where I face up to the interpretative 
problems the Act produces. The concomitant question of the authoritative or legitimacy limits 
to acts of creative interpretation is perhaps more difficult.  
 
In the epistemic task of ascertaining the content of the law, this question is not so pertinent: it 
is the constitutive aspect, in which authoritative judgments co-determine the content of the 
law, which poses the problem. I have been cautious throughout this study in making these 
constitutive judgments. My view is that authoritative law-makers are essentially entrusted 
with this task. In other words, legislatures and judges have the authority to do this.  
 
A legal scholar can advance a constitutive judgment about the law and be very persuasive 
about it; legal philosophy, linguistic philosophy, social theory, economic theory, logic and 
good sense could certainly dictate a cogent judgment of this nature which, in effect, changes 
the law. But the legitimacy of such a judgment is in doubt – it is only really when a judge 
accepts such a constitutive interpretation that its carries legal sway. For this reason, I have not 
been too ambitious in my interpretative proposals. I have mostly seen fit to suggest legislative 
amendments (especially in the areas where the law seems almost unworkable). The extent to 
which this has been found to be necessary under the law on distributions has been rather 
striking.  
                                                 
439
 See especially 3.3 above. 
440
 In particular see 3.3 above. 
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It has also been seen that a rigorous linguistic philosophy framework is able to assist in 
theorising about difficult interpretative problems. Just as the assertive content of an ordinary 
conversation cannot generally be identified with the (semantic) meanings of the sentences 
used (or with the aims of the conversationalists in saying what they do), so the assertive 
content of a legal text (such as the 2008 Act) cannot generally be identified with the 
meanings of the sentences making up the provisions (or with the policy aims motivating 
lawmakers to adopt it).
441
 In the same vein, the content of the 2008 Act cannot without more 
be identified with any normative improvement of what the lawmakers (actually) asserted.
442
  
 
Under the framework which I employed, I have pointed out how certain provisions can best 
be interpreted. But the most significant result is that, given the disjointed nature of the policy 
goals and the unclear mode of expression, substantial reforms will be necessary.
443
 I have 
tried to show, under the Soames model of interpretation that I employ, the limits of the 
interpretative task. Where normative improvements appear materially necessary, the 
interpretative task flirts precariously with daunting fundamental questions of authority and 
legitimacy. 
 
The most fundamental requirement for distributions is the solvency and liquidity requirement. 
It was found that the 2008 Act’s move from a capital maintenance system to a solvency and 
liquidity regime has merit.
444
 An economic analysis was performed to look into this 
requirement and the underlying question of creditor protection.
445
 The general logic of the 
solvency and liquidity approach was found to be sound, as the principle constitutes an 
appropriate mechanism to protect creditors, inter alia, in the making of distributions.  
 
It is the more detailed mechanics, and the overall coherence of the place of solvency and 
liquidity in the law on distributions which leaves much to be desired. In particular the 
relationship between the authorisation of a distribution and the acknowledgment of solvency 
and liquidity is unsatisfactory.
446
 And it was shown how conceptual errors such as this carry 
                                                 
441
 See 2.2 above. 
442
 See 2.2 and 2.3 above. 
443
 See chapter 6. 
444
 See 1.2.1 above. 
445
 See 1.2.2 above. 
446
 See 4.2 above. 
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over into other crucial areas, such as directorial liability.
447
 This is, for instance, an area in 
which substantive legislative revision is recommended.  
 
Recapitulating the conclusions of the preceding chapters more specifically, in chapter 2 I 
explained my approach to legal interpretation. I supplied the necessary conceptual tools and 
distinctions and provided examples of how legal interpretation should be understood (and 
how it should not be understood). This chapter installed a framework for the interpretative 
and legislative suggestions that followed throughout the thesis. It was found that (legal) 
pragmatic tools to aid interpretation are difficult to come by; and it was suggested that 
ambitious interpretative proposals must proceed by using principled criteria and cannot 
remain unsubstantiated. It was concluded that interpretative moves that do not follow self-
evidently from legal content have to be justified. The suggested framework is a general 
interpretative mode, derived from the nature of communication itself and so could – I would 
urge, should – be employed in relation to any piece of legislation or other legal text.448 
 
Chapter 3 was devoted to an analysis of the solvency and liquidity requirement, which forms 
a base requirement of the law on distributions under the new company law system. The 
chapter showed that the solvency and liquidity test constitutes an appropriate limitation on 
distributions to shareholders. The more specific mechanics of its operation, as prescribed by 
the 2008 Act, however, were found to be unsatisfactory. It was concluded that substantive 
revision will be crucial in this area. The conclusion was reached that the purposes of section 7 
do not play a role in the interpretation of solvency and liquidity. I suggested that it would be 
more beneficial to interpret the distribution provisions in view of the concept of solvency and 
liquidity.  
 
Chapter 4 was an attempt to disentangle and clarify the opaque relationship between the 
authorisation of a distribution and the acknowledgement of solvency and liquidity. It was 
clear that this relationship has not been coherently conceived. I noted the interdependence 
between the requirement of solvency and liquidity on the one hand, and the authorisation of 
the distribution and the acknowledgment of solvency and liquidity on the other.  
 
                                                 
447
 See chapter 5. 
448
 See especially 2.3. 
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Chapter 5 dealt with the question of liability for unlawful distributions. It was concluded that 
the problems elucidated in the preceding chapter have a knock-on effect on the question of 
liability for unlawful distributions. The interdependence and interplay between solvency and 
liquidity, the requirements for distributions, and the liability of directors was established. It 
was suggested that efficiency, good sense, and coherence on rare occasions require normative 
improvements to the text of the 2008 Act. 
 
Chapter 6 briefly sets out some recommended provisions that could remedy the defects 
highlighted in the previous chapters. This comprised the essentially prescriptive chapter 
where positive reforms proposals were advanced. In addition to piecemeal interpretative 
suggestions on the back of the Soames interpretation theory, therefore, I have also adduced 
draft proposals for reform, in order to suggest more fruitful and coherent approaches to future 
regulation on the issue. The provisions I recommend are not meant to be adopted verbatim; 
but they can serve as a springboard for future reform in this area.
449
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
449
 As I have said, the numbering and cross-referencing issue makes this impossible, lest a whole new Act is 
introduced (and I do not see this happening in the near future). At best, then, the provisions can serve as a 
template for future reform.   
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